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Abstract 
 
 
However much we appreciate the enormous scientific contribution by Professor 
Ronald Inglehart, who initiated the international data collection of the World 
Values Survey, our re-analysis of the very World Values Survey data [“roll-outs” 
of the World Values Survey data wvs1981_2008_v20090914.sav] brought us to 
question Inglehart’s theories, with which he and his associates interpret the mass 
of the World Values Survey data. Their theoretical approach does not use a 
sufficiently number of hard-core indicators how global publics view central 
issues of economic policy, and their theories overemphasize a secularistic view 
of the religious phenomenon in modern society. Their theories predict the 
gradual waning of the religious phenomena in parallel with the increase of 
human security, and even cherish at times the tendencies brought about by such 
a waning of the religious element in advanced democracies. Inglehart spells 
them out: higher levels of tolerance for abortion, divorce, homosexuality; the 
erosion of parental authority, the decrease of the importance of family life et 
cetera. Is that really something to cherish? 
 
Today, societal and economic development is discontinuous; regional centers of 
the world economy shift at an enormous speed; and above all, religion and 
family values can be an important assett in the stability of capitalist 
development. Economic growth inexorably shifts away from the North Atlantic 
arena towards new centers of gravitation of the world economy. Alberto 
Alesina’s and Paola Giuliano’s new maps of global values (Alesina and 
Giuliano, 2013) present a real break with the hitherto existing secularistic 
consensus of global value research. Their maps of family ties, respect for parents 
et cetera coincide with the global map of economic growth today.  
 
Leading representatives of the global economics profession now start to take up 
the challenge to interpret the mass of the data from the World Values Survey 
project on their own. The essay by Barro and McCleary (2003) was an important 
beginning and a good example of how today economic research uses data from 
the World Values Survey project to study the relationship between religion, 
denominations and economic growth.  
 
Alesina (2013); Alesina and Angeletos (2005); Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 
(2007); Alesina and Guiliano (2010, 2011, 2013); Alesina, Cozzi and Mantovan 
(2012); and Alesina, di Tella, and MacCulloch (2004) all show how the 
economic discipline can gain hard-core, quantitative and valuable insights from 
comparative knowledge about such phenomena as generalized trust and social 
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capital, individualism, family ties, morality, attitudes toward work and 
perception of poverty, and religious practice for economic processes.  
 
In our re-analysis, we use the advanced statistical multivariate analysis 
technique of the Promax factor analysis, which allows for correlations between 
factors. It is available to the global public via the IBM-SPSS statistical package 
XXI. We eliminated missing values by listwise delition.  
 
In our first re-analysis, there were 92289 interview partners from around the 
globe with complete data for all the 30 variables of our research design. Our 
main model explains 47.89% of the total variance of all the 30 variables. We 
highlight the relationships between the original 30 variables and the newly 
derived factor analytical dimensions: 
 
a) economic permissiveness 
b) traditional religion 
c) racism 
d) higher education for the younger generation (education gap between the 
generations) 
e) distrust of the army and the press 
f) authoritarian character 
g) tolerance and respect 
h) the 'ego' company (i. e. the rejection of obedience and unselfishness as 
values in education) 
i) [predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy 
 
We also look at the trajectory of global society by analyzing the factor scores 
along the path of the Human Development Indicator of the UNDP (“human 
security indicator”, also used by Inglehart and his associates). 
 
 Economic permissiveness clearly captures the dimension of lawlessness, 
moral-ethical decay and the shadow economy, so prominent in 
contemporary economic theory of growth. In statistical terms, it is the 
most important of all the resulting factors. 
 
 Traditional religion is linked in a very complex way to the absence of 
economic permissiveness. We also look at the exceptional performers 
(“residuals”) which best avoided economic permissiveness on each stage 
of secularization. 
 
We also present Chropleth maps of human values across the globe, and show the 
regional implications of our analysis. 
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Our global value development index combines law-abiding and social capital, 
avoiding racism; trust of the army and the press; no authoritarian character; a 
high degree of tolerance and respect + post-materialism; and a female 
acceptance of the market economy and democracy. The weight, given to each 
factor, corresponds to the Eigen values listed in this work. Our country results 
show that the five best ranked countries of our entire globe are all western 
democracies with a solid historical anchoring of their societies in the traditions 
of the Enlightenment – Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, New Zealand, and 
Australia. But we already find among the next five countries Canada, the two 
developing countries Vietnam and Tanzania, and the EU-member countries Italy 
(predominantly Roman Catholic, with a long history of liberal Catholicism since 
the Second Vatican Council) and Finland (predominantly Protestant). Our global 
value development index ranks the predominantly Muslim nation of Morocco 
twelfth – just behind the United States of America – and still ahead the Latin 
American democracy Uruguay and the EU-country Germany, to be followed by 
Bosnia and Indonesia.  
 
While in general terms our analysis is quite optimistic about the civil society 
foundations for a stable democracy for several Muslim countries, including 
Morocco, Bosnia, Indonesia, Turkey and Jordan, our analysis is fairly 
pessimistic for the former communist countries and successor states of the 
former Soviet Union, predominantly Muslim and non-Muslim alike.  
 
In a second factor analysis, we re-analyze the question of Islam and feminism, 
based on an analysis of all respondents from the World Values Survey. The 
Muslim population covered in this survey comprises representatives of 62.6% of 
the Muslim population of our globe. 
 
The data were based on the following variables: 
 
*  Age 
*  Education level (recoded) 
*  Highest educational level attained 
*  How important is God in your life 
*  How often do you attend religious services (never?) 
*  Important child qualities: religious faith 
*  Jobs scarce: Men should have more right to a job than women (reject) 
*  Sex (Gender) 
*  University is more important for a boy than for a girl (reject) 
*  Acceptancy of woman as a single parent 
 
The respondents (all denominations) comprised n = 173231 representative 
global citizens in 83 countries and territories. After Promax factor analysis, three 
factors explained 53.8% of total variance. While the distance to religious 
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practice is explained to some 4% by the education level (correlation between the 
two factors is 0.192), one can say with certainty that there is no real sharp 
contradiction between religion and feminism on a global scale. And while 
gender determines feminist convictions, contained in our analysis to some 40%, 
it is also evident that feminist convictions are not only held by women, but also 
increasingly by enlightened men, non-Muslims and Muslims alike. Interestingly 
enough, our data also show that people supporting typical feminist contentions, 
like female access to tertiary education and jobs even at a time of crisis (Factor 
3), are not necessarily too strongly in support of the acceptancy of women as a 
single parent (factor loading 0.352, i. e. only 12.39% of variance explained). 
Single parenthood is a form of household organization very common now in 
Western countries: the argument is that marriage is an outdated institution et 
cetera. Support for single parenthood by women is rather an expression of the 
distance towards religion around the globe (factor loading of 0.431, i. e. 18.58% 
of variance explained). 
 
Data emerging from the World Values Survey in the first decade of the 2000s 
also seem to suggest that the precariousness, which more and more characterizes 
the economies of leading Western countries leads toward an implosion of what 
Inglehart and his sociological school of thought interpreted as “self-expression 
values”. Our analysis of the time series element in the World Values Survey data 
shows that indeed, global value change seems to correspond to various ups and 
downs. To this end, we calculated which countries – in descending order – had 
very high increases or decreases in non-traditional values over preceding World 
Values Survey surveys from the original WVS website Inglehart’s own data 
(http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_
54). The very idea that self-expression values in the West are imploding, while 
in other regions of the world they are rising, is a challenge to existing value 
theories.  
 
The world, described by Inglehart and Baker, 2000, where in advanced 
industrial societies people pay large sums of money and travel long distances to 
experience exotic cultures no longer seems to exist for the “1.000 Euro” 
generation born after 1975, which experiences more and more job insecurity and 
hardly finds full-time tenured work opportunities, let alone the financial means 
to travel to long-distant countries. No wonder then that “self-expression” is 
dramatically declining in the West. 
 
We also highlight the fact that the latest wave of World Values Survey data, 
wave 6, from 2010 - 2014, released in May 2014 contains an item which directly 
asked 74,044 respondents in 52 countries whether they think that self-expression 
is an important value for child education. The correlation between these data and 
Inglehart’s self-expression index is negative and the R^2 between the two 
variables is almost 20%. 
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Among the twenty countries of our globe with a strong resilience of the self-
expression tendencies, there is a greater number of Muslim countries (i.e. 
members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) among them. Let us think 
for an instance Inglehart’s theory to its end: according to the World Values 
Survey data, among the twenty superstars of a resilient trend towards self-
expression we find Jordan; Pakistan; Bangladesh; Nigeria; Turkey; Algeria; 
Egypt; and Uganda! 
 
The most notable implosions or slow developments of self-expression – 
independent from the secularization process – had to be noted by contrast in 
western democracies. The resilience of self-expression is explaining more than 
1/5 of economic growth in the world system. Muslim countries are among the 
trend leaders in both directions, i.e. the resilience of self expression, and 
economic growth during the crisis years. Our Choropleth maps in this part of our 
article underline our contentions. Even a pure Inglehartian world values analysis 
would have to come to the conclusion that the value basis of Western society is 
eroding. 
 
So while the methodology of the two approaches – Inglehart’s and our own – is 
different, the same conclusions can be drawn from it.  
 
With all the extensions of the World Values Survey project over the last decades, 
both in terms of geography as well as the completeness of the data, the Inglehart 
world map of global values recedes into the memory about a world order, which 
no longer exists and which was severely shattered in its foundations by the 
tsunami of the global economic crisis of 2008. As we try to show in this article, 
it was also shattered by the long shadows of the internal corrosion, which social 
decay and the loss of values brought about long before the 2008 crisis hit the 
North Atlantic arena.  
 
In addition, we present a still more conclusive proof of the interrelationship 
between the different types of permissiveness and the weight these factors have 
in relationship to the other variables contained in the World Values Survey data. 
Based on our analysis of the complete available data based on 28 items from the 
World Values Survey from 70 countries of the world, including the OIC 
(Organization of Islamic Cooperation) member countries Albania; Azerbaijan; 
Bangladesh; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Burkina Faso; Indonesia; Jordan; 
Kyrgyzstan; Mali; Nigeria; Turkey; and Uganda we attempt to show the 
interrelationships between permissiveness, the shadow economy, educational 
values, and other socio-political variables, like fundamental positions on the 
market economy and democracy. 
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The nine factors to be extracted from the data for more than 90.000 
representative respondents in 70 countries are the following: 
 
• moral (sexual) permissiveness (‘Permissiveness 1’) 
• acceptancy of the shadow economy(‘Permissiveness 2’) 
• distance from religion (‘Permissiveness 3’) 
• educational values: independence and imagination 
• distance to market economy values 
• education values: responsibility and tolerance 
• educational values: determination and perseverance and being against 
saving 
• right wing acceptance of inequality 
• educational values: favoring unselfishness, rejecting hard work 
 
Contrary to Inglehart’s expectations about a positive role of the low importance 
given to religion in society, and divorce and abortion being fully accepted, it 
emerges that the two factors of permissiveness (permissive family values and 
the loss of hard-core Max Weberian economic values) are closely interrelated 
with one another and with the loss of religious values.  
 
Table 5.3 of our article shows the factor loadings for each of the variables 
analyzed here. The variables with a high importance for “effective democracy”, 
i. e. tolerance and respect for other people, rejection or acceptance of corruption, 
and the assessment of democracy as such and vis-à-vis military rule, are 
highlighted in our Table 5.3. Nowhere there is a notable negative or positive 
factor analytical loading of beyond 0. 333 (>10% of variance explained) 
confirming that religious people are antidemocratic, right-wing, and pro or anti-
market. 
 
In addition, the structure of the factor loadings even suggests the following: 
 
a) distance from religion is even a motive to reject a democratic political system 
 
b) moral/sexual permissiveness goes hand in hand with economic and social 
decay 
 
Table 5.4 shows the correlations between the promax factors, extracted from the 
correlation matrix between the variables of our model. Table 5.5 and Maps 5.1 
to 5.9 show the country values for our analysis (“factor scores”) as well as the 
cascades of moral and social decay in the Western countries and also the 
evidence for the Muslim countries with available data. Graph 5.5 finally 
summarizes the pessimistic research findings, which rather support the views of 
Barro and Schumpeter against the secularistic and permissive logic, proposed by 
Inglehart. 
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In Table 5.6 we provide our readers with clear-cut Pearson-Bravais correlation 
coefficients between the data presented by Hofstede and Inglehart and the factor 
scores from our own analytical dimensions, presented in this work on the bases 
of promax factor analysis with individual data from up to more than 80 
countries. Table 5.7 shows the Pearson-Bravais correlations between the Ralston 
et al. dimensions and our results. Ralston et al. is an application of the Schwartz 
categories to global business people. There was an enormous reception of the 
works of Shalom Schwartz, an Israeli psychologist and Professor at the Hebrew 
University in Jerusalem especially in the expanding field of international 
business studies. Our quantification of Schwartz’s theory relies exclusively on 
Ralston et al. The reason is simple: Ralston et al., 2011 – somewhat in the 
tradition of Hofstede - use samples, based on business people (Hofstede: one 
company, IBM; Ralston et al., 2011: business people in general). Thus his 
sampling is restricted to a certain segment of society, while Schwartz’s 
categories are much more encompassing. To provide more encompassing tests 
of Schwartz’s theory in the framework of theories of overall global value change 
would be the theme for another essay, and is beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
In Chapter 12 we analyze correlations and also show the relationships of the 
Ralston et al. business people data with our own dimensions. As with Hofstede 
and the GLOBE Project, influenced by Hofstede, there is, as we already 
mentioned, a problem of limited country samples in Ralston et al., 2011. To 
understand the Ralston et al. framework, one has to emphasize that Schwartz 
himself presented analyses of data from up to 73 countries, validating seven 
basic cultural orientations and the structure of interrelations among them: West 
European, English-speaking, Latin American, East European, and South Asian, 
Confucian influenced, and African and Middle Eastern. 
 
His seven dimensions are  
 
1. Embeddedness 
2. Hierarchy 
3. Mastery 
4. Affective Autonomy 
5. Intellectual Autonomy 
6. Egalitarianism 
7. Harmony 
 
In many ways, we can show that Hofstede’s Power Distance, Individualism 
versus Collectivism, Long-Term Orientation, and Indulgence versus Restraint 
very well correspond to our own factor analyses. The same happens with 
Inglehart’s main dimensions, traditional versus secular, and survival versus self-
expression, which we can well interpret in our own system. In all cases, 
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however, we could avoid some of the problematic assumptions, still inherent in 
the research by Hofstede and Inglehart.  
 
Table 5.8 shows the correlations of the country scores from Ralston et al.’ work 
with standard socio-economic indicators. Interestingly enough, Muslim 
population shares and OIC membership present high correlations with the 
Ralston et al. factors “Embeddedness”, “Hierarchy” and “Mastery”.  
 
We then debate current contentious political cleavages, especially in Europe in 
the light of the empirics, as suggested by the World Values Survey. These days, 
in the leading world newspapers we read stories which tell us a lot about the 
conflicts about global values in countries like Europe today. Is prostitution 
justifiable? Is homosexuality justifiable? The French socialists, it seems, for 
example seem to think that one is not, and the other is. President Hollande and 
his administration put considerable political energy into legalizing homosexual 
marriages and prohibiting prostitution. But global citizens hold another view, 
and there is a high positive correlation of 0.632 between the two items in the 
World Values Survey, based on 218877 individuals from around the globe. I.e. 
people in favor of the complete acceptability of homosexuality will also be in 
favor of the complete acceptability of prostitution and vice versa.  
 
Graph 5.1 highlights the politically, socially and ethically robust and globally 
applicable message of our article on the drivers of “effective democracy”: a 
sound gender political agenda, ending the political discrimination of women, 
and economic freedom will be conducive to “effective democracy”. 
Nevertheless the path towards “effective democracy” will be one of ups and 
downs, and especially in developing countries, there will be also certain limits 
for a too rapid economic liberalization in terms of “effective democracy”. 
 
As the manuscript to this article was about to be finished, the new data of the 
World Values Survey, 2010-2014 were released, containing yet another 
enormous wealth of new data, including on the Muslim world. We have chosen 
to concentrate on two phenomena, which received a large attention on the pages 
of this article – tolerance and democracy.  
 
In Table 5.12 we calculate a simple UNDP Human Development Index type of 
Index of Tolerance, minimizing the rejection of neighbors with the following 
characteristics among the publics of the above mentioned countries of wave 6 of 
the World Values Survey: 
 
 People who speak a different language 
 People of a different religion 
 Immigrants/foreign workers 
 People of a different race 
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According to the World Values Survey data, the most tolerant nation on earth 
today is Uruguay, followed by Sweden; New Zealand; Spain; Trinidad and 
Tobago; Poland; Rwanda; Colombia; Chile and Australia. 
 
Uzbekistan, Morocco and Kazakhstan are nowadays ahead of Germany; and 
Pakistan, Qatar and Tunisia are more tolerant than the EU-member country 
Romania. Some Muslim countries such as Turkey (which is still ahead of the 
OECD-member country South Korea), have still a poor performance. 
 
Table 5.13 and Maps 5.9 to 5.12 list the World Values Survey results for the 
average importance given by the global publics to democracy and the standard 
deviation of this indicator. Where the standard deviation is low, opinions on 
democracy – either way – are undivided, while high standard deviations indicate 
that the publics are – often bitterly – divided on the issue of democracy.  
 
Countries with an above than average importance assigned to democracy, and 
very high internal divisions on this issue are Tunisia; Mexico; Romania; 
Armenia and Yemen. While there is a general consensus that democracy is 
important, there are important dissenting voices. Nostalgia for past more 
authoritarian patterns of government can go hand in hand with economic 
discontent with present conditions. Countries with an above than average 
importance assigned to democracy, and very low internal divisions on this issue 
are the Netherlands; Egypt; Sweden; Turkey; and Cyprus. For anyone, 
attempting to turn back the clocks of history in such countries could result to be 
a very costly error. The recent introduction of internet censorship in Turkey 
would be just one example showing the relevance of this hypothesis. 
 
Countries with still a below than average importance assigned to democracy, but 
already very high internal divisions on the issue are Libya; Philippines; Qatar; 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories; and Russia. In these countries and 
territories, debates on the issue of democracy will surge, one way or the other. 
While the average importance assigned to democracy is still lower than the 
world average, the divisions on the issue are already very high, and unforeseen 
events could trigger a popular movement for more participation and democracy. 
Finally, countries with a below than average importance assigned to democracy, 
and very low internal divisions on this issue are Singapore; Rwanda; South 
Korea; Estonia; and Lebanon. One might expect that the current stagnation in 
the democratic development of the country will continue: publics don’t assign a 
great importance to democracy, and they are hardly divided on this issue.  
 
Table 5.13 and our maps also have another, more immediate and direct 
implication: the dire state of the support of democracy in many Western 
countries, currently hit by the economic crisis and austerity packages, and the 
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surge of democracy in the Muslim world and the Arab world in particular. That 
Egypt is ahead of Germany, Uzbekistan ahead of the EU-members Poland and 
Spain, and a number of other Arab and Muslim countries in general ahead of the 
United States; and Qatar ahead of the EU-member Estonia with justification 
could be celebrated by the Arab and Muslim readership of this article.  
 
 
JEL Classification: A13; Z12; P48; O017; N3 
 
 
Keywords: Relation of Economics to Social Values; religion; other Economic 
Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights, Formal and 
Informal Sectors, Shadow Economy, Institutional Arrangements; Labor and 
Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, 
Religion, and Philanthropy 
 
 
 12 
 
 
Background 
 
 
Societal and economic development is discontinuous; regional centers of the 
world economy shift at an enormous speed; and above all, religion and family 
values can be an important assett in the stability of capitalist development. 
Economic growth inexorably shifts away from the North Atlantic arena towards 
new centers of gravitation of the world economy. Alberto Alesina’s and Paola 
Giuliano’s new maps of global values (Alesina and Giuliano, 2013) present a 
real break with the hitherto existing secularistic consensus of global value 
research. Their maps of family ties, respect for parents et cetera. 
1
 coincide with 
the global map of economic growth today. 
                                                 
1
 Pages 45 ff in Alesina and Giuliano, 2013, available at 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/alesina/publications and World Bank data, available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries?display=map We 
recommend to our readers to carefully look at Alesina’s and Giuliano’s maps, one by one, and 
then to compare these maps with the freely available World Bank maps of global economic 
growth. The end result will always be the same: economic growth in the world shifts to 
regions, where “capitalist family values” are strong: 
 
 
 
economic growth, 2009-2013, in % per year 
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In doing so, we might add that we are researching in good company. Leading 
representatives of the global economics profession now start to take up the 
challenge to interpret the mass of the data from the World Values Survey project 
on their own. The essay by Barro and McCleary (2003) was an important 
beginning and a good example of how today economic research uses data from 
the World Values Survey project to study the relationship between religion, 
denominations and economic growth.  
 
Alesina (2013); Alesina and Angeletos (2005); Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 
(2007); Alesina and Guiliano (2010, 2011, 2013); Alesina, Cozzi and Mantovan 
(2012); and Alesina, di Tella, and MacCulloch (2004) all show how the 
economic discipline can gain hard-core, quantitative and valuable insights from 
comparative knowledge about such phenomena as generalized trust and social 
capital, individualism, family ties, morality, attitudes toward work and 
perception of poverty, and religious practice for economic processes.  
 
In our article, we will attempt to define “cultures” on a global scale largely 
following Alesina and Guiliano (2013). Although some of our preferred World 
Values Survey indicators are different from those used by Alesina and Guiliano 
(2013), there is sufficient resemblance between the two approaches, and also 
there is a high correspondence between their choropleth geographical maps of 
global values and our own maps.  
 
Leaving behind the omnipresent logic of the confrontation between traditional 
vs. secular-rational values and survival vs. self-expression values, which is so 
common for the Inglehart paradigm of global values, opens the way to consider 
such phenomena as the shadow economy.  
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We are above all interested in such phenomena as attitudes on competition and 
free markets, on social expenditures, and on bribery and corruption. Without 
question, bribery and corruption are one of the main challenges for international 
business studies nowadays. 
 
From such diverse economic theories as Alesina, Barro and Schumpeter, we re-
discover the importance of the data on generalized trust and social capital, 
family ties, morality, attitudes toward work and religious practice. Democratic 
and liberal values can correspond to a civilization, characterized by an 
enlightened religion, in the West and in the Muslim world alike.  
 
In many ways, our investigation puts the large secularistic scientific consensus 
on the issues under consideration on its head.  
 
We show that the world economic rise of the global South, among them the 
BRICS countries and the countries of the Arab Gulf, is no coincidence: 
economic growth in the post-crisis period from 2008 onwards is highly and 
positively correlated with family values. 
 
All too often, the loss of religion and the rise of the shadow economy go hand in 
hand, including in leading Western countries. The decay of family values, which 
are so deeply enshrined in the religious commandments of Judaism, Christianity 
and Islam, and which are also basic to the other global religious civilizations, 
goes hand in hand with the decay of economic and social values. 
 
In our study, we used the following variables to arrive at our factor analytical 
models.  
 
 
World Values Survey variable 
Age 
Competition good or harmful (harmful) 
Confidence: Armed Forces 
Confidence: The Press 
Education level (recoded) 
Highest educational level attained 
How important is God in your life 
How often do you attend religious services (never) 
Immigrant policy (prevent people from coming) 
Important child qualities: determination and perseverance 
Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility 
Important child qualities: hard work 
Important child qualities: imagination 
Important child qualities: independence 
Important child qualities: obedience 
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Important child qualities: religious faith 
Important child qualities: thrift, and saving money and things 
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people 
Important child qualities: unselfishness 
Income equality (large differences needed) 
Jobs scarce: Men should have more right to a job than women 
(reject) 
Justifiable: abortion 
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport 
Justifiable: cheating on taxes 
Justifiable: claiming government benefits even if one is not entitled 
to them 
Justifiable: divorce 
Justifiable: euthanasia 
Justifiable: homosexuality 
Justifiable: prostitution 
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 
Justifiable: suicide 
Most people can be trusted [highest numerical value: you just can’t 
be too careful]) 
Neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers 
Neighbors: People of a different race 
Political system: Having a democratic political system (reject) 
Political system: Having the army rule (very bad) 
Private vs. state ownership of business (state) 
Satisfaction with your life 
Self-positioning in political scale (right wing) 
Sex (Gender) [in multivariate analysis: female] (1=male; 2=female) 
University is more important for a boy than for a girl 
Woman as a single parent 
 
 
Already the great Harvard economist Joseph Alois Schumpeter (8 February 
1883 – 8 January 1950) put the decline of family values at the center of his 
theory about the decline of the capitalist order. Today, Barro goes even further: 
religion does affect economic outcomes mainly by fostering religious beliefs 
that influence individual traits such as thrift, work ethic, and honesty. Barro’s 
perspective is largely confirmed in this study.  
 
For Inglehart, phenomena as bribery, corruption, tax evasion, cheating the state 
to get government benefits for which one wouldn’t be entitled practically even 
do not exist, while the rich data base of the World Values Survey itself provides 
ample evidence about these phenomena. Starting with Schumpeter and his 
hypothesis about the waning of family values and the capitalist family enterprise 
as the basis of the crisis of capitalism, we re-discover the positive contribution 
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of religion for society instead of cherishing its decline in the name of “self-
expression”. 
 
In contrast to the research which still characterizes the reflexion on World 
Values Survey data in current social sciences, we think that the time has come to 
use techniques which properly allow for stronger relations between the “factors” 
underlying the correlations between the variables. We think that the Promax 
Factor Analysis is such an advanced analytical technique, and we use it 
throughout this article. Global value research would also be unthinkable today 
without factor analytical index construction. Our research results and the 
statistical foundations presented here are an invitation for decision makers and 
researchers to start for themselves developing indices based on the freely 
available World Values Survey data. All they need are competent statisticians, 
modern statistical software and the firm intention and will to develop projects 
facilitating the path towards a more mature and encompassing democracy – 
everywhere around the globe. 
 
The choice of the factor analytical method used to reduce the number of 
variables of the World Values Survey project to its unerlying dimensions is not 
just a matter for the specialist but it also has many different consequences. 
Inglehart and most other researchers rely on standard linear factor analysis, 
which is basically a statistical methodology already developed before the 
Second World War. 
 
It is surprising that the massive items available from the World Values Survey 
data base on the shadow economy and core economic values have not yet been 
hitherto used to a sufficient degree in the dominant theory construction of 
empirical social science. 
 
In a common approach, Schneider (2005) defines the shadow economy to 
include all market-based legal production of goods and services that are 
deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following reasons: (i) to 
avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes, (ii) to avoid payment of 
social security contributions, (iii) to avoid having to meet certain legal labor 
market standards, and (iv) to avoid complying with certain administrative 
procedures. However, this definition does not include economic activities that 
are illegal and fit the characteristics of classical crime, as well as the informal 
household economy or tax evasion. 
 
Schneider (2005), in the context of industrialized and transition economies, 
mentions that the shadow economy is expected to influence the tax system and 
its structure, the efficiency of resource allocation between sectors, and the 
official economy in a dynamic sense. 
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Schneider (2005) concludes that for all countries investigated, the shadow 
economy as share of GDP has reached a remarkably large size (Africa 33.9-
41.2; Americas 34.2-41.5; Asia 20.9-26.3; Transition countries 31.5-37.9 and 
highly developed OECD countries 13.2-16.8). The average percentage shares of 
GDP in all cases are increasing over time. The author demonstrates empirically 
a strong interaction of the shadow economy with government policies and with 
the official economy. He draws three further conclusions. First, an increasing 
burden of taxation and social security payments, combined with rising state 
regulatory activities, are the major driving forces underlying the size and growth 
of the shadow economy. Second, the shadow economy has a statistically 
significant and quantitatively important influence on the growth of the official 
economy. Increases in the shadow economy have a negative effect on the 
official growth in a developing country, but a positive effect in the developed 
industrialized and transition countries. People engage in shadow economic 
activity because of government actions, most notably high levels of taxation and 
regulation. 
 
Although World Values Survey (WVS) data are used by the economics 
profession in their attempt to estimate the drivers of the shadow economy, 
contemporary sociological WVS research has failed hitherto to integrate the 
shadow economy into general theories of values and value change. 
 
The data base of the World Values Survey indeed contains very precise items in 
connection with a neo-liberal interpretation of economic processes, like the 
acceptancy or rejection of free competition, or various items on the acceptability 
or desirability of state intervention. In contrast to hitherto published research, we 
try to integrate these elements into the core-model of global value change. For 
this good reason, we present here an extensive survey how contemporary 
economic theory already integrates economic freedom in its empirical and 
theoretical research. Our survey is intended to be an overview especially for 
readers who are more familiar with other disciplines of the social sciences and 
not economics. In the presentation, we use a non-mathematical language. 
 
Muslim societies sometimes already perform very well on indices of economic 
freedom, irrespective of their development level. As definded by the well-known 
think tank “Heritage Foundation” (http://www.heritage.org/index/book/chapter-
5) economic freedom is the condition in which individuals can act with 
maximum autonomy and minimum obstruction in the pursuit of their economic 
livelihood and prosperity. As Hayek observed, to be controlled in our economic 
pursuits would mean to be controlled in everything. 
  
For the Heritage Foundation, a comprehensive view of economic freedom 
encompasses all liberties and rights of production, distribution, or consumption 
of goods and services. 
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The Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom takes a broad and 
comprehensive view of country performance, measuring 10 separate areas of 
economic freedom. Each economic freedom is individually scored on a scale of 
0 to 100. A country’s overall economic freedom score is a simple average of its 
scores on the 10 individual freedoms. The 10 economic freedoms are grouped 
into four broad categories: 
 
• Rule of law (property rights, freedom from corruption); 
• Government size (fiscal freedom, government spending); 
• Regulatory efficiency (business freedom, labor freedom, monetary 
freedom); and 
• Market openness (trade freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom). 
 
The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union led to creation of 15 new states and a 
transition from centrally planned economies to market economies for 25 states 
for the period from 1998 to 2005. These countries experienced heterogeneous 
growth and development. Pääkkönen (2010) reviewed the political economy of 
economic growth in the post-communist economies transition to free markets. 
The focus is on the role of economic policy and institutions in the transition 
process. The author tested the hypothesis that better institutions, measured in 
terms of economic freedom, contributed to growth. The empirical results 
confirm this hypothesis. Increased government consumption has a negative 
effect on growth suggesting the presence of wasteful spending and hindrance to 
growth. 
 
Economic research provides very important insights into the conditions of 
“effective democracy”, which cannot depend – as contemporary World Values 
Survey research often contends – on “self expression” values alone. In 
accordance with World Values Survey research, “effective democracy” is an 
indicator, which combines performance in terms of what Western scholarship 
understands by ‘human rights’ and the rule of law (concept of the World Bank). 
 
Also, all the dimensions, which were shown to be relevant in our own empirical 
value research already surfaced in prior economic research, like economic 
permissiveness, which most strongly affects large parts of Latin America 
(except Venezuela, Peru, and the countries of the Southern Cone), some but not 
all nations of Africa, most of the former USSR and some other countries of East 
Central and Southeastern Europe, Thailand and the Philippines, as one of the 
main stumbling blocks against effective democracy. 
 
Corruption is widespread in particular among developing countries. A 
precondition for achieving growth and reducing poverty is to deal with 
corruption in an effective way. This view is supported by a growing literature, 
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which we review in this Chapter. Potentially effective instruments in rooting out 
corruption are democratic elections and press freedom.  
 
The major existing sociological theories about global values do not focus as yet 
sufficiently on these phenomena: Hofstede, Schwartz/Davidov and Inglehart, the 
three major theoretical approaches guiding the discipline of value research 
today.  
 
 
1. The sociological and psychological theories of 
global values  
 
 
To our great surprise we find out that the major existing sociological and 
psychological theories about global values do not even talk about these 
phenomena: they as yet do not exist for global value research in the traditions of 
Hofstede, Schwartz/Davidov and Inglehart, the three major theoretical 
approaches guiding the discipline.  
 
So, among the most prominent competing international attempts to define and 
measure the development of human values, we should specify the current three 
major approaches dominating international social science:  
 
 Hofstede’s theory of global values 
 the Schwartz/Davidov approach 
 Inglehart’s and his associates’ studies of world values  
 
First we mention Geert Hofstede. This Dutch psychologist and his associates 
really stood at the beginning of comparative international value research. 
Initially, they based their empirical studies on global culture on the statistical 
analysis of the staff of the single US transnational enterprise IBM in 40 different 
countries around the world (see also Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede and Minkov, 
2010; Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, 2010; Minkov and Hofstede, 2011, 
2013). The background to all this was very clear: with IBM production taking 
place in more and more countries around the globe, IBM needed to know more 
about the culturally determined mindsets of its employees.  
 
 
1. 1. Geert Hofstede 
 
 
According to Hofstede and his school, there are four to six basic clusters of 
international value systems, and they are all defined along the scales of how 
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different national societies handle ways of coping with inequality, ways of 
coping with uncertainty, the relationship of the individual with her or his 
primary group, and the emotional implications of having been born as a 
girl or as a boy. Hofstede defines these dimensions of national culture as  
 
 Power Distance 
 Individualism vs. Collectivism 
 Masculinity versus Femininity 
 Uncertainty Avoidance Index 
 Long-Term Orientation 
 Indulgence versus Restraint 
 
Between 1990 and 2002, Hofstede replicated these dimensions in six other 
cross-national studies on very different populations from consumers to airline 
pilots, covering between 14 and 28 countries. In the 2010 third edition of his 
book ‘Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind’, scores on the 
dimensions are listed for 76 countries. 
2
 
 
Power distance, according to Hofstede, is the extent to which the less powerful 
members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect 
that power is distributed unequally. This represents inequality (more versus 
less), but it is defined from below, not from above. ‘It suggests that a society's 
level of inequality is endorsed by the followers as much as by the leaders.’  
 
Uncertainty avoidance deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty and 
ambiguity. It indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel 
either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. Unstructured 
situations are novel, unknown, surprising, and are different from the usual. 
3
 
Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations 
by strict laws and rules, safety and security measures, and on the philosophical 
and religious level they try to avoid uncertainty by a belief in absolute 
Truth. According to Hofstede and his associates,  
 
“[…] People in uncertainty avoiding countries are also more emotional, and 
motivated by inner nervous energy. The opposite type, uncertainty accepting 
cultures, are more tolerant of opinions different from what they are used to; they 
try to have as few rules as possible, and on the philosophical and religious level 
they are relativist and allow many currents to flow side by side. People within 
these cultures are more phlegmatic and contemplative, and not expected by their 
environment to express emotions.” 4 
                                                 
2
 http: //www. geerthofstede. nl/dimensions-of-national-cultures  
3
 http: //www. geerthofstede. nl/dimensions-of-national-cultures  
4
 http: //www. geerthofstede. nl/dimensions-of-national-cultures  
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Individualism on the one side, versus its opposite, collectivism is the degree to 
which individuals are integrated into groups. On the individualist side we find 
societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to 
look after her/himself and her/his immediate family:  
 
“On the collectivist side, we find societies in which people from birth onwards 
are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, often extended families (with 
uncles, aunts and grandparents) which continue protecting them in exchange for 
unquestioning loyalty. The word collectivism in this sense has no political 
meaning: it refers to the group, not to the state.”5 
 
Masculinity versus its opposite, femininity is defined by the Hofstede School 
as referring to the distribution of emotional roles between the genders. 
According to Hofstede’s system this is another fundamental issue for any 
society to which a range of solutions are found. 
6
 For Hofstede, female values 
around the globe differ less than male values from country to country.  
 
With the passage of time, Hofstede and his associates added a fifth dimension 
to their value studies, called the long-term orientation (LTO). In part, this 
dimension is based on data from the ‘World Values Survey’ project. According 
to this interpretation, long-term oriented societies ‘foster pragmatic virtues 
oriented towards future rewards, in particular saving, persistence, and 
adapting to changing circumstances. Short-term oriented societies foster 
virtues related to the past and present such as national pride, respect for 
tradition, preservation of "face", and fulfilling social obligations. ’7 
 
In this context, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) also provided a principal 
components analysis of their own of the different items from the World Values 
Survey on such items as thrift and perseverance, religious faith, efforts to meet 
expectations of friends, love of parents, dedication of parents to their children’s’ 
well-being (rather than having a parallel parental life of their own), the stance on 
divorce, attitudes on national pride, making parents proud, and the importance of 
service to others in life. 
8
  
 
We re-arranged the original presentation in Hofstede and Minkov (2010) to 
allow our readers to immediately be able to see the relationship of the long-term 
orientation scale with the original factor loadings (i. e. principal components), 
based on the Hofstede/Minkov re-analysis of the World Values Survey data:  
 
                                                 
5
 http: //www. geerthofstede. nl/dimensions-of-national-cultures  
6
 http: //www. geerthofstede. nl/dimensions-of-national-cultures  
7
 http: //www. geerthofstede. nl/dimensions-of-national-cultures  
8
 http: //www. geerthofstede. nl/dimensions-of-national-cultures 
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Table 1.1: Hofstede’s LTO score 
 
 
 original factor 
loadings, reported in 
Hofstede/Minkov, 
2010 
multiplied by -100 
to arrive at the 
reformulated LTO-
score 
thrift -0,82 82 
perseverance -0,77 77 
divorce justifiable -0,04 4 
always love parents 0,10 -10 
live up to friends' expectations 0,57 -57 
parents do their best 0,62 -62 
parental pride 0,63 -63 
religious faith 0,65 -65 
national pride 0,68 -68 
service to others 0,84 -84 
 
South Korea, Japan and China lead the field, while Egypt, Jordan, but also 
several Latin American countries, rank lowest among the 38 countries with data.  
 
According to Hofstede and his school, there is also a sixth dimension emerging 
from their data: Indulgence versus Restraint. Indulgence stands “for a society 
that allows relatively free gratification of basic and natural human drives 
related to enjoying life and having fun. Restraint stands for a society that 
suppresses gratification of needs and regulates it by means of strict social 
norms.” 
 
Table 1.2 now summarizes the Hofstede scores in the world system. Many 
Muslim societies find themselves at the opposite ends of the various different 
scales, i.e. the global dividing lines are different from those portrayed by 
Huntington. 
 
  
 
Table 1.2: the global Hofstede scores (majority Muslim countries are 
marked in green color) 
 
 
country Power 
Distance 
Individual
ism vs. 
Collectivis
m 
Masculini
ty versus 
Femininit
y 
Uncertain
ty 
Avoidanc
e Index 
Long-
Term 
Orientatio
n 
Indulgenc
e versus 
Restraint 
Argentina 49 46 56 86 20 62 
Australia 36 90 61 51 21 71 
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Austria 11 55 79 70 60 63 
Bangladesh 80 20 55 60 47 20 
Belgium 65 75 54 94 82 57 
Brazil 69 38 49 76 44 59 
Bulgaria 70 30 40 85 69 16 
Canada 39 80 52 48 36 68 
Chile 63 23 28 86 31 68 
China 80 20 66 30 87 24 
Colombia 67 13 64 80 13 83 
Croatia 73 33 40 80 58 33 
Czech Rep 57 58 57 74 70 29 
Denmark 18 74 16 23 35 70 
El Salvador 66 19 40 94 20 89 
Estonia 40 60 30 60 82 16 
Finland 33 63 26 59 38 57 
France 68 71 43 86 63 48 
Germany 35 67 66 65 83 40 
Greece 60 35 57 112 45 50 
Hong Kong 68 25 57 29 61 17 
Hungary 46 80 88 82 58 31 
India 77 48 56 40 51 26 
Indonesia 78 14 46 48 62 38 
Iran 58 41 43 59 14 40 
Ireland 28 70 68 35 24 65 
Italy 50 76 70 75 61 30 
Japan 54 46 95 92 88 42 
Korea South 60 18 39 85 100 29 
Latvia 44 70 9 63 69 13 
Lithuania 42 60 19 65 82 16 
Luxembourg 40 60 50 70 64 56 
Malaysia 104 26 50 36 41 57 
Malta 56 59 47 96 47 66 
Mexico 81 30 69 82 24 97 
Morocco 70 46 53 68 14 25 
Netherlands 38 80 14 53 67 68 
New Zealand 22 79 58 49 33 75 
Norway 31 69 8 50 35 55 
Pakistan 55 14 50 70 50 0 
Peru 64 16 42 87 25 46 
Philippines 94 32 64 44 27 42 
Poland 68 60 64 93 38 29 
Portugal 63 27 31 104 28 33 
Romania 90 30 42 90 52 20 
Russia 93 39 36 95 81 20 
Serbia 86 25 43 92 52 28 
Singapore 74 20 48 8 72 46 
Slovak Rep 104 52 110 51 77 28 
 24 
Slovenia 71 27 19 88 49 48 
Spain 57 51 42 86 48 44 
Sweden 31 71 5 29 53 78 
Switzerland 34 68 70 58 74 66 
Taiwan 58 17 45 69 93 49 
Thailand 64 20 34 64 32 45 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
47 16 58 55 13 80 
Turkey 66 37 45 85 46 49 
U. S. A.  40 91 62 46 26 68 
United 
Kingdom 
35 89 66 35 51 69 
Uruguay 61 36 38 100 26 53 
Venezuela 81 12 73 76 16 100 
Vietnam 70 20 40 30 57 35 
 
Our own compilation from: http: //geerthofstede. com/dimensions-of-national-cultures and 
http: //www. geerthofstede. com/research--vsm . We only considered the countries with 
complete values for the final analysis.  
 
 
For Hofstede and his associates, there are very clear underlying dimensions of 
these six dimensions and social and cultural history. Some of these 
conclusions, not necessarily fully shared by us, are nevertheless really 
breathtaking theoretical perspectives over the last two millennia of global 
history:  
 
“Power distance scores are high for Latin, Asian and African countries and 
smaller for Anglo and Germanic countries. Uncertainty avoidance scores are 
higher in Latin countries, in Japan, and in German speaking countries, lower in 
Anglo, Nordic, and Chinese culture countries. Individualism prevails in 
developed and Western countries, while collectivism prevails in less developed 
and Eastern countries; Japan takes a middle position on this dimension. 
Masculinity is high in Japan, in some European countries like Germany, 
Austria and Switzerland, and moderately high in Anglo countries; it is low in 
Nordic countries and in the Netherlands and moderately low in some […] 
countries like France, Spain and Thailand. Long-term orientation scores are 
highest in East Asia, moderate in Eastern and Western Europe, and low in the 
Anglo world, the Muslim world, Latin America and Africa. Indulgence scores 
are highest in Latin America, parts of Africa, the Anglo world and Nordic 
Europe; restraint is mostly found in East Asia, Eastern Europe and the Muslim 
world.” 
 
“The grouping of country scores points to some of the roots of cultural 
differences. These should be sought in the common history of similarly scoring 
countries. All Latin countries, for example, score relatively high on both power 
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distance and uncertainty avoidance. Latin countries (those today speaking a 
Romance language i. e. Spanish, Portuguese, French, Italian or Romanian) 
have inherited at least part of their civilization from the Roman Empire. The 
Roman Empire in its days was characterized by the existence of a central 
authority in Rome, and a system of law applicable to citizens anywhere. This 
established in its citizens' minds the value complex which we still recognize 
today: centralization fostered large power distance and a stress on laws fostered 
strong uncertainty avoidance. The Chinese empire also knew centralization, but 
it lacked a fixed system of laws: it was governed by men rather than by laws. In 
the present-day countries once under Chinese rule, the mindset fostered by the 
empire is reflected in large power distance but medium to weak uncertainty 
avoidance. The Germanic part of Europe, including Great Britain, never 
succeeded in establishing an enduring common central authority and countries 
which inherited its civilizations show smaller power distance. Assumptions 
about historical roots of cultural differences always remain speculative but in 
the given examples they are plausible. In other cases they remain hidden in the 
course of history.” 9 
 
“Power distance is correlated with the use of violence in domestic politics and 
with income inequality in a country. Uncertainty avoidance is associated with 
Roman Catholicism and with the legal obligation in developed countries for 
citizens to carry identity cards. Individualism is correlated with national wealth 
and with mobility between social classes from one generation to the next. 
Masculinity is correlated negatively with the percent of women in 
democratically elected governments. Long-term orientation is correlated with 
school results in international comparisons. Indulgence is correlated with 
sexual freedom and a call for human rights like free expression of opinions.”10 
 
The differences between the Muslim countries in the sample and the global 
unweighted means reveal no particular pattern:  
 
 
Table 1.3: The Muslim countries in Hofstede’s global sample and their 
differences from the global, unweighted means 
 
 
 Power 
Distance 
Individual
ism vs. 
Collectivis
m 
Masculini
ty versus 
Femininit
y 
Uncertain
ty 
Avoidanc
e Index 
Long-
Term 
Orientatio
n 
Indulgenc
e versus 
Restraint 
Bangladesh 21,42 -25,76 5,89 -6,95 -2,76 -27,50 
Indonesia 19,42 -31,76 -3,11 -18,95 12,24 -9,50 
                                                 
9
 http: //www. geerthofstede. nl/dimensions-of-national-cultures  
10
 http: //www. geerthofstede. nl/dimensions-of-national-cultures 
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Iran -0,58 -4,76 -6,11 -7,95 -35,76 -7,50 
Malaysia 45,42 -19,76 0,89 -30,95 -8,76 9,50 
Morocco 11,42 0,24 3,89 1,05 -35,76 -22,50 
Pakistan -3,58 -31,76 0,89 3,05 0,24 -47,50 
Turkey 7,42 -8,76 -4,11 18,05 -3,76 1,50 
 
Our own compilation from: http: //geerthofstede. com/dimensions-of-national-cultures and 
http: //www. geerthofstede. com/research--vsm . We only considered the countries with 
complete values for the final analysis.  
 
In the following presentation of Hofstede’s theory, we are presenting the global 
ranks of the countries of the world according to Hofstede’s scales. We highlight 
the results for the majority Muslim countries in green color.  
 
 
Table 1.4: The global ranks according to Hofstede’s scales 
 
 
Country Power 
Distance 
Individual
ism vs. 
Collectivis
m 
Masculini
ty versus 
Femininit
y 
Uncertain
ty 
Avoidanc
e Index 
Long-
Term 
Orientatio
n 
Indulgenc
e versus 
Restraint 
Argentina 42 31 24 14 57 6 
Australia 52 2 17 46 55 8 
Austria 62 25 4 29 22 41 
Bangladesh 9 49 25 38 35 28 
Belgium 26 9 26 6 6 57 
Brazil 19 34 32 26 38 25 
Bulgaria 16 42 45 19 14 49 
Canada 50 5 28 49 42 21 
Chile 29 48 54 17 47 16 
China 10 50 12 57 4 59 
Colombia 23 61 15 23 61 2 
Croatia 14 38 44 24 24 39 
Czech Rep 36 24 20 28 13 50 
Denmark 61 10 58 61 44 19 
El Salvador 24 54 47 7 56 7 
Estonia 47 21 53 39 8 55 
Finland 56 18 55 41 41 22 
France 20 11 38 15 18 45 
Germany 53 17 11 34 5 58 
Greece 32 37 21 1 37 26 
Hong Kong 21 47 22 59 21 42 
Hungary 44 4 3 21 23 40 
India 12 28 23 53 29 34 
Indonesia 11 59 35 50 19 44 
Iran 34 32 39 40 60 3 
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Ireland 59 14 9 55 54 9 
Italy 41 8 6 27 20 43 
Japan 40 30 2 9 3 60 
Korea South 33 55 48 20 1 62 
Latvia 45 13 60 37 15 48 
Lithuania 46 20 56 35 7 56 
Luxembourg 48 22 29 30 17 46 
Malaysia 1 45 30 54 39 24 
Malta 38 23 34 4 34 29 
Mexico 7 41 8 22 53 10 
Morocco 17 29 27 33 59 4 
Netherlands 51 6 59 44 16 47 
New Zealand 60 7 18 48 45 18 
Norway 57 15 61 47 43 20 
Pakistan 39 60 31 31 31 32 
Peru 27 57 43 13 52 11 
Philippines 3 39 14 52 49 14 
Poland 22 19 13 8 40 23 
Portugal 30 44 52 2 48 15 
Romania 5 40 42 11 28 35 
Russia 4 33 50 5 9 54 
Serbia 6 46 40 10 27 36 
Singapore 13 51 33 62 12 51 
Slovak Rep 2 26 1 45 10 53 
Slovenia 15 43 57 12 32 31 
Spain 37 27 41 16 33 30 
Sweden 58 12 62 60 26 37 
Switzerland 55 16 7 42 11 52 
Taiwan 35 56 37 32 2 61 
Thailand 28 53 51 36 46 17 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
43 58 19 43 62 1 
Turkey 25 35 36 18 36 27 
U. S. A.  49 1 16 51 51 12 
United 
Kingdom 
54 3 10 56 30 33 
Uruguay 31 36 49 3 50 13 
Venezuela 8 62 5 25 58 5 
Vietnam 18 52 46 58 25 38 
 
Our own compilation from: http: //geerthofstede. com/dimensions-of-national-cultures and 
http: //www. geerthofstede. com/research--vsm . We only considered the countries with 
complete values for the final analysis.  
 
The following maps show the original Hofstede scores, as they are reproduced 
in Table 1.2, projected onto world maps. These choropleth maps help us to 
arrive at a better understanding of the six Hofstede factors.  
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 Hofstede’s power distance scale is generally lowest in Scandinavian and 
in the Anglo-Saxon democracies, and also in the social welfare state 
Austria, and it is, generally speaking, highest the ex-USSR, in India and 
South-East Asia and in China, in Mexico and Venezuela and in some 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe.  
 
 The most collectivistic countries are to be found in the Andean region of 
Latin America, in China and in countries of South and South-East Asia, 
while the highest individualism is to be found in the United States and in 
the Anglo-Saxon democracies, with high scores also to be found in the 
Netherlands, Denmark, and also in Italy and in Hungary.  
 
 The highest masculinity scores are to be found in some countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, in Japan and in Venezuela, while the 
countries of Scandinavia and the Baltic region, the Netherlands and, 
interestingly enough, Chile and Portugal are characterized by high 
femininity.  
 
 Uncertainty avoidance is highest in Greece, Portugal and Uruguay, and 
is generally highest in Roman Catholic and Orthodox cultures, and also in 
Japan and South Korea, while it is lowest in Protestant cultures, but also 
in China and in Iran, in South Asia and in South-East Asia.  
 
 Hofstede’s long-term orientation (LTO) is highest in South Korea, 
Japan, China, in Russia and the Baltic Republics, and in Germany and 
some other European countries, while it is especially absent in Latin 
America, in the Anglo-Saxon democracies and Scandinavia, and in 
Morocco and Iran; with most of the other European countries and the 
countries of South and South-East Asia classified in the same ranks.  
 
 Hofstede’s Indulgence Factor is highest in Venezuela, in countries of the 
Caribbean and in Mexico and, interestingly enough, also in Sweden, New 
Zealand, Australia, the UK, the US and Canada and in some European 
countries (Denmark, Netherlands, Switzerland and Austria) and in Chile, 
while Restraint is highest in Pakistan, in most former communist 
countries, and in China. Most continental European countries seem to be 
characterized by low indulgence and higher restraint.  
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Map 1.1: Hofstede’s Power Distance (maximum: painted in red) 
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Map 1.2: Hofstede’s Individualism (painted in red) vs. Collectivism (painted in blue) 
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Map 1.3: Hofstede’s Masculinity (painted in red) versus Femininity (painted in blue) 
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Map 1.4: Hofstede’s Uncertainty Avoidance Index (painted in red) 
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Map 1.5: Hofstede’s Long-Term Orientation (painted in red) 
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Map 1.6: Hofstede’s Indulgence (painted in red) versus Restraint (painted in blue) 
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Hofstede’s challenging categories found a global audience and attracted the 
attention of hundreds of scholarly articles, among others in the growing field of 
business studies. More recently, Grovewell International (“GLOBE Project) 
replicated the Hofstede findings on their own and largely came to the same 
conclusions.
11
  
 
 
1. 2. Shalom Schwartz and Eldad Davidov  
 
 
The next theory which we will briefly present here has been developed by 
Shalom Schwartz, an Israeli psychologist and Professor at the Hebrew 
University in Jerusalem. It was further developed in mathematical-statistical and 
theoretical terms by Eldad Davidov. As with Hofstede’s studies, there was an 
enormous international reception, especially in the expanding field of 
international business studies. The quantification of Schwartz’s theory in this 
paper thus relies exclusively on Ralston et al. The reason is simple: Ralston et 
al., 2011 – somewhat in the tradition of Hofstede - use samples, based on 
business people (Hofstede: one company, IBM; Ralston et al., 2011: business 
people in general). Thus his sampling is restricted to a certain segment of 
society, while Schwartz’s categories are much more encompassing. To provide 
more encompassing tests of Schwartz’s theory in the framework of theories of 
overall global value change – and not just value change among business people - 
would be the theme for another essay.  
 
In Chapter 12 we analyze correlations and also show the relationships of the 
Ralston business people data with our own dimensions. As with Hofstede and 
the GLOBE Project, influenced by Hofstede, there is, as we already mentioned, 
a problem of limited country samples in Ralston et al., 2011. Our essay thus 
does not pretend in the slightest way to provide materials on the overall 
interrelationship between the original Schwartz categories and the results, 
                                                 
11
 http://www.grovewell.com/ The GLOBE project was initiated by Professor Robert J. House 
of the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania in 1991. Based on interviews with 
more than 17.000 global managers in 62 cultures, the nine GLOBE cultural competencies are: 
 
1. Performance orientation  
2. Assertiveness orientation 
3. Future orientation 
4. Human orientation 
5. Collectivism I: Institutional collectivism 
6. Collectivism II: In-group collectivism 
7. Gender egalitarianism 
8. Power distance 
9. Uncertainty avoidance 
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achieved by Hofstede, Inglehart and our own investigations. It has to be 
emphasized that what is being tested here is solely Ralston’s quantification 
based on samples of business people.  
 
To understand the Ralston et al. framework, one has to emphasize that Schwartz 
himself began his investigations not on generalized surveys of the total 
population (Schwartz, 2009) but on global samples of schoolteachers and 
college students. Participants were 80 samples of schoolteachers (k-12) from 58 
national groups and 115 samples of college students from 64 national groups, 
together constituting 67 nations and 70 different cultural groups. Samples from 
ethnically heterogeneous nations came from the dominant, majority group. Most 
samples only included some 180 to 280 respondents. At a later stage, Schwartz 
validated his scales with survey data from the European Social Survey. The 
World Values Survey data also include items of the Schwartz scales. 
12
 
 
Schwartz himself presented analyses of data from up to 73 countries, validating 
seven basic cultural orientations and the structure of interrelations among them: 
West European, English-speaking, Latin American, East European, and South 
Asian, Confucian influenced, and African and Middle Eastern. 
 
The seven dimensions are  
 
1. Embeddedness 
2. Hierarchy 
3. Mastery 
4. Affective Autonomy 
5. Intellectual Autonomy 
6. Egalitarianism 
7. Harmony 
 
To understand the Ralston et al. framework, one has also to emphasize that at 
the basis of Schwartz’s theory are ten items from his so-called Portrait Value 
Questionnaire, whose individual dimensions we shall present according to a 
recent synthesis, provided by Dobewall and Strack, 2013. Items marked like 
“#a197” or “a193” et cetera refer to the original Schwartz Portrait Value 
Questionnaire. 
 
Universalism: #a197 “care for nature”: Looking after the environment is 
important to this person; to care for nature. 
 
Benevolence: #a193 “help others”: It is important to this person to help the 
people nearby; to care for their well-being.  
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 http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/  
 37 
 
Conformity: #a196 “behave properly”: It is important to this person to always 
behave properly; to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong. 
 
Security: #a191 “secure surroundings”: Living in secure surroundings is 
important to this person; to avoid anything that might be dangerous. 
 
Power: #a190 “wealth”: It is important to this person to be rich; to have a lot of 
money and expensive things. 
 
Achievement: #a194 “successful”: Being very successful is important to this 
person; to have people recognize one’s achievements. 
 
Stimulation: #a195 “risk excitement”: Adventure and taking risks are important 
to this person; to have an exciting life. 
 
Hedonism: #a192 “good time spoil self”: It is important to this person to have a 
good time; to “spoil” oneself. 
 
Self-Direction: #a189 “creative original”: It is important to this person to think 
up new ideas and be creative; to do things one’s own way. 
 
At one point in his analysis, Schwartz explains: 
 
“I derived value dimensions for comparing cultures by considering three of the 
critical issues that confront all societies. The first issue is the nature of the 
relation or the boundaries between the person and the group: To what extent 
are people autonomous vs. embedded in their groups? I label the polar locations 
on this cultural dimension autonomy versus embeddedness. In autonomy 
cultures, people are viewed as autonomous, bounded entities. They should 
cultivate and express their own preferences, feelings, ideas, and abilities, and 
find meaning in their own uniqueness. There are two types of autonomy: 
Intellectual autonomy encourages individuals to pursue their own ideas and 
intellectual directions independently. Examples of important values in such 
cultures include broadmindedness, curiosity, and creativity. Affective autonomy 
encourages individuals to pursue affectively positive experience for themselves. 
Important values include pleasure, exciting life, and varied life. In cultures with 
an emphasis on embeddedness, people are viewed as entities embedded in the 
collectivity. Meaning in life comes largely through social relationships, through 
identifying with the group, participating in its shared way of life, and striving 
toward its shared goals. Embedded cultures emphasize maintaining the status 
quo and restraining actions that might disrupt in-group solidarity or the 
traditional order. Important values in such cultures are social order, respect for 
tradition, security, obedience, and wisdom.  
 38 
 
The second societal problem is to guarantee that people behave in a 
responsible manner that preserves the social fabric. That is, people must 
engage in the productive work necessary to maintain society rather than 
compete destructively or withhold their efforts. People must be induced to 
consider the welfare of others, to coordinate with them, and thereby manage 
their unavoidable interdependencies. The polar solution labeled cultural 
egalitarianism seeks to induce people to recognize one another as moral equals 
who share basic interests as human beings. People are socialized to internalize 
a commitment to cooperate and to feel concern for everyone’s welfare. They are 
expected to act for the benefit of others as a matter of choice. Important values 
in such cultures include equality, social justice, responsibility, help, and 
honesty. The polar alternative labeled cultural hierarchy relies on hierarchical 
systems of ascribed roles to insure responsible, productive behavior. It defines 
the unequal distribution of power, roles, and resources as legitimate. People are 
socialized to take the hierarchical distribution of roles for granted and to 
comply with the obligations and rules attached to their roles. Values like social 
power, authority, humility, and wealth are highly important in hierarchical 
cultures.  
 
The third societal problem is to regulate how people manage their relations to 
the natural and social world. The cultural response to this problem labeled 
harmony emphasizes fitting into the world as it is, trying to understand and 
appreciate rather than to change, direct, or to exploit. Important values in 
harmony cultures include world at peace, unity with nature, and protecting the 
environment. Mastery is the polar cultural response to this problem. It 
encourages active self-assertion in order to master, direct, and change the 
natural and social environment to attain group or personal goals. Values such 
as ambition, success, daring, and competence are especially important in 
mastery cultures. In sum, the theory specifies three bipolar dimensions of 
culture that represent alternative resolutions to each of three problems that 
confront all societies: embeddedness versus autonomy, hierarchy versus 
egalitarianism, and mastery versus harmony. (Schwartz, 2006) 
 
Correlations between the sample means were used in a multidimensional 
scaling analysis to assess the presence of seven cultural orientations and the 
relations among them. The 2-dimensional projection in Graph 4.1, which is the 
main result of Schwartz’s research, portrays the pattern of intercorrelations 
among values, based on the sample means. Each value item is represented by a 
point such that the more positive is the correlation between any pair of value 
items, the closer they are in space, and the less positive their correlation, the 
more distant they are (Schwartz, 2009). According to Schwartz, this analysis 
should clearly discriminate the seven orientations: Embeddedness; Hierarchy; 
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Mastery; Affective Autonomy; Intellectual Autonomy; Egalitarianism; and 
Harmony, which are also at the basis of Ralston’s et al. work 
 
In his 2009 analysis, Schwartz says: 
 
“Equally important, the regions representing each orientation form the 
integrated cultural system postulated by the theory: They emanate from the 
center of the circle, follow the expected order around the circle, and form the 
poles of the three broad cultural dimensions.” (Schwartz, 2009) 
 
In Graph 1.1, we refer to Schwartz’s summarizing essay (2006) and his 
overview of the relationships in his theoretical system: 
 
Graph 1.1: the relationship of the seven cultural-level dimensions of 
societies to underlying values 
 
 
 
Muslim societies, according to Schwartz, rank very high on values of 
embeddedness. Embeddedness combines such values as social order, respect 
tradition, forgiving, moderateness, obedience, politeness, cleanness, national 
security, devoutness, wisdom, self-discipline, family security, honoring elders, 
reciprocation of favors, protecting the public image. According to Schwartz, 
2006, in cultures with an emphasis on embeddedness, people are viewed as 
entities embedded in the collectivity. Meaning in life comes largely through 
social relationships, through identifying with the group, participating in its 
shared way of life, and striving toward its shared goals. “Embedded cultures 
 40 
emphasize maintaining the status quo and restraining actions that might disrupt 
in-group solidarity or the traditional order. Important values in such cultures 
are social order, respect for tradition, security, obedience, and wisdom.” 
(Schwartz, 2006) 
 
To understand the Ralston et al. framework, one has also to emphasize that 
Schwartz attempts to identify seven transnational cultural groupings: West 
European countries, English-speaking countries, Latin American countries, East 
European countries, South Asian countries, Confucian influenced countries and 
African and Middle Eastern countries. Only nine cultures are located outside of 
their expected region. Four of these are, according to Schwartz, from the 
culturally diverse Middle East (Turkey, Greek Cyprus, Israeli Arabs, and Israeli 
Jews). Schwartz maintains that his regions show some parallels with the zones 
in Huntington (1993) and Inglehart and Baker (2000): 
 
 
Graph 1.2: The Schwartz global map of human values (adapted from 
Schwartz, 2006) 
 
 
 
 
Based on Ralston, Egri, Reynaud et al. 2011 we drew the following choropleth 
maps of the value orientations of global business people: 
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Map 1.7: Ralston et al. societal dimension: Embeddedness (highest value: painted in red) 
 
3,31
3,62
3,93
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4,55
4,85
5,16
5,47
5,78
6,09
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
Social relationships, in-group 
solidarity, striving toward 
attaining the goals of the group 
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Map 1.8: Ralston et al. societal dimension: Hierarchy (highest value: painted in red) 
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source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
 
Need for status differentiation 
through a hierarchal system based on 
rules and obligations, with the 
acceptance of the unequal 
distribution of power being seen as 
legitimate 
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Map 1.9: Ralston et al. societal dimension: Mastery (highest value: painted in red) 
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source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
Culture embraces attaining group or 
personal goals through dynamic 
self-assertation to master and or 
change the natural and social 
environment 
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Map 1.10: Ralston et al. societal dimension: Affective Autonomy (highest value: painted in red) 
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source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
Culture embraces 
individuals seeking 
emotionally gratifying 
life-experiences for 
themselves 
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Map 1.11: Ralston et al. societal dimension: Intellectual Autonomy (highest value: painted in red) 
 
3,82
4,00
4,17
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5,05
5,23
5,41
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
Culture embraces 
individuals’ independent 
pursuit of their own ideas 
and intellectual directions 
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Map 1.12: Ralston et al. societal dimension: Egalitarianism (highest value: painted in red) 
 
4,20
4,40
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5,99
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
Culture embraces the view that all 
people are moral equals and that 
there should be a commitment and 
concern for the welfare of all 
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Map 1.13: Ralston et al. societal dimension: Harmony (highest value: painted in red) 
 
3,41
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source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
Culture embraces accepting the world 
as it is and fitting in to it, rather than 
trying to change or take advantage of it 
 48 
 
The specific Ralston et al. country results for mastery, affective autonomy, 
intellectual autonomy and harmony contradict the generalizations about 
Muslim countries, inherent in Huntington, 1996. 
 
In order to evaluate the potentialities of the Ralston et al. framework, one also 
has mention that Eldad Davidov, who is also a researcher of Israeli origin, and 
who is currently professor of sociology at Zurich University, pays great attention 
to the statistical-mathematical foundations of comparative value analysis, 
including the detection of contradictory statements in survey research. Among 
his major works of mathematical sociology one finds Davidov, 2008, 2010; 
Davidov, Meuleman, Billiet, and Schmidt, 2008; Davidov, Schmidt and Billiet, 
2011; and Davidov, Schmidt, and Schwartz, 2008; where Davidov and 
associates also base their analysis of human values on the cascade of human 
values, already developed in the works of Shalom Schwartz.  
 
In his 2008 study on the contradictions of the European integration process, 
Davidov also highlights the close interrelationship between gender prejudice, 
homophobia, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, social out-groups (as for example 
homeless people), Islamophobia and the overall devaluation of newcomers:  
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Graph 1.3: Davidov’s explanation of group-focused enmity (adapted from 
Davidov and associates, 2008): group focused enmity explains racism, 
xenophobia, anti-Semitism, devaluation of homosexuals, of women, 
newcomers, Muslim people and homeless people at the same time 
 
 
 
 
1. 3. Inglehart’s theory 
 
 
Inglehart, in some of his main publications, developed by contrast an 
interpretation of global value change (Inglehart, 1970, 1977, 1990, 1997, 2000), 
which rests on a well-known two-dimensional scale of global values and 
global value change. It is based on the statistical technique of factor analysis 
of up to over twenty key WVS variables from the originally more than 900 
survey items in the WVS. Factor analysis, as we highlighted in our 
methodological introduction, reduces variables to the underlying statistical 
dimensions, and is based on a mathematical procedure, implemented today on 
most advanced statistical software packages for social statistics, like IBM SPSS 
(here versions 20 and 21).  
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Several essays developed the critique of Inglehart’s methodology (Hadenius, 
and Teorell, 2005; Haller, 2002; Haller and Hadler, 2006; Steenkamp, and 
Geyskens, 2012; furthermore Au, 2000; Davis, Dowley, and Silver, 1999; Li, 
Zinn, Chick, Absher, Graefe, and Hsu, 2007; Sacchi, 1998; Van de Vijver, and 
Poortinga, 2002).  
 
The two Inglehart dimensions are: (1) the Traditional/ Secular-Rational 
dimension and (2) the Survival/Self-expression dimension. These two 
dimensions also explain more than 70 percent of the cross-national variance in a 
factor analysis of ten indicators, and each of these dimensions is strongly 
correlated with scores of other important variables.  
 
So let us look at Inglehart’s theoretical main pillars. To understand his theory, 
we best should look at an important paragraph written in Inglehart and Baker, 
2000:  
 
‘In the course of human history, thousands of societies have existed, most of 
which are now extinct. These societies had a vast range of characteristics. 
Infanticide was common in hunting and gathering societies, but became rare in 
agrarian societies; homosexuality was accepted in some preindustrial societies; 
and women are believed to have dominated political and social life in some 
preindustrial societies. Although the full range of "traditions" is diverse, a 
mainstream version of preindustrial society having a number of common 
characteristics can be identified. All of the preindustrial societies for which we 
have data show relatively low levels of tolerance for abortion, divorce, and 
homosexuality; tend to emphasize male dominance in economic and political 
life, deference to parental authority, and the importance of family life, and are 
relatively authoritarian; most of them place strong emphasis on religion. 
Advanced industrial societies tend to have the opposite characteristics. It would 
be a gross oversimplification to assume that all known preindustrial societies 
had similar characteristics, but one can meaningfully contrast the cultural 
characteristics of industrial societies with those of this mainstream version of 
preindustrial society.’ (Inglehart and Baker, 2000: 23-24) 
 
In that quoted path-breaking essay, which has become a true classic of 
contemporary global sociology, they also go on to say that the two mentioned 
dimensions explain 70 percent of the total cross-national variation among 10 
variables. The factor scores generated by these 10 items are highly correlated 
with factor scores from earlier research. In a statistical Table in that landmark 
article, Inglehart and Baker, 2000 also show the results from a factor analysis of 
variables with 165,594 World Values Survey respondents (Inglehart and Baker, 
2000, their Table 1). As expected, the factor loadings are considerably lower 
than those at the national level, and are reproduced here below.  
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Traditional values are defined by:  
 
 God is very important in respondent's life 0.70 
 It is more important for a child to learn obedience and religious faith than 
independence and determinations (the so-called autonomy index from 
WVS data) 0.61 
 Abortion is never justifiable 0.61 
 Respondent has strong sense of national pride 0.60 
 Respondent favors more respect for authority 0.51 
 
Self-expression values are defined by:  
 
 Respondent gives priority to self-expression and quality-of-life (measured 
by the four-item materialist/post-materialist values index, documented 
in the WVS data) 0.59 
 Respondent describes self as very happy 0.58 
 Respondent has signed and would sign a petition 0.59 
 Homosexuality is always justifiable 0.54 
 You should be trusting people 0.44 
 
Inglehart and Baker, 2000 also maintain that in traditional societies a main goal 
in life is to make one's parents proud and one must always love and respect one's 
parents, regardless of how they behave. Conversely, parents must do their best 
for their children even if their own well-being suffers. People in traditional 
societies idealize large families, and they actually have them (high scores on this 
dimension are strongly correlated with high fertility rates):  
 
“Yet although the people of traditional societies have high levels of national 
pride, favor more respect for authority, take protectionist attitudes toward 
foreign trade, and feel that environmental problems can be solved without 
international agreements, they accept national authority passively: They seldom 
or never discuss politics. In preindustrial societies the family is crucial to 
survival. Accordingly, societies at the traditional pole of this dimension reject 
divorce and take a pro-life stance on abortion, euthanasia, and suicide. They 
emphasize social conformity rather than individualistic striving, believe in 
absolute standards of good and evil, support deference to authority, and have 
high levels of national pride and a nationalistic outlook. Societies with secular-
rational values have the opposite preferences on all of these topics. The 
survival/self-expression dimension taps a syndrome of trust, tolerance, 
subjective well-being, political activism, and selfexpression that emerges in 
postindustrial societies with high levels of security. At the opposite extreme, 
people in societies shaped by insecurity and low levels of well-being, tend to 
emphasize economic and physical security above all other goals, and feel 
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threatened by foreigners, by ethnic diversity and by cultural change. This leads 
to an intolerance of gays and other out-groups, an insistence on traditional 
gender roles, and an authoritarian political outlook. A central component of this 
dimension involves the polarization between materialist and postmaterialist 
values. Extensive evidence indicates that these values tap an intergenerational 
shift from an emphasis on economic and physical security toward an increased 
emphasis on self-expression, subjective well-being, and quality-of-life 
concerns.” (Inglehart and Baker, 2000) 
 
This cultural shift, Inglehart and Baker, 2000 say, is found throughout advanced 
industrial society; it emerges among birth cohorts that have grown up under 
conditions in which survival is taken for granted. These values are linked with a 
growing emphasis on environmental protection, the women's movement, and 
rising demands for participation in decision-making in economic and political 
life. But as our data in Chapter 10 show, recent experiences in the “North 
Atlantic arena” under the pressure of the current economic crisis clearly 
contradict the contention of the Inglehart/Baker 2000 essay that self-expression 
values will go on to become increasingly widespread in almost all advanced 
industrial societies. Instead of the predicted extension, we witness an implosion 
of self-expression values in the West. 
 
According to Inglehart and Baker, 2000, societies that emphasize survival values 
show relatively low levels of subjective well-being, report relatively poor health, 
are low on interpersonal trust, relatively intolerant of out-groups, are low on 
support for gender equality, emphasize materialist values, have relatively high 
levels of faith in science and technology, are relatively low on environmental 
activism, and relatively favorable to authoritarian government. Societies high on 
self-expression values tend to have the opposite preferences on these topics:  
 
“When survival is uncertain, cultural diversity seems threatening. When there 
isn't "enough to go around," foreigners are seen as dangerous outsiders who 
may take away one's sustenance. People cling to traditional gender roles and 
sexual norms, and emphasize absolute rules and familiar norms in an attempt to 
maximize predictability in an uncertain world. Conversely, when survival begins 
to be taken for granted, ethnic and cultural diversity become increasingly 
acceptable- indeed, beyond a certain point, diversity is not only tolerated, it may 
be positively valued because it is interesting and stimulating. In advanced 
industrial societies, people seek out foreign restaurants to taste new cuisine; 
they pay large sums of money and travel long distances to experience exotic 
cultures. Changing gender roles and sexual norms no longer seem threatening. 
The past few decades have witnessed one of the most dramatic cultural changes 
that has occurred since the dawn of recorded history - the emergence of new 
gender roles enabling women to enter the same occupations as men. 
Polarization over new gender roles is strikingly evident in the survival/self-
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expression dimension: One of its highest- loading issues involves whether men 
make better political leaders than women. In the world as a whole, a majority 
still accepts the idea that men make better political leaders than women, but this 
view is rejected by growing majorities in advanced industrial societies and is 
overwhelmingly rejected by the younger generation within these societies. Equal 
rights for women, gays and lesbians, foreigners, and other out-groups tend to be 
rejected in societies where survival seems uncertain and increasingly accepted 
in societies that emphasize self-expression values.” (Inglehart and Baker, 2000) 
 
In another important publication, Inglehart and Welzel (2010a) highlighted their 
understanding of modernization theory and the modernization process in an 
illuminating way: 
 
“The core concept of modernization theory is that economic development 
produces systematic changes in society and politics. If so, one should find 
pervasive differences between the beliefs and values of people in low-income 
and high-income societies. The World Values Survey and European Values 
Study ([…] WVS/EVS) provide evidence that the transition from agrarian to 
industrial society produces one set of changes, and the rise of postindustrial 
societies produces another set of changes in peoples’ values and motivations. 
Analyses of WVS/EVS data reveal two major dimensions of cross-cultural 
variation: a traditional versus secular-rational values dimension and a survival 
versus self-expression values dimension. These two dimensions tap scores of 
attitudinal variables, and are robust enough that researchers obtain similar 
results using various combinations of these variables.  
 
Theoretically, the traditional/secular-rational dimension reflects changes linked 
with the transition from agrarian to industrial society, associated with 
bureaucratization, rationalization, and secularization. Accordingly, the publics 
of agrarian societies emphasize religion, national pride, obedience and respect 
for authority, while the publics of industrial societies emphasize secularism, 
cosmopolitanism, autonomy, and rationality. With the emergence of 
postindustrial society, unprecedented levels of prosperity and the advent of the 
welfare state bring high levels of existential security. When survival is 
insecure, it tends to dominate people’s life strategies. But the younger birth 
cohorts of these societies have grown up taking survival for granted, allowing 
other goals to become more prominent. This trend is reinforced by the fact 
that in knowledge societies, one’s daily work requires individual judgment and 
innovation, rather than following routines prescribed from above. Both 
factors bring increasing emphasis on self-expression. The survival versus self-
expression dimension reflects polarization between emphasis on order, 
economic security, and conformity and emphasis on self-expression, 
participation, subjective well-being, trust, tolerance, and quality of life 
concerns. In recent decades the publics of virtually all rich countries have 
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gradually moved toward increasing emphasis on self-expression values, but the 
relative positions of given countries have been remarkably stable.” (Inglehart 
and Welzel, 2010a) 
 
We emphasize that our own empirical approach to the analysis of human values 
and their interrelationship among each other revealed many results, which 
partially contradict, correct or extend the Inglehartian findings, and in some 
ways re-iterate the interpretations, forwarded by Hofstede, Davidov, and 
Schwartz (2006). In contrast to all three hitherto dominant explanations, we 
introduce the dimension of the shadow economy, acceptancy of corruption, and 
overall moral decay. And as we see in the results, this consideration of the 
dimension of economic permissiveness results in a significant redrawing of 
the global maps of human values.  
 
The Inglehart dimensions are based upon World Values Survey data from at least 
145.000 interview partners around the globe. 
13
 For Inglehart and his associates, 
the rise of rational-secular values is an important element in socio-economic and 
democratic development. Self-expression values, as opposed to survival values, 
give high priority to environmental protection, tolerance of diversity and rising 
demands for participation in decision making in economic and political life. For 
Inglehart, there is a dramatic shift in child-rearing values, from emphasis on 
hard work toward emphasis on imagination and tolerance as important values to 
teach a child in the course of socio-economic development. Societies that rank 
high on self-expression values also tend to rank high on interpersonal trust. The 
culture of trust and tolerance are crucial, Inglehart emphasizes throughout his 
recent works, to democracy. Self-expression (x-axis) and secularism (y-axis) 
and are but two sides of the same coin – modernity. The Inglehart School 
assumes the following famous global “map of human values”. In our version of 
the famous graph, we check the Inglehart map data with the data, available to us 
from the electronic publicly available download facilities from the World Values 
Survey website. The two graphs are practically identical: 
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 http: //www. worldvaluessurvey. org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_54  
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Graph 1.4: Map of global human values according to Inglehart and 
associates 
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Source: adapted from Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, "Changing Mass Priorities: The 
Link Between Modernization and Democracy.” Perspectives on Politics, June 2010 (vol. 8, 
No. 2) page 554. Graph 1 is the latest published version of the Inglehart/Welzel map; earlier 
data, including a number of countries NOT included in Graph 1, are to be found at the 
supplementary data source in doc. format at the bottom of the WVS Internet page at http: 
//www. worldvaluessurvey. org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_54  
 
But in many ways, the map should and could be reverted, because secular 
values should be seen on an x-axis of global value development, and self-
expression values on the y-axis.  
 
Table 1.5 ranks the countries of the world according to their 
secularism/traditionalism scale according to the results of waves 1-4 of the 
World Values Survey. Tanzania, Puerto Rico and Jordan are the least secular 
countries of the world, while Sweden, Japan and the Czech Republic are the 
most secular countries of the world:  
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Table 1.5: Secular values according to Inglehart 
 
 TRADITIONAL/SECULAR  
RATIONAL VALUES WVS 1-4/2006 Sweden 1,234 
Japan 1,152 
Czech Republic 1,093 
Estonia 1,011 
Latvia 0,902 
Russian Federation 0,852 
Germany 0,812 
Netherlands 0,780 
Bulgaria 0,766 
France 0,730 
Belarus 0,714 
Switzerland 0,706 
Norway 0,704 
Finland 0,688 
Ukraine 0,658 
Slovenia 0,617 
South Korea 0,591 
Croatia 0,543 
Slovakia 0,516 
Serbia and Montenegro 0,503 
Lithuania 0,494 
Moldova 0,444 
Hungary 0,429 
Taiwan Province of China 0,422 
New Zealand 0,408 
Armenia 0,390 
Albania 0,329 
Great Britain 0,321 
Macedonia, Republic of 0,304 
Spain 0,239 
Italy 0,235 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0,226 
Romania 0,172 
Israel 0,147 
Australia 0,075 
Kyrgyzstan 0,032 
Uruguay 0,020 
Azerbaijan 0,018 
Canada -0,042 
Georgia -0,042 
India -0,080 
Viet Nam -0,125 
Argentina -0,247 
Mexico -0,267 
Poland -0,275 
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Singapore -0,278 
Indonesia -0,339 
United States -0,346 
Turkey -0,360 
Chile -0,431 
Dominican Republic -0,444 
Philippines -0,450 
Brazil -0,452 
Peru -0,489 
South Africa -0,506 
Uganda -0,586 
Bangladesh -0,671 
Egypt -0,713 
Algeria -0,734 
Pakistan -0,763 
Zimbabwe -0,772 
Nigeria -0,816 
Venezuela -0,822 
Jordan -0,882 
Puerto Rico -0,894 
Tanzania, United Republic Of -0,937 
 
 
Table 1.6 now ranks the countries of the world according to their survival/self-
expression scale based on the results of waves 1-4 of the World Values Survey. 
New Zealand, Australia and the United States are the most self-expression 
oriented countries of the world, while all of the five most survival oriented and 
least self-expression oriented countries of the world were of Orthodox Christian 
cultural heritage: Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and Romania.  
 
 
Table 1.6: Self-expression according to Inglehart 
 
 SURVIVAL/SELF-EXPRESSION 
VALUES WVS 1-4/2006 New Zealand 1,130 
Australia 1,025 
United States 0,951 
Sweden 0,902 
Canada 0,841 
Netherlands 0,794 
Switzerland 0,732 
Great Britain 0,661 
Finland 0,610 
Norway 0,536 
Puerto Rico 0,431 
Germany 0,298 
France 0,259 
Venezuela 0,243 
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Mexico 0,235 
Japan 0,206 
Uruguay 0,185 
Italy 0,165 
Viet Nam 0,124 
Dominican Republic 0,113 
Israel 0,111 
Czech Republic 0,086 
Spain 0,057 
Argentina 0,052 
South Korea -0,041 
South Africa -0,054 
Peru -0,061 
Chile -0,065 
Philippines -0,071 
India -0,101 
Brazil -0,124 
Tanzania, United Republic Of -0,125 
Singapore -0,158 
Croatia -0,173 
Egypt -0,175 
Slovakia -0,184 
Slovenia -0,220 
Nigeria -0,276 
Bosnia and Herzegovina -0,288 
Uganda -0,300 
Indonesia -0,332 
Poland -0,353 
Bangladesh -0,426 
Algeria -0,441 
Turkey -0,443 
Hungary -0,518 
Albania -0,525 
Kyrgyzstan -0,555 
Macedonia, Republic of -0,600 
Latvia -0,600 
Jordan -0,621 
Azerbaijan -0,644 
Lithuania -0,645 
Serbia and Montenegro -0,662 
Taiwan Province of China -0,663 
Georgia -0,664 
Pakistan -0,669 
Armenia -0,678 
Bulgaria -0,701 
Estonia -0,737 
Zimbabwe -0,765 
Romania -0,780 
Belarus -0,819 
Russian Federation -0,912 
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Ukraine -0,947 
Moldova -0,993 
 
 
Our choropleth maps – Maps 1.7 and 1.8 – designed with Inglehart’s data, 
further highlight these aspects of the Inglehart global map of human values. 
Choropleth maps show global statistics on an easily readable real world map. 
They allow important insights into the essence of social scientific theories. Even 
at the price of oversimplification they can show to audiences confronted with 
theories where a given phenomenon is strongest and where a given phenomenon 
is weakest. Projected onto such world choropleth maps, it is clear that 
Inglehart’s secular values, based on the World Values Survey, waves 1-4, are 
strongest in Sweden, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Japan, and indeed the entire 
former USSR, China, Korea, France, Germany, and the Benelux countries.  
 
Poland, the United States, but also Canada, the UK, Australia and New Zealand, 
as well as Spain, Italy and several other European countries are less secular than 
the leading secularist countries, with Turkey, Poland, and most of Latin America 
belonging to a middle range of the continuum, and most of the Muslim nations, 
Venezuela and Zimbabwe being the least secular countries in the world.  
 
Self-expression in the World Values Survey studies, waves 1-4, was highest in 
the highly developed Western Anglo-Saxon democracies, Scandinavia, and in 
the Netherlands and Switzerland. Most of the other continental European 
countries exhibited lower rates of self-expression. Latin America, several 
Muslim nations and Japan were to be found in the middle ranges of self-
expression. Lowest rates of self-expression were to be found in the Orthodox 
countries and/or the countries of former Communism.  
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Map 1.14: Inglehart: Secular Values. Data from the WVS waves 1-4 
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Map 1.15: Inglehart: Self-Expression Values. Data from the WVS waves 1-4 
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In Graph 1.5, we further take the results of Inglehart’s calculations at their face 
value. Here, we draw a scatterplot of our own in the style of Graph 1.4, but with 
reverted axes. There are hundreds of good historical and sociological reasons 
why secularization and not self-expression values are the prime movers of the 
modernization process. Also historically, secularization and not postmaterialistic 
self-expression values first developed in the Western countries from the 19
th
 to 
the late 20
th
 Century.  
 
As to be expected from the results of standard factor analysis without oblique 
factor rotation (see Chapter 3), the bi-variate correlation between the two 
Inglehart factors is very small. But there is an interesting wave structure in the 
relationship between secularism (in our Graph 1.5 projected on the x-axis) and 
self-expression (in our Graph 1.5 projected on the y-axis). With rising 
secularization, first there is a certain implosion and only then a rise in self-
expression values, considered by Inglehart and his associates to be so important 
for “effective democracy” (see below). There is then a rise of self-expression 
values, in order to implode again at later stages of development, and only at very 
high levels of secularization, self-expression rises in a linear fashion. This wave-
structure of modernization, secularization and self-expression is perhaps an 
important qualification of Inglehart’s theory.  
 
 64 
 
Graph 1.5: Secular values (x-axis) and self-expression values (y-axis) in the 
World Values Surveys, 1-4, 2006 
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Source: adapted from Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, "Changing Mass Priorities: The 
Link Between Modernization and Democracy.” Perspectives on Politics, June 2010 (vol. 8, 
No. 2) page 554. Their Graph 1 is one of the latest published versions of the Inglehart/Welzel 
map; earlier data are to be found at the supplementary data source in doc. format at the bottom 
of the WVS Internet page at http: //www. worldvaluessurvey. 
org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_54  
 
 
In Table 1.7 we now document these non-linear developments; the trend values 
and their residuals, used in Graph 1.1. Again taking Inglehart’s sociology at its 
face value, let us assume that secularization is the prime mover of value change. 
We all of a sudden discover then that the real problematic cases with 
exceptionally low self-expression rates are not the majority Muslim countries, 
but the countries of the Christian Orthodox cultural tradition, including the 
former USSR. In Table 1.7, which lists the distances of the dots (country values) 
in Graph 1.5 from the non-linear trend line, Egypt and its neighbor Israel have 
about the same residuals. All Muslim countries in the sample (with the 
exception of post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan) are even ahead of the three 
Baltic EU-member states Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in their self-expression 
development. Judged by the size of its residual self-expression, the EU-member 
country Poland is ranked about equally with Turkey, and is even behind several 
Muslim countries. I.e. judging by the advancement of secularization, Poland has 
a lower self-expression than several Muslim countries. Such comparisons could 
be continued almost endlessly, all showing that prospects for the Muslim 
countries in the framework of Inglehart’s sociology must be considered as more 
positive than commonly thought.  
 
 
Table 1.7: The two waves of self-expression – results from our non-linear 
re-analysis of the Inglehart global map of human values 
 
 
 TRADITIONAL
/SECULAR 
RATIONAL 
VALUES WVS 
1-4/2006 
SURVIVAL/SE
LF-
EXPRESSION 
VALUES WVS 
1-4/2006 
non-linear 
trend: Self-
Expression 
Residual: 
Self-
Expression 
New Zealand 0,4080 1,1300 -0,1876 1,3176 
Australia 0,0750 1,0250 -0,0246 1,0496 
United States -0,3460 0,9510 -0,0655 1,0165 
Netherlands 0,7800 0,7940 -0,2182 1,0122 
Switzerland 0,7060 0,7320 -0,2456 0,9776 
Finland 0,6880 0,6100 -0,2492 0,8592 
Canada -0,0420 0,8410 0,0029 0,8381 
Great Britain 0,3210 0,6610 -0,1425 0,8035 
Norway 0,7040 0,5360 -0,2461 0,7821 
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Puerto Rico -0,8940 0,4310 -0,1926 0,6236 
France 0,7300 0,2590 -0,2391 0,4981 
Germany 0,8120 0,2980 -0,1993 0,4973 
Venezuela -0,8220 0,2430 -0,2523 0,4953 
Sweden 1,2340 0,9020 0,5087 0,3933 
Mexico -0,2670 0,2350 -0,0286 0,2636 
Italy 0,2350 0,1650 -0,0964 0,2614 
Dominican 
Republic 
-0,4440 0,1130 -0,1240 0,2370 
South Korea 0,5910 -0,0410 -0,2496 0,2086 
Uruguay 0,0200 0,1850 -0,0084 0,1934 
Israel 0,1470 0,1110 -0,0532 0,1642 
Spain 0,2390 0,0570 -0,0985 0,1555 
Viet Nam -0,1250 0,1240 0,0047 0,1193 
South Africa -0,5060 -0,0540 -0,1645 0,1105 
Peru -0,4890 -0,0610 -0,1533 0,0923 
Egypt -0,7130 -0,1750 -0,2667 0,0917 
Argentina -0,2470 0,0520 -0,0212 0,0732 
Croatia 0,5430 -0,1730 -0,2399 0,0669 
Philippines -0,4500 -0,0710 -0,1279 0,0569 
Chile -0,4310 -0,0650 -0,1157 0,0507 
Slovakia 0,5160 -0,1840 -0,2320 0,0480 
Slovenia 0,6170 -0,2200 -0,2523 0,0323 
Tanzania, United 
Republic Of 
-0,9370 -0,1250 -0,1312 0,0062 
Brazil -0,4520 -0,1240 -0,1292 0,0052 
Nigeria -0,8160 -0,2760 -0,2552 -0,0208 
Uganda -0,5860 -0,3000 -0,2145 -0,0855 
Czech Republic 1,0930 0,0860 0,1742 -0,0882 
Japan 1,1520 0,2060 0,3027 -0,0967 
India -0,0800 -0,1010 0,0056 -0,1066 
Singapore -0,2780 -0,1580 -0,0331 -0,1249 
Bangladesh -0,6710 -0,4260 -0,2553 -0,1707 
Algeria -0,7340 -0,4410 -0,2695 -0,1715 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
0,2260 -0,2880 -0,0917 -0,1963 
Indonesia -0,3390 -0,3320 -0,0617 -0,2703 
Hungary 0,4290 -0,5180 -0,1975 -0,3205 
Poland -0,2750 -0,3530 -0,0318 -0,3212 
Turkey -0,3600 -0,4430 -0,0731 -0,3699 
Albania 0,3290 -0,5250 -0,1468 -0,3782 
Pakistan -0,7630 -0,6690 -0,2694 -0,3996 
Jordan -0,8820 -0,6210 -0,2061 -0,4149 
Lithuania 0,4940 -0,6450 -0,2245 -0,4205 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
0,5030 -0,6620 -0,2277 -0,4343 
Macedonia, 0,3040 -0,6000 -0,1334 -0,4666 
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Republic of 
Taiwan Province 
of China 
0,4220 -0,6630 -0,1943 -0,4687 
Bulgaria 0,7660 -0,7010 -0,2250 -0,4760 
Latvia 0,9020 -0,6000 -0,1217 -0,4783 
Zimbabwe -0,7720 -0,7650 -0,2683 -0,4967 
Armenia 0,3900 -0,6780 -0,1787 -0,4993 
Kyrgyzstan 0,0320 -0,5550 -0,0114 -0,5436 
Belarus 0,7140 -0,8190 -0,2437 -0,5753 
Azerbaijan 0,0180 -0,6440 -0,0079 -0,6361 
Georgia -0,0420 -0,6640 0,0029 -0,6669 
Ukraine 0,6580 -0,9470 -0,2525 -0,6945 
Romania 0,1720 -0,7800 -0,0647 -0,7153 
Russian 
Federation 
0,8520 -0,9120 -0,1694 -0,7426 
Estonia 1,0110 -0,7370 0,0247 -0,7617 
Moldova 0,4440 -0,9930 -0,2043 -0,7887 
 
 
Maps 1.16 and 1.17 further highlight these tendencies with the help of 
choropleth maps. 
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Map 1.16: Redrawing the Inglehartian map – the residuals from the linear function secularization selfexpression 
 
-0,89
-0,62
-0,35
-0,09
0,18
0,44
0,71
0,97
1,24
1,50
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
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Map 1.17: Redrawing the Inglehartian map – the residuals from a polynomial function of the fifth degree 
secularization selfexpression (see also Table 1.7) 
 
-0,79
-0,53
-0,26
0,00
0,26
0,53
0,79
1,05
1,32
1,58
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
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In Chapter 10, we will look at the changes in self-expression over time. We 
show with Inglehart’s own data that self-expression values are imploding over 
time in leading Western countries. In addition, direct measurements undertaken 
by the World Values Survey, wave 2010-2014, asking respondents whether they 
assign importance to the value of self-expression in child education, directly 
contradict the Inglehart scores (negative correlation, around 20% of variance 
explained). 
 
 
2. Towards a new political geography of human values 
 
 
2. 1 Re-analysis of Inglehart’s data 
 
 
Convincing, as Inglehart’s theory and empirics might appear at first sight, 
several essays questioned Inglehart’s way of combining the analyzed variables 
into his dimensions or the linkage between his dimensions and democratic 
development (Hadenius, and Teorell, 2005; Haller, 2002; Haller and Hadler, 
2006; Steenkamp, and Geyskens, 2012; furthermore Au, 2000; Davis, Dowley, 
and Silver, 1999; Li, Zinn, Chick, Absher, Graefe, and Hsu, 2007; Sacchi, 1998; 
Van de Vijver, and Poortinga, 2002). In our view, the most important theoretical 
and at the same time empirical problem is the following: principle component 
analysis or factor analysis with orthogonal standard rotation of factors (as is the 
current SPSS default option) is a convenient, but not always best way to reduce 
the relationships in a statistical correlation matrix between variables.  
 
It is of paramount importance to be of the “small print” here – what relationships 
exist between the factors? Which relationships are being allowed by the model? 
No correlations between the factors? The statistical method chosen by 
Inglehart to reduce the complexity of the different components allows for no 
correlations between the chosen factors. It is the standard varimax rotation. 
Today, this technique is increasingly being substituted by better and more 
advanced methods, like the promax rotation, which exactly allows such 
correlations between the factors (Finch, 2006). To make matters worse, 
Inglehart’s choice of the WVS data did not always use the items, which are the 
best available items for a maximum number of countries. His analyses are based 
on a maximum of 146789 global interviews reflecting 22 variables; while we 
thought it more appropriate to base our analysis on a maximum of 180041 
global interviews for 30 variables. Our analysis is based on the World Values 
Survey data roll-out entitled: “wvs1981_2008_v20090914.sav”, which was 
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freely available at the WVS website. Any person around the globe in the 
possession of an IBM/SPSS 21 license, and an internet connection to download 
the freely available WVS data should be able to arrive at exactly the same 
results as we do. 
 
In our research design, we worked with listwise deletion of missing values. At 
the end of the day, there were 92289 persons around the globe with complete 
data for all the 30 variables. We worked with the very best documented World 
Values Survey items. Our “new” nine factors all make very much ‘sense’ and are 
completely free from problematic theoretical assumptions. We included all 30 
original indicators, based on the original more than 180.000 WVS interviews, 
into the original principal components and later the promax factor analysis. Our 
research design was thus intended to be more straightforward and simple than 
Inglehart’s. In addition, it uses a more advanced and up to date statistical 
methodology. To explain the mathematical-statistical details of the Inglehart 
approach, let us quote here at length from Inglehart and Welzel (2010a), where 
the two authors very concisely explain the intricate details of their own factor 
analytical approach: 
 
“These two dimensions (i.e. Secular Values and Self-Expression Values) explain 
more than 70 percent of the cross-national variance in a factor analysis of ten 
indicators—and each of these dimensions is strongly correlated with scores of 
other orientations. The Traditional/Secular-rational values dimension reflects 
the contrast between societies in which religion is very important and those in 
which it is not. A wide range of other orientations are closely linked with this 
dimension. Societies near the traditional pole emphasize the importance of 
parent-child ties and deference to authority, along with absolute standards and 
traditional family values, and reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide. 
These societies have high levels of national pride, and a nationalistic outlook. 
Societies with secular-rational values have the opposite preferences on all of 
these topics. The second major dimension of crosscultural variation is linked 
with the transition from industrial society to post-industrial societies, which 
brings a polarization between Survival and Selfexpression values. The 
unprecedented wealth that has accumulated in advanced societies during the 
past generation means that an increasing share of the population has grown up 
taking survival for granted. Thus, priorities have shifted from an overwhelming 
emphasis on economic and physical security toward an increasing emphasis 
on subjective well-being, self-expression and quality of life. A central 
component of this emerging dimension involves the polarization between 
Materialist and Postmaterialist values, reflecting a cultural shift that is 
emerging among generations who have grown up taking survival for granted. 
Self-expression values give high priority to environmental protection, 
tolerance of diversity and rising demands for participation in decision making 
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in economic and political life. These values also reflect mass polarization over 
tolerance of out-groups, including foreigners, gays and lesbians and gender 
equality. The shift from survival values to self-expression values also includes a 
shift in child-rearing values, from emphasis on hard work toward emphasis on 
imagination and tolerance as important values to teach a child. And it goes 
with a rising sense of subjective well-being that is conducive to an atmosphere 
of tolerance, trust and political moderation. Finally, societies that rank high 
on self-expression values also tend to rank high on interpersonal trust. These 
two dimensions tap scores of variables […]. For technical reasons, early work 
using factor analysis derived the dimensions from ten of these variables; more 
recent work uses a 12-item additive index to measure Survival/Self-expression 
values. Regardless of how it is constructed, the resulting cross-cultural map is 
so robust that it produces very similar results. Moreover, using a completely 
different way of measuring basic values, different types of samples and a 
different type of dimensional analysis, Schwartz (2006) finds very similar 
transnational groupings among 76 countries.” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2010a) 
 
In contrast to Inglehart, we also include background variables, like gender, age 
and education. Thus, our analysis is not anymore a “gender-free zone”:  
 
Table 2.1: the research designs compared 
 
 
 Inglehart and associates Our re-analysis 
choice and naming of the dimensions ex ante, perhaps controversial, for 
example that survival values (and 
not tradition values) include the 
divorce and abortion item and the 
limits on selling foreign goods 
item, while the item on incomes 
and jobs, currently listed in the 
traditional values dimensions, very 
plausibly might be listed under the 
survival dimension as well 
ex post, as suggested by the 
empirical results; the results 
were compared to the 
literature 
factor analytical design standard factor analysis using 
orthogonal varimax rotation (does 
not allow for correlations between 
the factors) 
more advanced versions of 
factor analysis, allowing for 
relationships between the 
factors (Promax rotation) 
inclusion of socio-economic background 
variables like age, education in the model 
no yes 
n of countries, considered in the analysis 65 68 
number of variables in the original analysis 22 variables/later reduced to 10 30 
results are based on items, available for at 
least the following number of respondents 
146789 180041 
% of total variance explained at the 
individual analysis level 
26% (traditional values) + 13% 
(survival values) 
47. 89% 
 
 
Our re-analysis is based on 68 countries, and there is a good number of 
Muslim societies or predominantly Muslim societies among them [the 
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Organization of Islamic Cooperation members Albania; Azerbaijan; 
Bangladesh; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Indonesia; Jordan; Kyrgyzstan; Mali; 
Morocco; Tanzania; Turkey; Uganda]. The smallest n for any of our items is 
more than 180.000 persons and our total analysis is based finally on none the 
less than 92289 persons with complete data covering all the 30 variables from 
around the globe. No substitution of missing values had to be carried out. The 
SPSS XXI statistics program with the default options for factor analysis/promax 
rotation was applied. Independent of culture, religion or moral convictions, any 
researcher around the globe could arrive at the same results as we did.  
 
 
Table 2.2: The choice of our variables from the World Values Survey 
 
 
Variable label Interpretation of the variable according 
to the highest numerical value 
n =  
Age Age 247978 
Competition good or harmful Competition good or harmful 203976 
Confidence: Armed Forces [No] Confidence: Armed Forces 231665 
Confidence: The Press [No] Confidence: The Press 236529 
Highest educational level attained Highest educational level attained 230283 
How important is God in your life How important is God in your life 240112 
How often do you attend religious services [Never attend religious services. Scale: ] 
How often do you attend religious services 
238981 
Immigrant policy (prevent people from coming) Immigrant policy (prevent people from 
coming) 
187066 
Important child qualities: determination and 
perseverance 
Important child qualities: determination and 
perseverance 
247782 
Important child qualities: feeling of 
responsibility 
Important child qualities: feeling of 
responsibility 
255656 
Important child qualities: hard work Important child qualities: hard work 253331 
Important child qualities: imagination Important child qualities: imagination 252238 
Important child qualities: independence Important child qualities: independence 255656 
Important child qualities: obedience Important child qualities: obedience 255656 
Important child qualities: religious faith Important child qualities: religious faith 253503 
Important child qualities: thrift, and saving 
money and things 
Important child qualities: thrift, and saving 
money and things 
255656 
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect 
for other people 
Important child qualities: tolerance and 
respect for other people 
255656 
Important child qualities: unselfishness Important child qualities: unselfishness 252238 
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public 
transport 
224394 
Justifiable: cheating on taxes Justifiable: cheating on taxes 232012 
Justifiable: claiming government benefits even 
if one is not entitled to them 
Justifiable: claiming government benefits 230882 
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 243824 
Most people can be trusted [highest numerical 
value: you just can’t be too careful]) 
Lack of social capital (Most people can be 
trusted [highest numerical value: you just 
can’t be too careful]) 
246798 
Neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers [Rejecting] Neighbors: Immigrants/foreign 
workers 
225868 
Neighbors: People of a different race [Rejecting] Neighbors: People of a different 
race 
231410 
74 
 
Political system: having a democratic political 
system 
Political system: (It’s very bad] having a 
democratic political system 
193889 
Satisfaction with your life Satisfaction with your life 252679 
self-positioning in political scale (scale 1-left to 
10-right) 
[Right wing] self-positioning in political 
scale (scale 1-left to 10-right) 
180041 
Sex (Gender) [in multivariate analysis: female] 
(1=male; 2=female) 
Sex (Gender) [in multivariate analysis: 
female] (1=male; 2=female) 
252941 
University is more important for a boy than for 
a girl 
Rejecting sexist position: University is 
more important for a boy than for a girl 
207655 
 
 
The WVS data we used correspond to 88.96% of the total global population and 
84.75% of the world’s Muslim population. The complete data matrix for the re-
analysis of the Inglehart world map of human values is based on the sample of 
56.89% of the global population and 56.16% of the global Muslim population. 
Table 2.2 listed the final variables of our investigation. Table 2.3 now lists the 
indicators, their data range, and the original wording in the World Values Survey 
questionnaire. Our readers should thus be in a better position to be able to follow 
our naming of the different factors, which reproduce the underlying correlation 
matrix for the data.  
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Table 2.3: description of the variables of our model according to the World Values Survey 
 
Indicator range maximum 
numerical value 
wording 
Age 15 to 65 65+ V237. - This means you are __ __ years old.  
Competition good or harmful 1 to 10 10 (harmful) V119. - Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your 
views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you 
agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, 
you can choose any number in between. Sentences: Competition is good. It stimulates people to 
work hard and develop new ideas vs. Competition is harmful. It brings the worst in people 
[No] Confidence: Armed 
Forces 
1 to 4 4 (none at all) V132. - I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how 
much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not 
very much confidence or none at all? The armed forces 
[No] Confidence: The Press 1 to 4 4 (none at all) V133. - I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how 
much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not 
very much confidence or none at all? The press 
Highest educational level 
attained 
1 to 9 9 University with 
degree/Higher 
education - 
upper-level 
tertiary 
certificate 
V238. - What is the highest educational level that you have attained? (use functional equivalent 
of the following, in given society; IF STUDENT, CODE HIGHEST LEVEL HE/SHE 
EXPECTS TO COMPLETE):  
How important is God in your 
life 
1 to 10 10 (very 
important) 
V192. - How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate- 10 means very 
important and 1 means not at all important.  
[Never attend religious 
services. Scale: ] How often do 
you attend religious services 
1 to 7 7 (never, 
practically never) 
V186. - Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious 
services these days? 
Immigrant policy 1 to 4 4 (prohibit 
people from 
coming) 
V124. - How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the 
following do you think the government should do? 
Important child qualities: 
determination and perseverance 
0 to 1 1 (important) determination and perseverance 
Important child qualities: 
feeling of responsibility 
0 to 1 1 (important) feeling of responsibility 
Important child qualities: hard 
work 
0 to 1 1 (important) hard work 
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Important child qualities: 
imagination 
0 to 1 1 (important) imagination 
Important child qualities: 
independence 
0 to 1 1 (important) independence 
Important child qualities: 
obedience 
0 to 1 1 (important) obedience 
Important child qualities: 
religious faith 
0 to 1 1 (important) religious faith 
Important child qualities: thrift, 
and saving money and things 
0 to 1 1 (important) thrift, and saving money and things 
Important child qualities: 
tolerance and respect for other 
people 
0 to 1 1 (important) tolerance and respect for other people 
Important child qualities: 
unselfishness 
0 to 1 1 (important) unselfishness 
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on 
public transport 
1 to 10 10 (always 
justifiable) 
V199. - Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. (Read out statements. Code 
one answer for each statement). Avoiding a fare on public transport 
Justifiable: cheating on taxes 1 to 10 10 (always 
justifiable) 
V200. - Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. (Read out statements. Code 
one answer for each statement). Cheating on taxes if you have a chance 
Justifiable: claiming 
government benefits even if one 
is not entitled to them 
1 to 10 10 (always 
justifiable) 
V198. - Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. (Read out statements. Code 
one answer for each statement). Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled 
Justifiable: someone accepting 
a bribe 
1 to 10 10 (always 
justifiable) 
V201. - Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. (Read out statements. Code 
one answer for each statement). Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties 
Lack of social capital (Most 
people can be trusted [highest 
numerical value: you just can’t 
be too careful]) 
1 to 2 2 (you can't be 
too careful) 
V23. - Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be 
very careful in dealing with people? 
[Rejecting] Neighbors: 
Immigrants/foreign workers 
0 to 1 1 (mentioned) On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like 
to have as neighbors? 
[Rejecting] Neighbors: People 
of a different race 
0 to 1 1 (mentioned) On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like 
to have as neighbors? 
Political system: (It’s very bad] 
having a democratic political 
system 
1 to 4 4 (very bad) V151. - I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about 
each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly 
good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political 
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system 
Satisfaction with your life 1 to 10  10 (satisfied) V22. - All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Please 
use this card to help with your answer.  
[Right wing] self-positioning in 
political scale (scale 1-left to 
10-right) 
1 to 10 10 (right wing) V114. - In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right.” How would you place your 
views on this scale, generally speaking? 
Sex (Gender) [in multivariate 
analysis: female] (1=male; 
2=female) 
1 to 2 2 (female) V235. - Sex (Gender) 
Rejecting sexist position: 
University is more important 
for a boy than for a girl 
1 to 4 4 (strongly 
disagree) 
V62. - For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with 
each. Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly? A university education is 
more important for a boy than for a girl 
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Table 2.4 provides an overview of the sample sizes of World Values Survey 
respondents with complete data for all the chosen 30 variables.  
 
Table 2.4: the sample size of World Values Survey respondents with 
complete data for all 30 variables of our investigation 
 
Country/region n = 
Albania 1297 
Azerbaijan 860 
Argentina 2031 
Australia 2750 
Bangladesh 1033 
Armenia 1154 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1809 
Brazil 2161 
Bulgaria 953 
Belarus 861 
Canada 2832 
Chile 2109 
Taiwan 1820 
Cyprus 932 
Czech Republic 835 
Dominican Republic 276 
Ethiopia 950 
Estonia 685 
Finland 1552 
Georgia 2042 
Germany 2953 
Ghana 718 
Guatemala 748 
Hong Kong 785 
Hungary 478 
India 2358 
Indonesia 1112 
Italy 597 
Jordan 300 
South Korea 1156 
Kyrgyzstan 883 
Latvia 772 
Lithuania 489 
Mali 595 
Mexico 2299 
Moldova 1809 
Morocco 278 
New Zealand 1022 
Nigeria 1494 
Norway 2016 
Peru 1864 
Philippines 2174 
Poland 543 
Puerto Rico 1378 
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Romania 1433 
Russian Federation 821 
Slovakia 777 
Viet Nam 1830 
Slovenia 1181 
South Africa 6086 
Zimbabwe 667 
Spain 2336 
Sweden 1639 
Switzerland 910 
Thailand 1452 
Trinidad and Tobago 597 
Turkey 945 
Uganda 759 
Ukraine 1186 
Macedonia 1176 
Tanzania 671 
United States 3317 
Burkina Faso 725 
Uruguay 1075 
Venezuela 1634 
Serbia and Montenegro 1975 
Zambia 775 
Serbia 559 
Total 92289 
 
 
So our re-analysis of Inglehart’s theories is based on 68 countries. The smallest 
n for any of our single variables is slightly more than 180.000 persons. For 
92289 persons around the globe, there are complete data for all the 30 variables 
available in the WVS database (http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSData.jsp) 
at once. 
14
 
 
 
2. 2. A “light” version of the results and their immediate 
consequences for the general public: the Kuznets curves of human 
values along the paths of human development.  
 
 
Since the content of Chapter 2.3, presenting the factor analytical model in great 
detail will be only of special interest to the social scientific audience of this 
article, we present here for the general public a “light” version of the results and 
their immediate consequences. 
 
                                                 
14
 WVS FIVE WAVE AGGREGATED FILE 1981-2005 (NEW) available at http: //www. 
wvsevsdb. com/wvs/WVSData. jsp  
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We already highlighted that our model, based on the usual standard criteria of 
factor analysis and the promax rotation, explains 47.89% of the total variance of 
all the 30 variables. For an analysis of original survey data from more than 
90.000 global representative interview partners, this percentage must be 
considered as high. 
 
In Table 2.5, we highlight the relationships between the original 30 variables 
and the newly derived factor analytical dimensions. As it is well-known from 
the methodological literature on the subject, the naming of the different factors 
might sound arbitrarily. The best proposed solution, suggested by the literature, 
is to provide readers with a full unbiased original account of all the loadings 
from the rotated structure matrix and also to mention the table of the correlations 
between the newly derived factors (to cite some classical and contemporary 
literature on the subject, see: Child, 2006; Diena et al., 2005; Finch, 2006; 
Jackson and Borgatta, 1981; Kim and Mueller, 1978a, 1978b; Thompson, 2004; 
Ueberla, 1970). We think that our naming of the factors, based on the structure 
of the loadings, represents a good choice, compatible with the results of a large 
body of world-values-related literature, quoted in our bibliography. But as in 
any factor analysis, the naming of the factors is indeed subjective and open to 
criticism. But we claim that from the given lists of results, the choice taken by 
us is a good one.  
 
We also should highlight that a loading (i. e. correlation coefficient of a factor 
with an underlying variable) of, say, 0.400 only represents 16% of variance of 
the original variable explained, and 0.500 only implies a percentage of 25% of 
explained variance, while 0.600 already implies 36% of explained variance, and 
0.900 would imply 81% of total variance explained et cetera. Readers are 
invited to compare the loadings with our proposed naming of the factors:  
 
a) economic permissiveness 
b) traditional religion 
c) racism 
d) higher education for the younger generation (education gap between the 
generations) 
e) distrust of the army and the press 
f) authoritarian character 
g) tolerance and respect 
h) the 'ego' company (i. e. the rejection of obedience and unselfishness as 
values in education) 
i) [predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy 
 
Let us now look at the trajectory of the factor scores along the path of Human 
Development (measured by the well-known UNDP Human Development 
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Indicator). Norris and Inglehart, 2004 link the UNDP Human Development 
Index directly with the concept of “human security”. They maintain that human 
security will be increasing with a rising UNDP Human Development Index.  
 
By tracking the progress of the value indicators along the axis of the Human 
Development Indicator, we discover that value change in the societies of this 
world is far from linear. Our new factors, best representing the core items of the 
World Values Survey, as a rule present a curve-linear relationship with the 
UNDP-Human Development Index (UNDP HDI). This is an important new 
qualification in the debate about global development. 
 
We should add here that there is not yet a widely accepted definition of the 
concept of Human Security. While definitions vary, their common ground 
remains the individual, not the state. There is a clear difference between the 
individual security and the state security.  
 
According to the 2009 UNDP Human Development Report,  
 
“Most contemporary Arab writers express the belief in an unbreakable bond 
between individual human security and national security on the one hand and 
human security and external military threats on the other. Other writers believe 
that the authoritarian state is the source of the greatest threats to human 
security in the region (…) However, such writers do not maintain that the 
achievement of human security rules out state security. Rather, they hold that 
the achievement of individual human security will have the effect of 
transforming the authoritarian state into one that respects the rule of law. This 
shift may require, among other things, the reform of existing security 
apparatuses or possibly even the establishment of new security institutions.” 
(UNDP, Arab Human Development Report, 2009).  
 
It is noteworthy that the UNDP’s report, drawing on the concerns of the Arab 
thinkers, defines Human Security as “the liberation of human beings from those 
intense, extensive, prolonged, and comprehensive threats to which their lives 
and freedom are vulnerable.” 
 
However, while the UNDP’s report relies primarily on the internationally 
recognized dimensions of human security, as identified in the 1994 global 
Human Development Report, it acknowledges that “any identification of threats 
to Arab human security needs to reflect the status of the region as a highly 
diverse area which, through most periods of its history, has been the object of 
conflict among the world’s superpowers.” 
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Applying this type of reasoning, we might expect the following to happen in the 
process of modernization:  
 
 Traditional religion diminishes in its societal role, as human security is 
rising 
 Tolerance and respect, distrust of the army and the press, the “ego-
company” orientation, and the [predominantly] female rejection of the 
market economy and democracy all rise with human security 
 There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between human security and 
permissiveness/pessimism, racism, the education gape between the 
generations, and the authoritarian character 
 
Graph 2.1a and 2.1b highlight these strongly non-linear relationships:  
 
 
Graph 2.1a and Graph 2.1b: the global trajectory of human values along 
the scale of the Human Development Index 
 
 
 
 
The logic of global value change in the course of development 
-1 
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In Inglehart’s model, the two dimensions – traditional values and survival values 
- are independent from one another, whereas the promax model allows for 
correlations between the factors.  
 
We will now look at the factor loadings above +- 0.500 and we will try to debate 
the similarities, but also differences in the research results with earlier 
approaches.  
 
Economic permissiveness has its higher loadings with the WVS items  
 
 Justifiable: cheating on taxes 
 Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport 
 Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 
 Justifiable: claiming government benefits even if one is not entitled to 
them 
 
Traditional religion expresses the higher factor loadings on the items  
 
 How important is God in your life 
 Important child qualities: religious faith 
 Negative loading [Never attend religious services. Scale: ] How often do 
you attend religious services 
 
Racism 
 
 [Rejecting] Neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers 
 [Rejecting] Neighbors: People of a different race 
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 Immigrant policy (prevent people from coming) 
 
Higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the 
generations) 
 
 Highest educational level attained 
 Rejecting sexist position: University is more important for a boy than for 
a girl 
 Negative loading Age 
 Negative loading Important child qualities: thrift, and saving money and 
things 
 
Distrust of the army and the press 
 
 [No] Confidence: The Press 
 [No] Confidence: Armed Forces 
 Negative loading: [Right wing] self-positioning in political scale (scale 1-
left to 10-right) 
 
Authoritarian character 
 
 Lack of social capital (Most people can be trusted [highest numerical 
value: you just can’t be too careful]) 
 Important child qualities: hard work 
 Important child qualities: obedience 
 Negative loading: Important child qualities: imagination 
 Negative loading: Important child qualities: independence 
 
Tolerance and respect + post-materialism 
 
 Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people 
 Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility 
 Rejecting sexist position: University is more important for a boy than for 
a girl 
 Negative loading: Important child qualities: hard work 
 
The ‘ego’ company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness) 
 
 Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility 
 Important child qualities: independence 
 Negative loading: Important child qualities: unselfishness 
 Negative loading: Important child qualities: obedience 
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[predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy 
 
 Sex (Gender) [in multivariate analysis: female] (1=male; 2=female) 
 Competition good or harmful 
 Political system: (It’s very bad] having a democratic political system 
 
 
Traditional religion reflects very well the results from all the three mentioned 
major research traditions in cross-national value research today. This is a factor, 
whose relationship with these research traditions is very clear, and whose 
significance can be easily interpreted also from the viewpoint of Hofstede’s, 
Inglehart’s and Schwartz/Davidov’s theory.  
 
Economic permissiveness clearly captures the dimension of lawlessness, 
moral-ethical decay and the shadow economy, so prominent in contemporary 
economic theory of growth. It is completely lacking in the hitherto published 
analyses by Hofstede, Schwartz/Davidov and Inglehart. Yet it is the most 
important of all the resulting factors today. To have overlooked this dimension 
is a major still existing shortcoming of contemporary cross-national quantitative 
value research. As Graph 2.1a and Graph 2.1b show, this factor presents a clear 
U-shaped function of the development level, so well-known from economic 
literature ever since the discoveries of Simon Kuznets (1955) about the 
relationship between income levels and economic inequalities. We foresee a 
culmination of crises tendencies, manifesting themselves in lawlessness, racism, 
the educational generation gap, and the authoritarian character, all at middle 
development levels, coinciding with the maximum points of income inequality 
in a nation’s history. As the power of traditional religion fades away in modern 
developed society, not only positive processes (like the increase in tolerance) set 
in: we also witness a rising distrust in the army and the press, and a growing and 
only slowly decreasing level of [predominantly] female rejection of the market 
economy and democracy.  
 
Inglehart expects that with a rising level of capitalist development, the values of 
‘self-expression’ gain upper hand, and that the religious element is basically a 
human answer to the problem of a lack of security. If human security increases, 
religion slowly recedes. But economic permissiveness, racism, the educational 
generation gap, and the authoritarian character all first increase with rising levels 
of development and increasing secularization. Only at very high levels of 
development racism and economic permissiveness diminish again. In a cultural 
shift, well explainable by Inglehart’s theories, tolerance increases as the social 
power of religion recedes; but as traditional religion diminishes, distrust of the 
army and the press, and the [predominantly] female rejection of the market 
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economy and democracy increase. So we are far less optimistic than the hitherto 
existing theories. 
 
Comparable to Hofstede’s LTO-factor, we also detect a factor, which we call 
‘the ego company’, which is especially strong in the countries of East Asia.  
 
Traditional religion is linked in a very complex way to the absence of economic 
permissiveness. An interesting question for future research would be which 
countries are exceptional performers (“residuals”) on each stage of 
secularization.  
 
Graph 2.2: economic permissiveness (lowest value: Bangladesh, highest 
value: Serbia, y-axis) as a function of secularization (lowest value: Nigeria; 
highest value: Russia, x-axis) in our own theoretical system  
 
 
 
 
 
X-axis: secularization (= our factor “traditional religion”*-1); y-axis: economic 
permissiveness 
 
 
2. 3. The final factor analytical model. A presentation for the 
specialists 
 
The general public might skip over this Chapter and directly go to Chapter 2.4. 
We will start our presentation of the final factor analytical results by looking at 
the correlations between the nine factors. The final diagram about the noticeable 
interrelationships between the various factors of our model is described in Graph 
2.4:  
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Graph 2.3: final summarizing model, based on the correlations between the 
nine factors  
 
 
 
 
 
The methodological literature already referred to above suggests that the 
assumption of non-correlation between the factors, inherent in Inglehart’s 
varimax-rotation model, is unrealistic. We have highlighted the correlations 
above 0.100 in our Table in bold letters, to allow our readers a closer look at the 
underlying relationships between the factors.  
 
The following Tables and Graphs are directed towards the specialists. The 
general public might simply gaze over the following Tables and Graphs, while 
the specialists are invited to take a closer look at the following materials.  
 
The methodological literature in Chapter 3 of this article already highlighted the 
importance of the Eigen values as a defining mathematical benchmark of a 
principal components/factor analysis. Graph 2.4 shows the Eigen values of our 
investigation; with the first two factors way past any linear continuation of the 
factors 10 – 29, shown in the x-axis.  
 
Thus eight factors,  
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 economic permissiveness 
 traditional religion 
 racism 
 higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the 
generations) 
 distrust of the army and the press 
 authoritarian character 
 tolerance and respect + post-materialism 
 the ‘ego’ company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness) 
 
are not only well above Eigen value 1.0, but also way above the linear 
continuation of the Eigen values of factors 9 – 19. Following the simple standard 
procedure of analyzing the Eigen values, we suggest to treat the results for factor 
nine with some caution at least. Although its Eigen value is still above 1.0, its 
numerical vicinity to the low Eigen values of factors 10 – 19 is clearly visible. In 
all, our model explains some 47% of the total variance of the correlation matrix 
of the data for 30 variables from more than 90.000 interview partners of the 
World Values Survey, with two factors explaining more than 17% of the total 
variance in between them already – economic permissiveness, and traditional 
religion, the two defining processes of global values and global value change 
today.  
 
We have highlighted all factor loadings from the rotated structure matrix 
(Promax rotation according to the SPSS 20 with Kaiser normalization) in 
different typing and shadings in order to facilitate our readers to arrive at their 
own independent opinions about our results (provided that they think that the 
original World Values Survey data are credible and unbiased).  
 
We should emphasize the point that the correlations between the factors are not 
correlations between aggregations at the country level but reflect the correlations 
between the factors, to be extracted from the data at the individual level of the 
more than 90. 000 interview partners across countries and across cultures. Under 
such conditions, correlations between factors of more than +-.100 are already to 
be considered high. Nevertheless, we have to emphasize that the relationships 
between the factors with Eigen values of 2.0 or above (economic 
permissiveness, and traditional religion), with the rest of the nine factors under 
consideration here in no way sufficiently firmly confirm widespread 
expectations of contemporary secularism and atheism directed against the 
religious phenomenon. 
 
Seven factors under consideration here are a new input for the entire global 
debate about human values:  
 
89 
 
 the strength of economic permissiveness,  
 the clear proof of the existence of a factor describing racism,  
 the generation gap in education, connected with value transformation 
processes, 
 the existence of a joint political distrust factor directed against important 
institutions of society - the army and the press. This factor is also relevant 
for some highly developed countries, and not only countries in the 
periphery and semi-periphery of the world system, recovering from years 
of military dictatorship (like Argentina, Chile et cetera) 
 the clear proof of an “authoritarian personality” factor, and a  
 re-emergence of the Hofstede dimension of “long term orientation”, called 
here “the ego company”.  
 
Two factors bear great semblance to the results, achieved by Inglehart and his 
associates –  
 
 traditional religion and  
 tolerance + respect and post-materialism.  
 
Our readers are also invited to look at Table 2.7 for the aggregate country results 
and at Table 2.8 for the “global map” of human religious denominations. Table 
2.8 and its results about factor scores for the major global denominations are 
way past of what Huntington, 1996 had to say on the clash between 
civilizations. Of course, we should remind our readers that results based on 500 
interview partners have an error margin of up to +-4.4% (see also Graph 2.1, 
confidence interval 95%).  
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Graph 2.4: Screeplot for our factor analysis 
 
 
 
 Eigen 
value 
% of 
variance 
explained 
Cumulated 
percentage 
economic permissiveness 2,526 8,711 8,711 
traditional religion 2,472 8,523 17,234 
racism 1,688 5,822 23,056 
higher education of the younger generation 1,442 4,974 28,029 
distrust of the army and the press 1,298 4,475 32,504 
authoritarian character 1,189 4,099 36,604 
tolerance and respect 1,143 3,942 40,545 
the 'ego' company 1,118 3,854 44,399 
[predominantly] female rejection of the market 
economy and democracy 
1,012 3,489 47,888 
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Table 2.5: Structure matrix – Promax with Kaiser normalization 
 
 economic 
permissiven
ess 
traditional 
religion 
racism higher 
education 
of the 
younger 
generation 
(education 
gap 
between the 
generations
) 
distrust of 
the army 
and the 
press 
authoritaria
n character 
tolerance 
and respect 
+ post-
materialism 
the ‘ego’ 
company 
(rejection of 
obedience + 
unselfishnes
s) 
[predomina
ntly] female 
rejection of 
the market 
economy 
and 
democracy 
Age -0,169 -0,071 -0,026 -0,680 -0,022 -0,037 0,195 0,114 -0,135 
Competition good or 
harmful 
0,155 -0,059 0,020 -0,163 0,064 -0,093 -0,076 -0,101 0,556 
[No] Confidence: Armed 
Forces 
0,079 -0,087 -0,054 0,157 0,757 -0,035 0,014 0,032 0,111 
[No] Confidence: The Press -0,016 -0,090 -0,076 -0,020 0,759 -0,010 0,120 0,039 -0,007 
Highest educational level 
attained 
-0,041 -0,098 -0,094 0,648 0,078 -0,195 0,165 0,158 -0,136 
How important is God in 
your life 
-0,039 0,813 0,035 -0,026 -0,123 0,200 -0,076 -0,106 0,054 
[Never attend religious 
services. Scale: ] How often 
do you attend religious 
services 
0,018 -0,800 -0,064 0,033 0,138 -0,119 0,108 0,080 -0,021 
Immigrant policy (prevent 
people from coming) 
0,003 0,089 0,302 -0,191 0,107 0,227 0,097 0,044 0,095 
Important child qualities: 
determination and 
perseverance 
0,002 -0,232 0,015 0,282 -0,003 -0,104 0,114 0,114 -0,192 
Important child qualities: 
feeling of responsibility 
-0,043 -0,186 -0,044 0,071 -0,009 -0,028 0,462 0,408 0,071 
Important child qualities: 0,007 0,033 -0,023 -0,029 -0,200 0,437 -0,500 0,256 -0,148 
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hard work 
Important child qualities: 
imagination 
0,000 -0,098 -0,022 0,159 0,082 -0,613 -0,074 0,005 0,032 
Important child qualities: 
independence 
-0,020 -0,133 0,057 0,207 0,067 -0,508 0,007 0,353 0,031 
Important child qualities: 
obedience 
0,030 0,268 0,035 -0,158 -0,043 0,300 -0,201 -0,562 0,031 
Important child qualities: 
religious faith 
-0,028 0,741 0,041 -0,065 -0,038 0,166 -0,082 -0,169 -0,007 
Important child qualities: 
thrift, and saving money and 
things 
0,006 -0,069 0,080 -0,338 -0,097 0,212 -0,282 0,260 0,170 
Important child qualities: 
tolerance and respect for 
other people 
-0,064 -0,029 -0,104 -0,009 0,026 0,033 0,623 -0,032 -0,072 
Important child qualities: 
unselfishness 
-0,008 -0,013 -0,024 0,063 -0,016 -0,107 0,131 -0,644 0,031 
Justifiable: avoiding a fare 
on public transport 
0,779 -0,059 -0,002 0,079 0,066 0,021 -0,078 -0,026 0,112 
Justifiable: cheating on 
taxes 
0,791 -0,103 0,020 0,047 0,084 0,018 -0,089 0,021 0,026 
Justifiable: claiming 
government benefits even if 
one is not entitled to them 
0,716 0,006 0,059 -0,003 0,017 0,041 -0,112 -0,053 0,132 
Justifiable: someone 
accepting a bribe 
0,736 0,015 0,070 0,001 0,006 0,049 -0,132 -0,024 0,058 
Lack of social capital (Most 
people can be trusted 
[highest numerical value: 
you just can’t be too 
careful]) 
0,037 0,149 0,073 0,085 0,164 0,562 -0,238 0,058 0,121 
[Rejecting] Neighbors: 
Immigrants/foreign workers 
0,039 0,025 0,845 -0,064 -0,076 0,045 -0,113 0,018 0,003 
[Rejecting] Neighbors: 
People of a different race 
0,043 0,059 0,827 -0,055 -0,115 0,026 -0,161 0,006 -0,008 
Political system: (It’s very 
bad] having a democratic 
political system 
0,175 -0,106 0,097 -0,087 0,136 0,246 -0,239 -0,009 0,458 
93 
 
[Right wing] self-
positioning in political scale 
(scale 1-left to 10-right) 
0,005 0,193 0,164 -0,063 -0,300 0,045 -0,035 0,095 -0,145 
Sex (Gender) [in 
multivariate analysis: 
female] (1=male; 2=female) 
-0,079 0,165 -0,045 0,167 -0,021 -0,011 0,216 0,061 0,661 
Rejecting sexist position: 
University is more 
important for a boy than for 
a girl 
-0,153 -0,064 -0,182 0,384 0,087 -0,160 0,399 -0,042 0,177 
 economic 
permissiven
ess 
traditional 
religion 
racism higher 
education 
of the 
younger 
generation 
(education 
gap 
between the 
generations
) 
distrust of 
the army 
and the 
press 
authoritaria
n character 
tolerance 
and respect 
the ‘ego’ 
company 
(rejection of 
obedience + 
unselfishnes
s) 
[predomina
ntly] female 
rejection of 
the market 
economy 
and 
democracy 
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Table 2.6: the correlations between the factors 
 
    Matrix of components   
 economic 
permissive
ness 
tradition
al 
religion 
racism higher education of the 
younger generation 
(education gap between 
the generations) 
distrust of the 
army and the 
press 
authoritarian 
character 
tolerance and 
respect + post-
materialism 
the ‘ego’ 
company 
(rejection of 
obedience + 
unselfishness) 
traditional religion -0,051        
racism 0,067 0,063       
higher education of 
the younger 
generation 
(education gap 
between the 
generations) 
0,010 -0,036 -0,103      
distrust of the 
army and the press 
0,058 -0,122 -0,069 0,084     
authoritarian 
character 
0,055 0,190 0,064 -0,192 -0,042    
tolerance and 
respect + post-
materialism 
-0,175 -0,090 -0,144 0,119 0,072 -0,276   
the ‘ego’ company 
(rejection of 
obedience + 
unselfishness) 
-0,046 -0,173 0,034 0,058 -0,028 0,014 -0,004  
[predominantly] 
female rejection of 
the market 
economy and 
democracy 
0,093 0,034 0,018 0,030 0,117 0,045 -0,005 -0,027 
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Table 2.7: the country means for the different new factors – mapping the new map of global values on earth 
 
 economic 
permissiven
ess 
traditional 
religion 
racism higher 
education 
of the 
younger 
generation 
(education 
gap 
between the 
generations
) 
distrust of 
the army 
and the 
press 
authoritaria
n character 
tolerance 
and respect 
+ post-
materialism 
the ‘ego’ 
company 
(rejection of 
obedience + 
unselfishnes
s) 
[predomina
ntly] female 
rejection of 
the market 
economy 
and 
democracy 
Albania 0,094 -0,056 -0,137 -0,201 0,214 0,114 -0,149 -0,060 -0,229 
Argentina -0,090 0,101 -0,369 -0,103 0,557 0,050 0,067 0,037 0,147 
Armenia 0,476 -0,471 -0,022 0,237 -0,060 0,332 -0,596 0,287 -0,030 
Australia -0,340 -0,569 -0,387 0,004 0,275 -0,516 0,554 -0,241 -0,166 
Azerbaijan 0,283 -0,112 -0,135 0,297 0,204 0,183 -0,504 0,683 -0,169 
Bangladesh -0,589 0,839 1,712 -0,022 -0,854 -0,286 -0,626 0,457 -0,463 
Belarus 0,520 -0,746 -0,413 -0,035 0,000 0,555 -0,508 0,323 0,010 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
-0,304 -0,087 0,000 0,010 -0,128 -0,044 -0,083 -0,143 -0,172 
Brazil 0,525 0,583 -0,373 -0,071 -0,037 0,503 -0,153 -0,429 0,346 
Bulgaria -0,188 -0,776 -0,037 0,028 -0,282 0,257 -0,258 0,196 -0,037 
Burkina Faso 0,128 0,859 -0,440 -0,225 -0,243 0,450 -0,825 -0,710 -0,228 
Canada -0,284 -0,183 -0,424 0,038 0,018 -0,437 0,499 -0,112 -0,003 
Chile 0,225 0,147 -0,139 -0,131 0,223 -0,131 0,209 -0,316 0,457 
Cyprus -0,146 0,068 0,040 0,154 -0,026 0,056 0,194 -0,204 -0,017 
Czech Republic 0,286 -0,986 0,112 -0,448 0,180 0,496 -0,134 0,266 -0,079 
Dominican Republic -0,220 0,653 -0,079 0,920 0,273 0,159 0,282 0,064 -0,030 
Estonia 0,041 -0,944 -0,110 0,095 0,081 0,406 -0,231 0,560 -0,108 
Ethiopia -0,343 0,711 -0,114 0,250 0,429 -0,493 -0,759 -0,062 0,137 
Finland -0,162 -0,664 -0,046 -0,168 -0,059 -0,680 0,811 -0,018 0,187 
Georgia -0,054 0,179 -0,080 0,208 -0,075 0,335 -0,228 0,510 -0,178 
Germany -0,068 -0,928 -0,256 -0,268 0,563 -0,521 0,629 0,529 0,132 
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Ghana -0,098 1,120 0,097 0,054 -0,688 0,461 -0,464 -0,584 -0,402 
Guatemala 0,535 0,806 -0,354 0,125 0,310 0,236 -0,120 -0,546 0,424 
Hong Kong -0,048 -0,856 1,801 -0,193 0,008 -0,236 -0,575 -0,164 0,222 
Hungary 0,467 -0,716 0,256 -0,132 0,353 0,057 0,455 0,074 0,075 
India -0,064 0,260 0,704 -0,044 -0,824 0,133 -0,464 -0,100 -0,436 
Indonesia -0,412 1,032 0,591 0,268 -0,366 -0,218 0,017 0,182 -0,110 
Italy -0,362 0,005 -0,240 0,093 0,153 -0,346 0,579 0,041 -0,032 
Jordan -0,207 1,118 1,329 0,095 -0,824 -0,160 0,058 -0,695 -0,403 
Kyrgyzstan 0,117 -0,185 0,047 0,433 0,041 0,239 -0,409 0,419 0,175 
Latvia 0,478 -0,712 -0,115 0,046 0,319 0,511 -0,144 0,561 0,018 
Lithuania 0,169 -0,376 0,167 0,047 -0,011 0,289 -0,360 0,487 0,080 
Macedonia -0,134 -0,191 0,362 0,056 0,508 -0,035 0,458 0,002 0,058 
Mali 0,509 0,743 0,087 -0,454 -0,619 0,278 -0,879 -0,453 -0,129 
Mexico 0,505 0,322 0,208 0,075 0,093 -0,097 -0,137 -0,407 0,307 
Moldova 0,579 -0,136 -0,098 -0,034 0,221 0,322 -0,385 0,359 0,184 
Morocco -0,419 0,855 -0,184 -0,086 -0,208 0,291 -0,232 -0,068 -0,463 
New Zealand -0,371 -0,675 -0,419 -0,085 0,125 -0,702 0,601 -0,090 -0,323 
Nigeria -0,139 1,126 0,040 0,371 0,012 0,640 -0,700 -0,489 -0,483 
Norway -0,271 -0,813 -0,288 0,165 0,151 -1,324 0,989 0,165 -0,088 
Peru 0,067 0,594 -0,188 0,327 0,432 0,387 -0,072 -0,297 -0,018 
Philippines 0,624 0,775 0,249 0,076 -0,397 0,405 -0,543 -0,009 0,270 
Poland -0,051 0,390 -0,080 -0,449 0,093 0,040 0,299 -0,057 0,496 
Puerto Rico -0,335 0,865 -0,216 0,231 -0,043 0,181 0,472 -0,163 0,005 
Romania -0,209 0,275 0,111 0,008 -0,279 0,084 -0,083 0,514 -0,374 
Russian Federation 0,339 -1,070 -0,251 -0,174 0,099 0,777 -0,462 0,363 0,259 
Serbia 1,266 -0,152 0,285 0,078 0,445 0,143 -0,194 0,100 0,140 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
-0,178 -0,534 -0,112 -0,037 0,229 0,076 -0,101 0,106 -0,322 
Slovakia 0,476 -0,176 -0,016 -0,411 -0,042 0,494 -0,139 0,221 -0,105 
Slovenia 0,156 -0,639 0,029 0,017 0,384 -0,182 0,279 0,100 0,068 
South Africa -0,003 0,649 0,124 0,102 0,010 0,350 -0,120 -0,098 0,022 
South Korea -0,114 -0,507 0,563 0,272 -0,026 -0,182 -0,431 0,963 0,376 
Spain -0,135 -0,554 -0,372 -0,265 0,264 0,039 0,075 -0,158 0,126 
Sweden -0,109 -1,036 -0,443 0,045 0,311 -1,205 1,067 0,133 -0,137 
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Switzerland -0,404 -0,565 -0,364 0,067 0,253 -1,067 0,968 0,296 -0,153 
Taiwan -0,206 -0,705 0,191 -0,140 0,325 -0,057 0,180 0,563 0,210 
Tanzania -0,448 1,008 0,034 -0,032 -1,063 0,056 -0,437 -0,564 -0,337 
Thailand 0,561 0,300 0,722 -0,739 0,093 -0,297 -0,051 -0,334 0,382 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
0,090 0,804 -0,307 -0,253 0,460 0,601 0,037 -0,256 0,060 
Turkey -0,460 0,271 0,300 0,026 -0,218 0,463 -0,217 0,024 0,083 
Uganda 0,279 0,849 -0,051 0,540 -0,545 0,607 -0,503 -0,478 -0,256 
Ukraine 0,553 -0,504 -0,219 -0,016 -0,020 0,345 -0,435 0,230 0,080 
United States -0,292 0,292 -0,250 -0,050 -0,076 -0,207 0,348 -0,038 -0,155 
Uruguay -0,270 -0,406 -0,311 -0,225 0,274 -0,427 0,442 -0,455 0,422 
Venezuela -0,047 0,417 0,142 0,159 -0,303 0,199 0,170 -0,369 0,202 
Viet Nam -0,341 -0,786 0,496 -0,266 -1,833 -0,122 -0,408 0,173 -0,292 
Zambia 0,648 0,795 0,403 0,323 -0,086 0,329 -0,584 -0,343 -0,012 
Zimbabwe -0,468 0,876 -0,063 0,049 -0,071 0,678 -0,405 -0,704 -0,144 
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Table 2.8: the global map of the major world denominations
15
 in the World Values Survey project, ordered by sample 
size in the WVS (analyses about global denominations with a WVS sample size of below 500 should be considered with 
utmost care and do not reflect population/country weighted averages but are simple based on global overall WVS 
samples for the different denominations) 
 
N Religious denomination economic 
permissive
ness 
traditional 
religion 
racism higher 
education of 
the younger 
generation 
(education 
gap between 
the 
generations) 
distrust of 
the army 
and the 
press 
authorit
arian 
characte
r 
tolerance 
and 
respect + 
post-
materialis
m 
the ‘ego’ 
company 
(rejection of 
obedience + 
unselfishness) 
[predomina
ntly] female 
rejection of 
the market 
economy 
and 
democracy 
75239 Total number -0,014 0,208 0,016 -0,025 -0,048 0,037 -0,019 -0,013 0,004 
26269 Roman Catholic 0,062 0,294 -0,112 -0,016 0,024 0,097 0,038 -0,098 0,109 
12652 Protestant -0,179 0,249 -0,093 -0,004 0,025 -0,137 0,221 -0,048 -0,070 
10726 Orthodox 0,110 -0,075 -0,022 0,015 0,082 0,189 -0,157 0,235 -0,027 
9602 Muslim -0,144 0,484 0,300 0,014 -0,249 0,134 -0,347 -0,025 -0,182 
2660 Buddhist 0,238 -0,069 0,561 -0,494 -0,109 -0,198 -0,105 0,025 0,310 
2256 Hindu -0,082 0,310 0,622 0,014 -0,661 0,161 -0,374 -0,099 -0,338 
1270 The Church of Sweden -0,117 -1,056 -0,430 -0,019 0,272 -1,169 1,066 0,141 -0,146 
973 Armenian Apostolic 
Church 
0,445 -0,330 0,000 0,244 -0,077 0,302 -0,567 0,250 -0,013 
783 Ancestral worshipping -0,349 -0,888 0,791 -0,178 -1,926 -0,134 -0,479 0,313 -0,379 
599 Independent African 
Church (e. g. ZCC, 
Shembe, etc.) 
0,019 0,934 0,251 -0,100 -0,358 0,402 -0,356 -0,201 0,158 
536 Pentecostal -0,280 1,181 -0,055 0,402 -0,001 0,503 -0,314 -0,388 -0,276 
                                                 
15
 It is important to emphasize that these results are only unweighted world averages as they emerge from the World Values Survey project. These 
data say nothing about the value structures of given individuals across the globe and in individual countries adhering to the denominations, listed in 
our Table. For each denomination, there would be wide standard deviations, which we did not list in Table 5.8 due to reasons of the limitations of 
space. 
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2. 4. The new choropleth maps of global human values 
 
 
Graph 2.1 depicted the Inglehart/Welzel map of human values. The choropleth 
maps, Maps 2.1 to 2.9, designed by us on the basis of the preceding data, now 
focus on our analysis and its geographical implications.  
 
Economic permissiveness most strongly affects large parts of Latin America 
(except Venezuela, Peru, and the countries of the Southern Cone), some, but not 
all nations of Africa, most of the former USSR and some other countries of East 
Central and Southeastern Europe, and Thailand and the Philippines. Medium 
levels of economic permissiveness are to be found – among others – in India, in 
Germany, Sweden, the Czech Republic and Poland, in Venezuela, Peru, and the 
countries of the Southern Cone of Latin America, in South Africa, in Ghana et 
cetera, while there were some really shining results to be reported from several 
African countries. The Anglo-Saxon Western democracies had very good 
performances on this indicator.  
 
In our factor analysis, traditional religion was highest in most of the nations of 
Africa, and the countries of Latin America with the highest poverty rates (Brazil, 
Peru, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Mexico), in the Arab speaking Muslim 
countries and in Poland. It is noteworthy that Turkey, India and the United 
States are classified in the same league of religiosity, while the real bastions of 
secularism are Scandinavia, Russia, Germany and the Czech Republic.  
 
Racism is lowest in most of the old democracies of the West and in the South of 
Latin America, while in Venezuela, Mexico, in several African countries, in 
Eastern Europe and in Turkey, middle levels of racism are to be observed. The 
worst performances to be recorded are to be encountered in Bangladesh, Jordan, 
and South Korea, Indonesia, and India. Thailand and Vietnam also have higher 
racism-scores.  
 
The generational education gaps are lowest in Thailand, Mali, Poland, the 
Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic. In most developed western 
democracies, generational education gaps are also low. In Uganda, Nigeria, 
Zambia, Peru and Kyrgyzstan we find the highest values on this score.  
 
Distrust of the army and the press is highest in Germany, Spain, Australia, 
Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, Hungary, Latvia, Ethiopia, Guatemala and the 
Dominican Republic. Russia and several countries in East and Central Europe, 
but also Canada, Mexico, Italy, Switzerland, Norway, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Thailand, New Zealand, South Korea, Kyrgyzstan are in the same league of 
medium skepticism regarding the army and the press. The United States, Brazil, 
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Venezuela, Turkey, Finland, several countries of Central and Southeastern 
Europe, Morocco, Burkina Faso, Zambia, and Zimbabwe already exhibit lower 
levels of skepticism in their armed forces and the press. The highest level of 
trust in the army and the press is to be found in Vietnam, followed by Tanzania, 
Jordan, India and several nations in Africa and Indonesia.  
 
The authoritarian character is highest in Russia, and tends to be high in many 
countries of East Central Europe and in several developing countries of Africa, 
Asia, Brazil and Peru. Notable exceptions are Indonesia, which is in the same 
league as the United States, Uruguay, Chile, Mexico, Bangladesh and Thailand, 
and also Ethiopia. Lowest rates of the authoritarian character are to be registered 
in Scandinavia and in Switzerland.  
 
Tolerance, respect and post-materialism are highest in Scandinavia, 
Switzerland and New Zealand, followed by Germany and then Australia, 
Canada, Italy, Hungary, Macedonia and Uruguay. Considering the very clear 
correlations of tolerance and respect and post-materialism with “effective 
democracy” (see Chapter 10, below), the low levels of tolerance and respect and 
post-materialism in Russia and most of the former Communist countries of 
Eastern Europe bode ill for the future of democracy in those countries. Also in 
India, Kyrgyzstan, South Korea, India and Bangladesh, the low values of 
tolerance, respect and post-materialism have to be recalled.  
 
The “ego company” bears a lot of resemblance with Hofstede’s “long term 
orientation” factor. Predictably, it is highest in South Korea, but also the high 
values in Russia, Germany, the Baltic Republics, Azerbaijan, Romania, 
Moldavia and Bangladesh have to be observed. Lowest values for the “ego 
company factor” are to be encountered in several African countries. Also several 
states in Latin America, East and Southeast Asia are on the lower ranks of this 
factor. Also most of the developed western democracies and the Muslim nations 
are not especially characterized by the “ego company”.  
 
The [predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and 
democracy is highest in Poland, Guatemala, Chile, Uruguay, Thailand and South 
Korea, and also Russia Brazil and the Philippines: these are all countries, which 
in one form or the other had the experience of authoritarian governments in the 
not too distant past in the 1970s or 1980s, and where distrust against democracy 
and the market economy today above all is a distrust along gender lines. 
Interestingly enough, also Argentina, Ethiopia and Kyrgyzstan belong to this 
pattern, while Finland, Mexico, and Germany are interesting “outlayers” further 
to be studied in future political science research. In the following, we list the 
factor definitions and the countries with the highest and lowest factor scores. 
Members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) are marked in green 
colors. 
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 Economic permissiveness  
 
Definition: 
 
Justifiable: cheating on taxes 
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport 
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 
Justifiable: claiming government benefits 
 
 
Best practice of avoiding it:  
Bangladesh 
Zimbabwe 
Turkey 
Tanzania 
Morocco 
 
Worst practice of avoiding it:  
Serbia 
Zambia 
Philippines 
Moldova 
Thailand 
 
 
 Traditional religion  
 
Definition: 
 
How important is God in your life 
Important child qualities: religious faith 
Negative loading: never attend religious services 
 
 
Highest values: 
Nigeria 
Ghana 
Jordan 
Indonesia 
Tanzania 
 
Lowest values: 
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Russian Federation 
Sweden 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Germany 
 
 Racism  
 
Definition: 
 
[Rejecting] Neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers 
[Rejecting] Neighbors: People of a different race 
Immigrant policy (prevent people from coming) 
 
 
Best practice of avoiding it: 
Sweden 
Burkina Faso 
Canada 
New Zealand 
Belarus 
 
Worst practice of avoiding it: 
Hong Kong 
Bangladesh 
Jordan 
Thailand 
India 
 
 Generational education gaps  
 
Definition: 
 
Highest educational level attained 
Rejecting sexist position: University is more important for a boy than for a girl 
Negative loading Age 
Negative loading important child qualities: thrift saving money and things 
 
 
Highest values: 
Dominican Republic 
Uganda 
Kyrgyzstan 
Nigeria 
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Peru 
 
Lowest values: 
Thailand 
Mali 
Poland 
Czech Republic 
Slovakia 
 
 Distrust of the army and the press  
 
Definition: 
 
[No] Confidence: The Press 
[No] Confidence: Armed Forces 
Negative loading: [Right wing] self-positioning in political scale (scale 1-left to 
10-right) 
 
 
Best practice of avoiding it: 
Viet Nam 
Tanzania 
Bangladesh 
Jordan 
India 
 
Worst practice of avoiding it: 
Germany 
Argentina 
Macedonia 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Serbia 
 
 The authoritarian character  
 
Definition: 
 
Lack of social capital (Most people can be trusted [highest numerical value: you 
just can’t be too careful]) 
Important child qualities: hard work 
Important child qualities: obedience 
Negative loading: Important child qualities: imagination 
Negative loading: Important child qualities: independence 
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Best practice of avoiding it: 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
New Zealand 
Finland 
 
Worst practice of avoiding it: 
Russian Federation 
Zimbabwe 
Nigeria 
Uganda 
Trinidad and Tobago 
 
 Tolerance, respect and post-materialism  
 
Definition: 
 
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people 
Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility 
Rejecting sexist position: University is more important for a boy than for a girl 
Negative loading: Important child qualities: hard work 
 
 
Best practice: 
Sweden 
Norway 
Switzerland 
Finland 
Germany 
 
Worst practice: 
Mali 
Burkina Faso 
Ethiopia 
Nigeria 
Bangladesh 
 
 The “ego company”  
 
Definition: 
 
Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility 
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Important child qualities: independence 
Negative loading: Important child qualities: unselfishness 
Negative loading: Important child qualities: obedience 
 
 
Highest values: 
South Korea 
Azerbaijan 
Taiwan 
Latvia 
Estonia 
 
Lowest values: 
Burkina Faso 
Zimbabwe 
Jordan 
Ghana 
Tanzania 
 
 The rejection of the market economy and democracy  
 
Definition: 
 
Sex (Gender) [in multivariate analysis: female] (1=male; 2=female) 
Competition good or harmful 
Political system: (It’s very bad] having a democratic political system 
 
 
Best practice of avoiding it: 
Nigeria 
Bangladesh 
Morocco 
India 
Jordan 
 
Worst practice of avoiding it: 
Poland 
Chile 
Guatemala 
Uruguay 
Thailand 
  
106 
 
Map 2.1: Economic permissiveness 
 
 
 
Justifiable: cheating on taxes 
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on 
public transport 
Justifiable: someone 
accepting a bribe 
Justifiable: claiming 
government benefits 
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Map 2.2: traditional religion 
 
 
 
 
How important is God in your 
life 
Important child qualities: 
religious faith 
Negative loading [Never 
attend religious services. 
Scale: ] How often do you 
attend religious services 
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Map 2.3: racism (global rank, avoiding racism). 
16
 Highest racism: marked in red; lowest racism: marked in blue 
 
 
1,00
8,75
16,50
24,25
32,00
39,75
47,50
55,25
63,00
70,75
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
                                                 
16
 The indicator did not produce meaningful maps with the original values, so we transformed it to a ranking. 
[Rejecting] Neighbours: 
Immigrants/foreign workers 
[Rejecting] Neighbours: People 
of a different race 
Immigrant policy (prevent 
people from coming) 
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Map 2.4: higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations) 
 
 
Highest educational level 
attained 
Rejecting sexist position: 
University is more important 
for a boy than for a girl 
Negative loading Age 
Negative loading Important 
child qualities: thrift saving 
money and things 
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Map 2.5: distrust of the army and the press 
 
 
 
[No] Confidence: The Press 
[No] Confidence: Armed 
Forces 
Negative loading: [Right 
wing] self positioning in 
political scale (scale 1-left to 
10-right) 
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Map 2.6: authoritarian character 
 
 
 
 
Lack of social capital 
(Most people can be 
trusted [highest numerical 
value: you just can’t be too 
careful]) 
Important child qualities: 
hard work 
Important child qualities: 
obedience 
Negative loading: 
Important child qualities: 
imagination 
Negative loading: 
Important child qualities: 
independence 
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Map 2.7: tolerance and respect + post-materialism 
 
 
 
Important child qualities: 
tolerance and respect for 
other people 
Important child qualities: 
feeling of responsibility 
Rejecting sexist position: 
University is more important 
for a boy than for a girl 
Negative loading: Important 
child qualities: hard work 
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Map 2.8: the ‘ego’ company 
 
 
 
 
Important child qualities: 
feeling of responsibility 
Important child qualities: 
independence 
Negative loading: Important 
child qualities: unselfishness 
Negative loading: Important 
child qualities: obedience 
  
114 
 
Map 2.9: [predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy 
 
 
 
 
Sex (Gender) [in multivariate 
analysis: female] (1=male; 
2=female) 
Competition good or harmful 
Political system: (It’s very bad] 
having a democratic political 
system 
 
 115 
 
 
2. 5. Some conclusions from the country factor scores 
 
 
Looking back on Chapters 2.3 and 2.4 of this article, one might summarize for 
the general readership of this publication that factor analysis (Promax version) 
of the 30 variables presented in Table 2.6 yielded nine underlying dimensions 
(factors), also presented in the quick overview of Table 2.9. Our results 
suggested the following nine factors to be relevant:  
 
 
Table 2.9: The main results of the principal components analysis – Eigen 
values and percentage of variance explained 
 
 
 Eigen value % of 
variance 
explained 
cumulated % of 
total variance 
explained 
1) economic permissiveness 2,526 8,711 8,711 
2) traditional religion 2,472 8,523 17,234 
3) racism 1,688 5,822 23,056 
4) higher education of the 
younger generation 
(education gap between the 
generations) 
1,442 4,974 28,029 
5) distrust of the army and the 
press 
1,298 4,475 32,504 
6) authoritarian character 1,189 4,099 36,604 
7) tolerance and respect + post-
materialism 
1,143 3,942 40,545 
8) the ‘ego’ company 
(rejection of obedience + 
unselfishness) 
1,118 3,854 44,399 
9) [predominantly] female 
rejection of the market 
economy and democracy 
1,012 3,489 47,888 
 
 
Graph 2.2 and 1.3 as well as our maps for the nine newly derived scales on a 
global level revisit the old debate, started by Huntington, 1993 and 1996. Graph 
2.2 and 1.3 explain to us, just where there are the main differences and where 
are the main similarities between the Muslim/Orthodox global population and 
the average global citizen. But as the country results (factor scores), reproduced 
in Table 2.7 explain to us quite well, closer inspection tells us that things turn 
out to be more complicated than most social science approaches today would 
predict. Global rank 7 (Latvia), rank 9 (Czech Republic), rank 10 (Slovakia), 
rank 14 (Estonia), rank 24 (Lithuania) and rank 26 (Bulgaria) on the global 
authoritarianism scale are held by NATO Western allies in Europe, and 
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Catholic Latin American countries are among the global leaders of the 
authoritarianism scale. And interestingly enough, there are Muslim or 
predominantly Muslim societies like Bangladesh, and Indonesia, which are less 
authoritarian than several key Western allies – the United States, Slovenia, and 
South Korea; and Jordan is less authoritarian than Spain or Poland.  
 
So what can we say about religious global value differences in the light of 
Huntington’s theories? Based on our data, we could say with great caution that 
there is a certain trend towards racism and traditional religion in too many 
places in the global Muslim community (Umma), and a lack of the values of 
tolerance and respect in too many places in the global Muslim community 
(Umma),, all compared to the global community of humankind. 
 
The world of global Orthodoxy is characterized also in too many places by a 
very strong tendency towards the ‘ego company’ (rejection of the educational 
values of unselfishness and obedience) and the authoritarian character, and a 
lack of the values of tolerance and respect and traditional religiosity. Future 
research would have to highlight not only the global denominational means, but 
also the global standard deviations, to arrive at more meaningful results. 
 
We used the terms “great caution” because even if a racist trend exists in too 
many places in several Muslim societies, it is not a characteristic feature of 
“Islamic culture” as such.  
 
There is a very great variation of these results, documented in Table 2.7 and in 
our country maps. And we have to consider as well that phenomena of racism 
and traditional religion, lack of the values of tolerance and respect, all are 
dependent on the development level. Since the majority of Muslim nations are 
underdeveloped countries, it is to be expected that their performance could 
improve over time.  
 
 
2. 6. Adorno’s F-scale and global economic growth in the post-
2008 crisis era 
 
 
Among the results, which have a direct consequence for the explanation of 
economic growth rates since the global economic crisis of 2008, we find our 
factor “authoritarian character”. It emerges that with other statistical predictors 
of economic growth or social development being constant, the “authoritarian 
character” is not conducive to economic growth in our era. Our concept of the 
“authoritarian character” takes some elements from the classical sociological 
work by Adorno et al. (1950), which defined the “authoritarian personality” as 
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having high average scores on the following variables. 
17
 Scholarly interest in 
the F-scale has been enormous ever since the main English language publication 
Adorno et al., 1950, among the most influential studies being Fahrenberg and 
Steiner, 2004; Flere, 1991; Meloen, Van Der Linden, and De Witte, 1996; Ray, 
1985; Ray, and Lovejoy, 1990; Rubinstein, 1995, Rusby, 2010.  
 
Today, some elements, based on the World Values Survey, are completely 
different from the original Adorno “F-scale”, which was intended by its authors 
to be a measurement scale to assess the potentials of authoritarianism in modern 
society after the horrors of Nazism and Fascism in Europe:  
 
 
                                                 
17
 http: //www. zonalatina. com/Zldata387. htm  
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1. Obedience and respect for authority are the 
most important virtues children should 
learn.  
2. A person who has bad manners, habits, and 
breeding can hardly expect to get along 
with decent people.  
3. If people would talk less and work more, 
everybody would be better off.  
4. The business man and the manufacturer 
are much more important to society than 
the artist and the professor.  
5. Science has its place, but there are many 
important things that can never be 
understood by the human mind.  
6. Every person should have complete faith 
in some supernatural power whose 
decisions he obeys without question.  
7. Young people sometimes get rebellious 
ideas, but as they grow up they ought to 
get over them and settle down.  
8. What this country needs most, more than 
laws and political programs, is a few 
courageous, tireless, devoted leaders in 
whom the people can put their faith.  
9. No sane, normal, decent person could ever 
think of hurting a close friend or relative.  
10. Nobody ever learned anything really 
important except through suffering.  
11. What the youth needs most is strict 
discipline, rugged determination, and the 
will to work and fight for family and 
country.  
12. An insult to our honor should always be 
punished.  
13. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on 
children, deserve more than mere 
imprisonment; such criminals ought to be 
publicly whipped, or worse.  
14. There is hardly anything lower than a 
person who does not feel a great love, 
gratitude, and respect for his parents.  
15. Most of our social problems would be 
solved if we could somehow get rid of the 
immoral, crooked, and feebleminded 
people.  
16. Homosexuals are hardly better than 
criminals and ought to be severely 
punished.  
17. When a person has a problem or worry, it 
is best for him not to think about it, but to 
keep busy with more cheerful things.  
18. Nowadays more and more people are 
prying into matters that should remain 
personal and private.  
19. Some people are born with an urge to jump 
from high places.  
20. People can be divided into two distinct 
classes: the weak and the strong.  
21. Some day it will probably be shown that 
astrology can explain a lot of things.  
22. Wars and social troubles may someday be 
ended by an earthquake or flood that will 
destroy the whole world.  
23. No weakness or difficulty can hold us 
back, if we have enough will power.  
24. It is best to use some prewar authorities in 
Germany to keep order and prevent chaos.  
25. Most people don't realize how much our 
lives are controlled by plots hatched in 
secret places.  
26. Human nature being what it is there will 
always be war and conflict.  
27. Familiarity breeds contempt.  
28. Nowadays when so many different kinds 
of people move around and mix together 
so much, a person has to protect himself 
especially carefully against catching an 
infection or disease from them.  
29. The wild sex life of the old Greeks and 
Romans was tame compared to some of 
the goings-on in this country, even in 
places where people might least expect it.  
30. The true American way of life is 
disappearing so fast that force may be 
necessary to preserve it.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2.10 explains the factor loadings for our own scale of authoritarianism, 
achieved by promax rotation. We define the authoritarian character by the 
following five factor loadings equal or above the absolute value of .30:  
 
Table 2.10: the authoritarian character 
 
 authoritarian 
character 
Most people can be trusted (you can’t be too careful) 0,562 
Important child qualities: hard work 0,437 
Important child qualities: obedience 0,300 
Political system: Having a democratic political system (reject) 0,246 
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Immigrant policy (prohibit people from coming) 0,227 
Important child qualities: thrift, and saving money and things 0,212 
How important is God in your life 0,200 
Important child qualities: religious faith 0,166 
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 0,049 
Neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers (reject) 0,045 
Self-positioning in political scale (right) 0,045 
Justifiable: claiming government benefits even if one is not entitled 
to them 
0,041 
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people 0,033 
Neighbors: People of a different race (reject) 0,026 
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport 0,021 
Justifiable: cheating on taxes 0,018 
Confidence: The Press (no confidence) -0,010 
Sex (Gender) (female) -0,011 
Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility -0,028 
Confidence: Armed Forces (no confidence) -0,035 
Age -0,037 
Competition good or harmful (harmful) -0,093 
Important child qualities: determination and perseverance -0,104 
Important child qualities: unselfishness -0,107 
How often do you attend religious services (never) -0,119 
University is more important for a boy than for a girl (reject) -0,160 
Highest educational level attained -0,195 
Important child qualities: independence -0,508 
Important child qualities: imagination -0,613 
 
 
Adorno and associates expected a strong tendency of their scale – reflecting 
conventionalism, authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, anti-
intellectualism, anti-intraception, superstition and stereotypedness, power and 
"toughness", destructiveness and cynicism, projectivity, and exaggerated 
concerns over sex – to be encountered among the political right (hence also the 
name “F-scale” for the “F” in the word “fascism”), while there is hardly any 
empirical connection today between our version of the World Values Survey-
based authoritarianism scale and the conventional right-left political spectrum. 
The three religion variables used in our analysis – importance of God in life, the 
desire for religious education of children, and religious service attendance rate, 
have just 4% or less of variance in common with the authoritarianism 
phenomenon.  
 
Table 2.11 shows the average tendencies towards the authoritarian character 
among the major global denominations. It is simply wrong to attempt to portray 
adherents of the Muslim religion as more authoritarian as adherents of several 
Eastern religions, Orthodox and Greek Catholics as well as other Churches 
inspired by Christianity. The difference between global Roman Catholics and 
Muslims on this scale is minimal; while several different Protestant Churches 
are the real strongholds of the spirit of an enlightened education and also social 
capital (=trust in other people).  
 120 
 
 
Table 2.11: the authoritarian tendencies in major world denominations 
(analyses about global denominations with a WVS sample size of below 500 
should be considered with utmost care and do not reflect 
population/country weighted averages but are simple based on global 
overall WVS samples for the different denominations) 
 
 
 n =  authoritarian 
character 
Pentecostal 536 0,50 
Independent African Church (e. g. ZCC, 
Shembe, etc.) 
599 0,40 
Armenian Apostolic Church 973 0,30 
Orthodox 10726 0,19 
Hindu 2256 0,16 
Muslim 9602 0,13 
Roman Catholic 26269 0,10 
Ancestral worshipping 783 -0,13 
Protestant 12652 -0,14 
Evangelical 2586 -0,16 
Buddhist 2660 -0,20 
The Church of Sweden 1270 -1,17 
 
 
Graph 2.5 and following now depicts the development of human value scales 
along the trajectory of different development levels, as measured by the UNDP 
Human Development Index in global society. While traditional religiosity 
clearly diminishes with increasing Human Development, distrust of the army 
and the press, tolerance and respect, and the ‘ego company’ increase with 
increasing UNDP levels, and there are U-shaped trade-offs between the UNDP 
Human Development levels and Economic permissiveness, racism, comparative 
higher education levels of the younger generation, the authoritarian character, 
and the [predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and 
democracy.  
 
All this suggests that “modernity” in global society would be characterized by 
what most sociologists interpret as the phenomena of 
 
 less traditional religion and 
 more tolerance and respect 
 
and the negative phenomena of  
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 more distrust in the army and the press and 
 an increasingly ego-centric culture 
 the female rejection of democracy and the market economy  
 
In global society, the paths to modernity are indeed not conflict-free, and at 
middle levels of development we generally reach a climax of societal  
 
 racism 
 the generation gap in education 
 Economic permissiveness  
 the authoritarian character 
 
On average, the Arab States reached a Human Development Index of 0.641 in 
2011. In the framework of the general tendencies to be deduced from our theory, 
we can cautiously predict that Arab nations indeed are currently undergoing the 
most critical phase in their development. In the light of our analysis based on the 
trajectories of our global values analysis in comparison to the Human 
Development Index (UNDP HDI), we can expect for the countries of the Arab 
world the following to happen: from the level of UNDP HDI = 0.600 onwards, 
also in the Muslim countries economic permissiveness will decrease, the weight 
of religious traditionalism will decline, racism already reached its climax and 
will decline, the education gap between the generations will decline 
dramatically, tolerance and respect will increase, egoism will decrease, and the 
trajectory of the authoritarian character and the [predominantly] female rejection 
of the market economy and the press will not increase sharply anymore. 
Decision makers and democratic civil society will be however confronted with 
one negative phenomenon. From the level of UNDP HDI = 0.600 onwards, 
distrust of the army and the press will increase with rising human development 
(see also Graphs 2. 21 ff.). 
 
Now, our data also can be used to re-analyze the drivers and bottlenecks of 
global economic growth during the current world economic slump, which began 
in 2007/2008. Our data are based on the well-known IMF World Economic 
Outlook data series, and represent the average economic growth rates 2008, 
2009, 2010 and 2011.  
 
Based on stepwise multiple regressions and the macro-quantitative world system 
analysis “Corvinus University” data set,18 we can show that under due 
consideration of the non-linear tradeoffs between economic development levels 
and subsequent growth rates (“convergence effects”), market size (% of world 
population) is an important driver of contemporary growth. The authoritarian 
character is one of its main stumbling blocks. Our analysis is based on n = 62 
                                                 
18
 http: //www. uni-corvinus. hu/index. php?id=47854  
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countries with complete data and our regression results are based on the SPSS, 
version XX, and the default options for the multiple regression procedure (i. e. 
forward regression).  
 
 
Table 2.12: the determinants of global economic growth during the current 
economic crisis (mean economic growth rates, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011) 
according to IMF data  
 
 
 Regression 
Coefficient B 
Standard 
error 
Beta T Sig.  
Constant -0,029 18,796  -0,002 0,999 
% world 
population 
0,251 0,115 0,199 2,181 0,033 
2000 Economic 
Freedom Score 
0,055 0,038 0,175 1,463 0,149 
ln GDP per capita 2,458 4,362 0,917 0,564 0,575 
ln GDP per capita 
^2 
-0,280 0,258 -1,818 -1,086 0,282 
authoritarian 
character 
-1,893 0,770 -0,291 -2,457 0,017 
 
N = 62 countries, adj. R^2 = 52. 1%; F = 14. 244; error p = .000. Economic growth data are 
IMF data, and the data matrix is freely available from http://economics.uni-
corvinus.hu/index.php?id=47854  
 
 
2.7. The trajectories of global value change along the paths of 
human development 
 
 
In the following, we will further analyze the trajectories of global value change 
along the paths of development. The Inglehart approach assumes that values 
largely depend on human security, and that human security is well measured by 
the UNDP Human Development Index. Now we will analyze the trajectory of 
value change of the OIC-members, i. e. the Muslim world, and global society 
separately. Such an analysis wields astonishing results and interesting 
predictions for the Muslim world at the same time. Knowing the UNDP Human 
Development Index of a given Arab or Muslim country, we can predict the 
probable path of value development during the next decade, provided that the 
UNDP Human Development Index will move in a given, predictable direction. 
 
Based on the trade-off between human values according to the World Values 
Survey and the UNDP Human Development Index, we find that in Muslim 
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countries there will be several optimistic tendencies at work, which could 
imply that under proper policies being pursued, Muslim countries could 
overcome with resilience the crisis of modernity. Yes, unfortunately, there is a 
U-shaped phenomenon of racism in these countries which is strongest at middle 
UNDP Human Development Index development levels, and there is a plateau 
curve of human egoism, and an inter-generational education gap, which are all 
strongest at middle development levels, just as in world society at large. But 
traditionalist religion, racism, the educational generation gap, the ego company, 
they all will diminish in their influence over society, when Muslim countries in 
general and Arab countries in particular will increase their UNDP Human 
Development Index. Economic permissiveness will decrease in weight, just as 
tolerance and respect will increase with rising development levels. These 
empirically robust relationships are one of the reasons for our optimism for the 
future of the democracy movement in the Muslim world.  
 
Our statistics also imply that the crisis of modernization in the countries of the 
world system is at times more dramatic than in the countries of the OIC.  
 
We have to note as well that the authoritarian character and the female rejection 
of democracy and the market economy are at a relatively constant level along 
the development trajectory:  
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Graph 2.5 and Graph 2.6: predicting the future trajectory of the global 
Umma: permissiveness, traditional religion, educational gap, distrust of the 
army and the press, authoritarian character, tolerance and respect, the 
“ego company”, female rejection of markets and democracy as a function of 
the UNDP Human Development Index in Muslim societies  
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2.8. The performance of Muslim countries along these trajectories 
 
 
To our great surprise, the trajectories of our development paths show that 
Muslim societies would have at least the potential of relatively smoother 
transitions to a mature, enlightened and humanistic society than the countries of 
the world system as a whole. How can we dare to advance such an optimistic 
proposition, which is counter to the explicit or implicit conclusions from most 
other published social science research around our globe? Our results generally 
imply that especially the rich and wealthy Muslim societies of our globe have 
the human and material abilities to initiate democratic reforms towards a full 
parliamentary democracy, if they did not do so already (perhaps in the 
framework of a Constitutional Monarchy, British style) at relatively low risk-
levels. It should be also noted that one possible framework could be that of a 
Constitutional Monarchy, British style. 
19
 
 
Already 50 years ago, the American political scientist Karl Wolfgang Deutsch 
had the following message for the countries like the Arab world today, facing 
the challenges of modernization: 
 
“[…] Deliberate political and economic intervention into the social 
mobilization process, on the other hand, might open up some more hopeful 
                                                 
19
 This parallel is all the more interesting, since Her Britanic Majesty the Queen is also the 
Head of the global Anglican Church. 
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perspectives. Such intervention should not aim at retarding economic and social 
development, in the manner of the policies of the regime of Prince Metternich in 
Austria during much of the first half of the 19th century. Those policies of 
slowing down social mobilization and economic development in the main only 
diminished the capabilities of the government, paved the way to domestic 
failures and international defeats and were followed over the course of three 
generations by the persistent backwardness and ultimate destruction of the state. 
A more promising policy might have to be, on the contrary, one of active 
intervention in favor of more rapid and more balanced growth; a somewhat 
more even distribution of income, related more closely to rewards for productive 
contributions rather than for status and inheritance; the more productive 
investment of available resources; and a sustained growth in the political and 
administrative capabilities of government and of ever wider strata of the 
population. The crude model outlined above may have some modest usefulness 
in surveying and presenting in quantitative terms some of the magnitudes and 
rates of change that would be relevant for understanding the basic problems of 
such a more constructive policy in developing countries. Somewhat as the 
economic models of the late Lord Keynes drew attention to the need of keeping 
the national rates of spending and investment in a country in balance […]” 
(Deutsch, 1961: 505-506]. 
 
 
a) Economic permissiveness is highest at low levels of Muslim Human 
Development, while for global society, it reaches a climax at the current 
average UNDP Human Development Index level of the Arab world. Thus 
it can be said that development in the Muslim world promises to be more 
corruption free and shadow economy free than in the rest of the countries 
of our globe, once these Muslim countries reach the current UNDP 
Human Development Index level of the Arab world. 
b) Traditionalist religion and racism both in the Muslim world and in global 
society indeed are evolving in an inverted U-shaped pattern along the 
trajectory of development, but the climax levels at middle development 
stages are in fact lower in Muslim countries than in global society 
c) The generational education gap is a problem for Muslim societies too, but 
still the climax levels are higher in global society 
d) The distrust level concerning the army and the press is certainly a problem 
for global Muslim development, but still, at high levels of the UNDP 
Human Development Index, these Muslim societies will reach distrust 
levels which are in fact lower than in global society 
e) Yes indeed, there is also a problem with the authoritarian character, but in 
global society the climax level of the authoritarian character phenomenon 
is far worse than in Muslim countries 
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f) At high levels of Human Development, societal egoism and the female 
rejection of democracy and the market economy are relatively lower than 
in other mature societies of our globe  
g) What is a problem, indeed, is the future trajectory of Muslim tolerance 
and respect. Muslim societies – in accordance with the prescriptions of the 
Noble Quran, have to learn to become open towards immigration and 
multiculturalism; and to forgo – particularly in the Gulf –the old and 
useless tradition of “sponsorship”, and to be more respectful toward 
human rights (included the rights of foreign workers).  
 
In the following, we chart for each of our empirically derived value indicators 
their trajectories in comparison to the Human Development Index already 
achieved – each time comparing the OIC members (=Muslim countries) with 
global society at large. For one, our results reveal a surprising new dimension to 
the entire debate about human values, going back to the discoveries of the great 
American economist Simon Kuznets and his insights about the development 
crisis of inequality being most profound at middle development levels.  
 
Like the curve-linear effect between the income level and income inequality, 
generally known by the term ‘the Kuznets curve’ in global cross-national 
research nowadays, traditional religion, racism, the gaps in higher education 
between the different generations, the authoritarian character in Muslim 
societies clearly present a curve-linear effect. These phenomena cannot be 
separated from the overall process of the transition of a country from a rural to 
an urban society. This process implies the concomitant processes of the 
transition of the employment structure of a society from the primary to the 
secondary and the tertiary sector. We now invite our readers to look at our 
summary of global value change in Muslim and global society along the paths of 
achieved human development.  
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Graph 2.7 to Graph 2.15: predicting the future trajectory of global society 
and the global Umma: permissiveness, traditional religion, educational gap, 
distrust of the army and the press, authoritarian character, tolerance and 
respect, the “ego company”, female rejection of markets and democracy as 
a function of the UNDP Human Development Index in global society and in 
Muslim societies  
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2. 9. The discovery of a Global Value Development Index and 
regional value differences at the sub-national level  
 
 
In the following, we will use the factor analytical scores of this Chapter to 
calculate a new Global Value Development Index, which uses the 
measurement scales (factors) of our work.  
 
Our global value development index combines law-abiding and social capital, 
avoiding racism; trust of the army and the press; no authoritarian character; a 
high degree of tolerance and respect + post-materialism; and a female 
acceptance of the market economy and democracy. 
 
Hopefully the index, based on our factor analytical model, will be recognized by 
religious and non-religious readers alike as a measurement scale which 
expresses the true degree of development of a civil society of a country. Among 
the factors of Chapter 5, we exclude the extent of traditional religion in the 
country, because this factor reflects the religious choice of an individual. It also 
excludes the generational educational gap. It also neglects the factor “ego 
company”, where different cultural codes of global society might sharply 
diverge on the assessment whether it constitutes a “good” or “bad phenomenon”.  
 
Thus, our average Global Value Development Index country score combines  
 
 avoiding economic permissiveness;  
 avoiding racism;  
 avoiding distrust of the army and the press;  
 avoiding the authoritarian character;  
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 tolerance and respect + post-materialism; and  
 avoiding a [predominantly] female rejection of the market economy 
and democracy.  
 
The weight, given to each factor, corresponds to the Eigen values listed in Graph 
2.4 of this work. 
 
Our country results show that the five best ranked countries of our entire globe 
are all western democracies with a solid historical anchoring of their societies in 
the traditions of the Enlightenment – Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, New 
Zealand, and Australia. But we already find among the next five countries 
Canada, the two developing countries Vietnam and Tanzania, and the EU-
member countries Italy (predominantly Roman Catholic, with a long history of 
liberal Catholicism since the Second Vatican Council) and Finland 
(predominantly Protestant). Our global value development index, ranks the 
predominantly Muslim nation of Morocco twelfth – just behind the United 
States of America – and still ahead the Latin American democracy Uruguay and 
the EU-country Germany, to be followed by Bosnia and Indonesia. In our Table, 
we highlighted the member countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation 
in green color, while the member countries of the European Union are marked in 
blue color.  
 
 
Table 2.13: The rankings of the countries of the world on a new Global 
Value Development Index (OIC member countries and Bosnia and 
Hercegovina are marked in green colors) 
 
 
Country Value Development 
Index 
Global Rank Value 
Development 
Index 
Switzerland 3,84 1 
Norway 3,77 2 
Sweden 3,41 3 
New Zealand 3,33 4 
Australia 2,57 5 
Canada 2,50 6 
Vietnam 2,38 7 
Tanzania 2,23 8 
Italy 2,23 9 
Finland 2,11 10 
United States 2,06 11 
Morocco 1,50 12 
Uruguay 1,44 13 
Germany 1,08 14 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina 1,07 15 
Indonesia 0,91 16 
Romania 0,89 17 
Spain 0,54 18 
Cyprus 0,51 19 
Dominican Republic 0,50 20 
Bulgaria 0,34 21 
Ghana 0,31 22 
Zimbabwe 0,26 23 
Ethiopia 0,08 24 
Turkey 0,06 25 
Venezuela 0,03 26 
Jordan 0,01 27 
Argentina 0,00 28 
Poland -0,07 29 
Georgia -0,11 30 
Bangladesh -0,20 31 
India -0,20 32 
Albania -0,36 33 
Macedonia -0,43 34 
Slovenia -0,47 35 
Burkina Faso -0,51 36 
Estonia -0,66 37 
Chile -0,69 38 
South Africa -0,79 39 
Nigeria -0,81 40 
Peru -0,94 41 
Uganda -0,95 42 
Trinidad and Tobago -1,04 43 
Korea, South -1,28 44 
Kyrgyzstan -1,36 45 
Azerbaijan -1,37 46 
Lithuania -1,53 47 
Hungary -1,69 48 
Slovakia -1,76 49 
Brazil -1,77 50 
Czech Republic -1,81 51 
Mali -1,83 52 
Belarus -1,87 53 
Ukraine -1,99 54 
Guatemala -2,00 55 
Mexico -2,10 56 
Armenia -2,13 57 
Latvia -2,22 58 
Russia -2,27 59 
Moldova -2,59 60 
Thailand -2,85 61 
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Philippines -2,86 62 
Zambia -3,25 63 
 
 
Our map shows that the euro-centric assumptions by European decision makers, 
which pushed European Union Enlargement ahead of democratic consolidation 
after the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, are utterly 
wrong. The degree of development of a democratic civil society [characterized 
by law-abiding and social capital, avoiding racism; trust of the army and the 
press; no authoritarian character; a high degree of tolerance and respect + post-
materialism; and a female acceptance of the market economy and democracy] is 
very poorly developed in several of the countries, admitted into the European 
Union in 2004 and after. Our choropleth map of global value development (Map 
2.10) then summarizes the results of Table 2.14 at a glance. 
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Map 2.10 Combined global value development index (avoiding permissiveness, racism, distrust of the army and the 
press, authoritarian character, [predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy; and 
practicing the values of tolerance and respect (weighted by the Eigen values of the promax factor analytical model) 
 
 
 
law-abiding and social capital, 
avoiding racism; trust of the 
army and the press; no 
authoritarian character; a high 
degree of tolerance and respect 
+ postmaterialism; and a high 
female acceptance of the 
market economy and 
democracy 
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Once more, it emerges that the political geography of global values in the 21
st
 
Century is far away from the imaginary of culturalist scientists and populist 
politicians alike: even for neighboring countries, culturalist explanation 
mechanisms utterly fail. Just compare Uruguay and Brazil, both predominantly 
Roman Catholic; Italy and Hungary, both predominantly Roman Catholic, 
Morocco and Mali, both predominantly Muslim, or for that matter, Morocco and 
Spain, just separated by the Straits of Gibraltar; Tanzania and Zambia, two 
neighboring African countries, and Vietnam and Thailand, two Asian 
neighboring countries. While Uruguay, Italy, Morocco, Tanzania and Vietnam 
are real frontrunners in value development, we find that Brazil; Hungary, Mali, 
Zambia, and Thailand are real laggards in global value development. These 
phenomena hold independently of the attained development level of a country, 
measured by the Human Development Index of the UNDP. All of a sudden we 
discover how exceptional countries like Uruguay, Italy, Morocco, Tanzania 
and Vietnam really are. Global sociological research would do well to focus on 
factors which contributed towards their performance.  
 
The World Value Survey data also permit the research community to analyze the 
results not only at the national level, but also at the regional level, where the 
interviews were recorded.  
 
The idea that global values are often distributed in the nations of the world in a 
highly regionally contradictory pattern is relatively new in the research literature 
on the subject. First studies in this direction were published, among others, by 
Alm, Martinez-Vazque, and Torgler, 2006; Bonini, 2008; Freitag, 2003; 
Howard, 2002; and Torgier and Schneider, 2007.  
 
Our regional evaluations of the World Values Survey data are all available from 
https://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-books-and-articles 
where readers will find the file entitled: “Regional aspects of socio-religious 
values according to the World Values Survey” and “The global analysis of 
feminism and its regional implications for the Muslim world”.  
 
Of the global regions with more than 30 interview partners each, it emerges for 
example that the 30 most permissive and pessimistic social climates are 
located in:  
 
ZM: Copperbelt Province Zambia 
CS: South East Serbia Serbia and Montenegro 
CS: Central West Serbia Serbia and Montenegro 
MD: Vulkaneshtskij Moldova 
MD: Autonomous Gaugasian Republic Moldova 
UA: Zhitomyr oblast Ukraine 
RO: Arges Romania 
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BF: Sahel Region Burkina Faso 
UA: Kirovograd oblast Ukraine 
GH: Northern Ghana 
IN: Assam India 
ML: Mopti Mali 
AM: Ararat Marz Armenia 
UA: Southern Ukraine 
UA: Central Ukraine 
BY: Gomel oblast Belarus 
ML: Sikasso Mali 
LV: Ziemelu reg.  Latvia 
UG: Kampala Uganda 
GT: Altiplano/Centro Guatemala 
 
 
The 30 superstars of law-abiding and social trust (=highest negative loadings 
on the economic permissiveness factor) we find in the following regions of the 
world:  
 
 
BD: Kishoreganj Bangladesh 
TR: East Central Anatolia Turkey 
BD: Feni Bangladesh 
BD: Mymensingh Bangladesh 
TR: Western Black Sea Turkey 
BD: Sylhet Bangladesh 
TR: Western Marmara Turkey 
BD: Chittagong Bangladesh 
BD: Rangpur Bangladesh 
BD: Habiganj Bangladesh 
GE: Samegrelo Georgia 
ZW: Masvingo Zimbabwe 
BD: Brahmanbaria Bangladesh 
ID: Lampung Indonesia 
ZW: Mashonaland West Zimbabwe 
ET: Addis Ababa Ethiopia 
ID: East Java Indonesia 
TR: Eastern Black Sea Turkey 
ZW: Midlands Zimbabwe 
BD: Nator Bangladesh 
VN: northwest Vietnam 
BD: Sirajgonj Bangladesh 
MA: Marrakech-Tensift Morocco 
IN: Punjab India 
TR: Eastern Marmara Turkey 
ID: Dareah Istimewa Yogyakarta Indonesia 
VN: north central Vietnam 
TR: Western Anatolia Turkey 
BD: Dhaka Bangladesh 
ZW: Mashonaland Central Zimbabwe 
BD: Barisal Bangladesh 
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The 30 most traditional religious regions of the world are to be found in:  
 
 
BD: Mymensingh Bangladesh 
GH: Brong Ahafo Ghana 
ZM: Western Province Zambia 
BD: Sylhet Bangladesh 
BD: Kishoreganj Bangladesh 
BD: Brahmanbaria Bangladesh 
BD: Comilla Bangladesh 
NG: West Nigeria 
BD: Habiganj Bangladesh 
NG: Middle belt Nigeria 
GH: Eastern Ghana 
GH: Ashanti Ghana 
GH: Northern Ghana 
BD: Rangpur Bangladesh 
NG: North Nigeria 
ID: Lampung Indonesia 
ID: Central Java province Indonesia 
NG: East Nigeria 
GH: Greater Accra Ghana 
NG: Lagos Nigeria 
BF: Central North Burkina Faso 
ID: Banten Indonesia 
GH: Volta Ghana 
ID: West java province Indonesia 
BF: North Region Burkina Faso 
GH: Central Ghana 
UG: Mbale Uganda 
ID: East Java Indonesia 
UG: Tororo Uganda 
ZW: Mashonaland West Zimbabwe 
 
 
Equally important, it emerges that the 30 most secularist regions of the entire 
world are to be found in:  
 
 
DE: Ost-Berlin Germany 
RU: Far East Russia 
CZ: Severoèeský kraj - North Bohemia - Czech Republic 
RU: Western Siberia Russia 
DE: Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Germany 
RU: Volga; Povolzskij Russia 
DE: Sachsen Germany 
DE: Brandenburg Germany 
DE: Sachsen-Anhalt Germany 
BG: Lovech Bulgaria 
SE: Skåne Sweden 
EE: Isa-Virumaa Estonia 
UA: Vinnytsia oblast Ukraine 
EE: Tartumaa Estonia 
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DE: Thueringen Germany 
EE: Laane-Viruma Estonia 
SE: Vasterbotten Sweden 
UA: Kharkiv oblast Ukraine 
UA: Luhansk oblast Ukraine 
VN: northwest Vietnam 
RU: Volgo-Vyatki Russia 
SE: Västra Götaland Sweden 
CZ: Jihoèeský kraj - South Bohemia - Czech Republic 
RU: North Caucasus Russia 
SE: Vasternorrland Sweden 
SE: Stor Stockholm Sweden 
CZ: Západoèeský kraj - West Bohemia - Czech Republic 
RU: Urals Russia 
DE: Berlin Germany 
BG: Razgrad Bulgaria 
SE: Uppsala Sweden 
 
 
The 30 most racist and xenophobic cultures of the world are to be found in the 
following regions:  
 
 
BD: Sirajgonj Bangladesh 
IN: Jharkhand India 
BD: Brahmanbaria Bangladesh 
BD: Kishoreganj Bangladesh 
BD: Feni Bangladesh 
BD: Nator Bangladesh 
BD: Habiganj Bangladesh 
BD: Sylhet Bangladesh 
BD: Chittagong Bangladesh 
BD: Barisal Bangladesh 
ID: Banten Indonesia 
BD: Dhaka Bangladesh 
GH: Eastern Ghana 
TH: The South Thailand 
IN: Assam India 
BD: Mymensingh Bangladesh 
BD: Comilla Bangladesh 
TR: Central Anatolia Turkey 
IN: Madhya Pradesh India 
IN: Rajasthan India 
TH: The North Thailand 
IN: West Bengal  India 
IN: Orrisa India 
IN: Bihar  India 
VN: northwest Vietnam 
KR: Jeonbuk / North Jeolla Korea-South 
ID: DKI Indonesia 
ZM: Copperbelt Province Zambia 
VN: southeast Vietnam 
ID: Dareah Istimewa Yogyakarta Indonesia 
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The least racist and xenophobic cultures of the world are to be found in the 
following regions of the world:  
 
 
BF: Central West Burkina Faso 
MD: Floreshtskij Moldova 
BF: Central North Burkina Faso 
BF: Central Plateau Burkina Faso 
ES: Asturias Spain 
ZW: Midlands Zimbabwe 
ZW: Masvingo Zimbabwe 
BY: Mogilev oblast Belarus 
SE: Stor Stockholm Sweden 
CA: Saskatchewan Canada 
UA: Hmelnytsk oblast Ukraine 
AR: Rosario Argentina 
CA: Manitoba Canada 
BF: Boucle du Mouhoun Burkina Faso 
SE: Skåne Sweden 
RO: Dolj Romania 
UY: Fray Bentos Uruguay 
SE: Uppsala Sweden 
NZ: Wellington New Zealand 
CA: Alberta Canada 
AL: Tirana Albania 
BY: Brest oblast Belarus 
CA: Nova Scotia Canada 
NZ: Hawkes Bay New Zealand 
CA: Ontario Canada 
SE: Vasterbotten Sweden 
MD: Kantemirskij Moldova 
NO: Oslo and Akershus Norway 
NO: Nordland Norway 
CA: British Columbia Canada 
BR: RJ Brazil 
 
 
Such comparisons for the hopefully flourishing future research field of regional 
analyses of human values could be continued endlessly. On a European level, 
one should not underestimate the long-term implications of such a discourse.  
 
It also emerges, for example that even in highly developed overseas 
democracies, regional value differences are considerable. Differences between 
the deeply religious “Bible Belt” in the US South and the relatively secular New 
England are but one example. Secular Western Turkey quickly catches up with 
other European regions concerning the “Westernization” of values, while 
Central Anatolia lags behind. Table 2.13 provides us with a first overview of the 
highest and lowest placed regions in the current European Union member states 
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and the EU-accession countries, ranked again by an average Value Development 
Index score, which combines, as before  
 
 avoiding economic permissiveness;  
 avoiding racism;  
 avoiding distrust of the army and the press;  
 avoiding the authoritarian character;  
 tolerance and respect + post-materialism; and  
 avoiding a [predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and 
democracy.  
 
The regional index is again built by weighting the regional factor scores 
according to the World Values Survey results by the Eigen values of each of 
these factors.  
 
Tables 2.14 and 2.15 suggest huge national and regional differences in the 
European Union, which will increase even more after the next proposed round 
of EU-enlargement. Table 2.15 could be an important checklist for European 
decision makers in future EU-enlargement negotiations, pinpointing just where 
the real strengths and weaknesses of candidates in global value development 
really are situated. 
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Graph 2.16: The regional value dimension – nine factor model for the different regions in the US 
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Graph 2.17: The regional value dimension – nine factor model for some European regions 
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Table 2.14: The rankings of the best and the worst ranked regions in the European Union and the candidate and 
potential candidate countries 
 
 
 
Region where the 
interview was 
conducted 
Country avoiding 
economic 
permissive
ness 
avoiding 
racism 
avoiding 
distrust of the 
army and the 
press 
avoiding the 
authoritaria
n character 
tolerance and 
respect + post-
materialism 
avoiding a 
[predominan
tly] female 
rejection of 
the market 
economy and 
democracy 
Regional 
development 
index 
World Rank Rank in the 
enlarged EU 
SE: Skåne Sweden 0,745 0,928 0,309 0,999 0,971 0,584 0,756 3 1 
FI: Lappi Finland 0,764 0,910 0,473 0,824 0,893 0,468 0,722 10 5 
SE: Jonkoping Sweden 0,756 0,880 0,238 0,781 0,979 0,528 0,694 21 9 
RO: Dolj Romania 0,889 0,928 0,487 0,294 0,686 0,859 0,690 22 10 
DE: Rheinland-Pfalz Germany 0,659 0,893 0,282 0,743 0,910 0,510 0,666 33 13 
IT: Emilia-Romagna Italy 0,866 0,843 0,281 0,586 0,790 0,569 0,656 43 14 
PR: Montana Portugal 0,860 0,906 0,330 0,430 0,681 0,583 0,632 71 23 
CS: Central Serbia Serbia and 
Montenegro 
0,807 0,887 0,381 0,325 0,618 0,629 0,608 97 36 
CY: Kyrenia Cyprus 0,830 0,760 0,460 0,446 0,585 0,525 0,601 108 42 
ES: Castilla Leon Spain 0,894 0,891 0,330 0,387 0,626 0,447 0,596 115 49 
IT: Campania Italy 0,770 0,834 0,255 0,486 0,786 0,354 0,581 138 58 
TR: Eastern Black 
Sea 
Turkey 0,926 0,740 0,446 0,138 0,693 0,534 0,579 141 60 
PR: Metropolitana Portugal 0,742 0,792 0,360 0,317 0,809 0,394 0,569 157 68 
SI: Osrednja 
Slovenska 
Slovenia 0,635 0,799 0,204 0,546 0,743 0,463 0,565 169 73 
BG: Ruse Bulgaria 0,809 0,862 0,459 0,256 0,550 0,427 0,561 178 78 
EE: Tartumaa Estonia 0,808 0,691 0,431 0,263 0,504 0,626 0,554 193 84 
MK: Ohridski Macedonia 0,780 0,728 0,152 0,446 0,687 0,468 0,544 222 99 
AL: Tirana Albania 0,644 0,923 0,217 0,411 0,483 0,550 0,538 233 104 
DE: Thueringen Germany 0,750 0,818 0,109 0,474 0,714 0,335 0,533 244 110 
CZ: Prague Czech Republic 0,547 0,759 0,295 0,263 0,693 0,619 0,530 257 115 
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AL: Center Albania 0,614 0,743 0,355 0,312 0,546 0,602 0,529 258 116 
RO: Arges Romania 0,212 0,735 0,617 0,433 0,424 0,736 0,526 266 121 
HU: Central-Hungary Hungary 0,528 0,680 0,220 0,346 0,814 0,510 0,516 289 130 
FI: Vaasan Finland 0,733 0,669 0,292 0,468 0,733 0,190 0,514 295 132 
BG: Sofia-province Bulgaria 0,677 0,762 0,395 0,323 0,471 0,453 0,513 298 134 
SK: Bratislava County Slovakia 0,425 0,747 0,336 0,303 0,699 0,522 0,505 323 138 
LT: Vilnius Lithuania 0,699 0,782 0,363 0,258 0,454 0,447 0,501 335 140 
SI: Pomurska Slovenia 0,588 0,775 0,233 0,375 0,664 0,366 0,500 337 142 
MK: Poloski Macedonia 0,661 0,842 0,077 0,274 0,604 0,498 0,493 362 149 
HU: South-Danubian Hungary 0,639 0,710 0,260 0,307 0,702 0,285 0,484 374 153 
ES: Pais Vasco Spain 0,505 0,878 0,175 0,388 0,550 0,402 0,483 378 155 
EE: Isa-Virumaa Estonia 0,603 0,839 0,286 0,204 0,411 0,544 0,481 383 157 
LV: Daugavpils Latvia 0,707 0,888 0,242 0,126 0,418 0,500 0,480 386 158 
CY: Limassol Cyprus 0,675 0,723 0,390 0,299 0,585 0,188 0,477 396 160 
SK: Northern Slovakia Slovakia 0,471 0,769 0,338 0,199 0,507 0,506 0,465 419 167 
TR: Central Anatolia Turkey 0,821 0,317 0,509 0,318 0,361 0,400 0,455 436 168 
LT: Kaunas Lithuania 0,551 0,711 0,337 0,323 0,423 0,308 0,442 465 171 
CZ: Západoèeský kraj 
- West Bohemia - 
Czech Republic 0,499 0,642 0,278 0,195 0,448 0,490 0,426 482 172 
LV: Ziemelu reg.  Latvia 0,355 0,881 0,169 0,193 0,423 0,488 0,418 488 174 
CS: South East 
Serbia 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
0,040 0,662 0,244 0,262 0,505 0,309 0,337 509 176 
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Table 2.15: Country ranks of global values 
 
 avoiding 
economic 
permissive
ness 
traditiona
l religion 
avoiding 
racism 
generatio
nal 
education 
gaps, a 
growing 
acceptanc
e of 
female 
higher 
education 
and the 
rejection 
of thrift  
avoiding 
the 
distrust of 
the army 
and the 
press 
avoiding 
the 
authorit
arian 
characte
r 
tolerance 
and 
respect + 
post-
materialis
m 
the ‘ego’ 
company 
(rejection 
of 
obedience 
+ 
unselfishn
ess) 
avoiding 
the 
rejection of 
the market 
economy 
and 
democracy 
Albania 43 35 24 56 47 33 37 37 12 
Argentina 32 32 9 49 66 28 23 30 51 
Armenia 54 46 37 11 22 48 62 16 31 
Australia 12 51 6 38 54 7 8 49 17 
Azerbaijan 50 37 25 7 46 38 57 2 16 
Bangladesh 1 11 66 40 3 13 63 10 3 
Belarus 59 58 5 43 31 62 58 14 37 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
14 36 39 36 17 24 29 44 15 
Brazil 60 21 7 46 26 60 38 57 61 
Bulgaria 23 59 36 33 12 42 44 20 28 
Burkina Faso 45 8 2 57 14 55 66 67 13 
Canada 16 41 3 32 35 9 9 43 35 
Chile 48 31 23 50 49 20 18 52 66 
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Cyprus 25 33 42 16 27 30 19 48 33 
Czech Republic 51 65 48 64 45 59 33 17 27 
Dominican Republic 19 18 32 1 52 36 16 28 30 
Estonia 40 64 28 20 37 54 42 5 24 
Ethiopia 10 17 27 10 61 8 65 38 49 
Finland 24 53 35 53 23 5 4 34 54 
Georgia 35 30 30 13 20 49 41 8 14 
Germany 33 63 15 62 67 6 5 6 48 
Ghana 31 2 46 27 6 56 55 64 6 
Guatemala 61 12 11 17 55 40 31 62 65 
Hong Kong 37 62 67 55 32 14 60 47 57 
Hungary 53 57 55 51 59 31 12 27 43 
India 34 29 63 44 4 34 54 42 4 
Indonesia 6 4 62 9 10 15 26 21 23 
Italy 9 34 18 21 44 11 7 29 29 
Jordan 21 3 65 19 5 19 24 65 5 
Kyrgyzstan 44 42 44 3 36 41 49 11 52 
Latvia 56 56 26 30 57 61 36 4 38 
Lithuania 47 44 51 29 30 44 45 9 44 
Macedonia 28 43 58 26 65 25 11 32 40 
Mali 58 16 45 66 7 43 67 58 22 
Mexico 57 24 53 24 39 22 34 56 60 
Moldova 64 38 29 42 48 46 46 13 53 
Morocco 5 9 22 48 16 45 43 39 2 
New Zealand 8 54 4 47 42 4 6 40 9 
Nigeria 26 1 43 4 34 65 64 61 1 
Norway 17 61 14 14 43 1 2 23 26 
Peru 41 20 21 5 62 52 28 51 32 
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Philippines 65 15 54 23 9 53 59 33 59 
Poland 36 23 31 65 38 27 15 36 67 
Puerto Rico 13 7 20 12 24 37 10 46 36 
Romania 20 27 47 37 13 32 30 7 7 
Russian Federation 52 67 16 54 41 67 53 12 58 
Serbia 67 39 56 22 63 35 39 25 50 
Slovakia 55 40 38 63 25 58 35 19 25 
Slovenia 46 52 40 35 60 18 17 26 42 
South Africa 39 19 49 18 33 51 32 41 39 
South Korea 29 48 61 8 28 17 50 1 62 
Spain 27 49 8 60 51 26 22 45 47 
Sweden 30 66 1 31 56 2 1 24 21 
Switzerland 7 50 10 25 50 3 3 15 19 
Taiwan 22 55 52 52 58 23 20 3 56 
Tanzania 4 5 41 41 2 29 52 63 8 
Thailand 63 25 64 67 40 12 27 53 63 
Trinidad and Tobago 42 13 13 59 64 63 25 50 41 
Turkey 3 28 57 34 15 57 40 31 46 
Uganda 49 10 34 2 8 64 56 60 11 
Ukraine 62 47 19 39 29 50 51 18 45 
United States 15 26 17 45 19 16 14 35 18 
Uruguay 18 45 12 58 53 10 13 59 64 
Venezuela 38 22 50 15 11 39 21 55 55 
Viet Nam 11 60 60 61 1 21 48 22 10 
Zambia 66 14 59 6 18 47 61 54 34 
Zimbabwe 2 6 33 28 21 66 47 66 20 
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So, our analysis is fairly pessimistic for the former communist countries and 
successor states of the former Soviet Union, predominantly Muslim and non-
Muslim alike. They excel hardly anywhere by an overwhelmingly positive 
performance. The history of Communism which began to be implemented in 
Russia in 1917 destroyed the religious fabric of society and left a hyper-
authoritarian society in place. Russia’s global value performance percentile 
performance scores, which might be interpreted as a serious question mark 
about Russia’s future trajectory, are the following (see below). The best value 
performance of Russia is avoiding the distrust of the army and the press, where 
Russia is only at standardized rank 61 among a hypothetical 100 nations. 
Avoiding economic permissiveness, Russia is only at standardized rank 78 
among a hypothetical 100 nations et cetera, et cetera. 
 
 
avoiding the distrust of the army and the press    61% 
avoiding economic permissiveness      78% 
tolerance and respect + post-materialism     79% 
avoiding the rejection of the market economy and democracy  87% 
traditional religion         100% 
avoiding the authoritarian character      100% 
 
 
The degree of development of a democratic civil society, characterized by law-
abiding and social capital, avoiding racism; trust of the army and the press; no 
authoritarian character; a high degree of tolerance and respect + post-
materialism; and a female acceptance of the market economy and democracy is 
very poorly developed in several of the countries, admitted into the European 
Union in 2004 and after.  
 
Just how important the dimension of tolerance, respect and postmaterialism is 
for “effective democracy” and how important the closeness to religion (the 
traditional religion factor) is for economic growth, we realize when we look at 
the bi-variate scatterplots. “Effective democracy” is defined with Alexander, 
Inglehart and Welzel, 2012 as the combination of civil rights with the absence 
of corruption (Graph 2.18). The overall Value Development Index shows an 
interesting trade-off with “effective democracy”: the non-linear effect is 
certainly stronger than the linear effect. Tolerance and respect and 
postmaterialism explains almost 2/3 of effective democracy, while the closeness 
to religion explains more than ¼ of economic growth, 2008-2011: 
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Graph 2.18: Value development and closeness to religion as drivers of 
“effective democracy” and economic growth  
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Source: our own calculations from Alexander, Inglehart and Welzel, 2012 and the results of 
this work. The Alexander, Inglehart and Welzel, 2012 data are freely available from 
http://ips.sagepub.com/content/33/1/41.refs  
 
Finding the necessary combination between liberal values and religion will 
be an important task for democratic forces around the world. 
 
Our materials support the verdict that the member countries of the European 
Union and the European Commission should carefully weigh the costs and 
benefits of further enlargements, also in terms of the value balances in 
comparison to the world’s leading democracies and the ascending democracies 
in Latin America and other regions of the world, which conform much better to 
the essence of the values of the Enlightenment. What is also at stake was 
recently spelt out by the Turkish political scientist Prof. Suat Kiniklioglu, who 
remarked recently: 
 
“An examination of the intense social media discourse in the aftermath of the 
coup in Egypt as well as the growing failure in Syria illustrates the increasingly 
blurred lines between the Turkish nation and the ummah as a unit of analysis in 
the minds of Turkey's conservatives/Islamists. Atılgan Bayar, who is a 
consultant to the staunchly pro-government news channel A Haber, announced 
in August 2013 that he accepts Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
as the “caliph of the earth,” a title used by Ottoman sultans after Yavuz Sultan 
Selim. Indeed, since the Gezi Park protests, we have seen a more pronounced 
identification of Erdoğan as the head of an imagined ummah rather than merely 
as the head of the Turkish government. In view of Erdogan’s domestic troubles, 
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pro-government commentators have established a link between Erdogan’s 
political fate and that of Muslims everywhere. Erdogan’s political fortunes are 
linked to the fate of Muslims from Syria to Egypt, from Myanmar to Africa. This 
sort of linkage is, of course, astutely constructed from within to be made use of 
in the domestic political battle.  
 
When Erdoğan is elevated to the role of head of the ummah, any sort of criticism 
of Turkish domestic or foreign policy is equated to being a “pawn of the 
Zionists,” the US or other foreign entities. Alternatively, one who longs for the 
old authoritarian state, has no foreign policy vision or cannot foresee a stronger 
role for Turkey is dismissed as a Kemalist. However, Turkey's 
conservatives/Islamists are entertaining an extremely dangerous and 
irresponsible political discourse for domestic political ends. Many conservative 
voters are unaware of Turkey's real capacity, the situation on the ground in 
the region or perceptions developed in the last two years vis-à-vis Turkey. 
They have bought into the grandiose narrative that portrays Turkey as the 
leader of the Islamic ummah. Exploiting such a religious and unrealistic 
foreign policy narrative for domestic political objectives is destined to lead to 
enormous disappointments. Worse, Turkey's reputation and international 
standing is damaged by this irresponsible exploitation of the Turkish public at 
large. It is telling that Turkey's conservatives/Islamists desperately feel the need 
to manipulate the public discourse in such an irresponsible fashion.” 20 
 
 
3. The global analysis of feminism and its regional 
implications for the Muslim world.  
 
 
In the following Chapter, we will re-analyze the entire question of feminism, 
religion and Islam anew.  
 
 
3. 1. Muslim feminism – the view of a quantitative social scientist 
 
 
In the following analysis, we particularly try to provide global scholarship with 
a promax factor analysis of the interrelationships between religion, gender, 
feminism and social background variables, like age and education.  
 
 
                                                 
20
 http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists/suat-kiniklioglu_336109-nation-or-ummah.html  
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Influential World Values Survey oriented studies on the issue of global feminism 
were, among others, Cao and Stack, 2010; Hayes, McAllister, and Studlar, 2000; 
and Inglehart, and Norris, 2000. The studies Inglehart, 2002, 2003b, 2007; 
Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart and Norris P., 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2010, 
Inglehart and Welzel, 2003, and 2005. Most of these studies strongly believed 
that the real difference between the West and the Muslim world is not the 
commitment towards democracy, which is now very strong in the Muslim 
world, but different views on gender and family issues. By re-analyzing the data 
from n = 173231 representative global citizens in 83 countries and territories, we 
are permitted to compare the average values in different regions of the world, 
since the large samples, for the first time in cross-national value research, allow 
us to draw comparisons also on the regional level.  
 
Our Table 3.2 destroys the myth of value “monolithic” Muslim countries, and 
instead, a starling variety of regional convictions and value patterns emerge, 
even in countries, where Western knowledge hitherto had little knowledge about 
them, like Saudi-Arabia.  
 
The Muslim countries contained in our analysis are Albania; Algeria; 
Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Burkina Faso; Egypt; Indonesia; Iran; Jordan; 
Kyrgyzstan; Mali; Morocco; Nigeria; Pakistan; Saudi Arabia; Turkey; and 
Uganda. They already make up none the less than an estimated 62.55% of the 
entire Muslim population of our globe. In addition, our analysis is also 
representative of the large Muslim minorities in China, Ethiopia, India and 
Russia, whose population comprise an additional estimated 17.55% of the global 
‘Umma’. Our analysis is thus the largest ever undertaken analysis on gender 
relations and religion in the world and in Muslim countries. A peculiarity of the 
World Values Survey Project, must be taken into consideration here: when you 
introduce only a small additional number of variables into the multivariate 
analysis you risk reducing the number of individuals with complete data often 
dramatically. This is mainly due to large cross-country differences in the actual 
questionnaires fielded in the different countries. In the present analysis, we kept 
the variables to a minimum. Nevertheless we hope to be able to tap with them 
the dimensions of religion, gender, feminism and social background variables, 
like age and education:  
 
 
Age 
Education level (recoded) 
Highest educational level attained 
How important is God in your life 
How often do you attend religious services 
(never?) 
Important child qualities: religious faith 
Jobs scarce: Men should have more right to 
a job than women (reject) 
Sex (Gender) 
University is more important for a boy than 
for a girl (reject) 
Woman as a single parent 
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Our factor analysis explains almost 54% of the total variance. Our analysis is 
based on none the less than 173231 representative individuals in 83 countries. 
 
 
Table 3.1.a Feminism and religion re-analyzed. Data from n = 173231 
representative global citizens in 83 countries and territories.  
 
 
 initial extraction 
Important child qualities: religious faith 1,000 0,544 
Jobs scarce: Men should have more right to a 
job than women 
1,000 0,387 
Woman as a single parent 1,000 0,281 
University is more important for a boy than for a 
girl 
1,000 0,459 
How often do you attend religious services 1,000 0,570 
How important is God in your life 1,000 0,666 
Sex (Gender) 1,000 0,438 
Age 1,000 0,190 
Highest educational level attained 1,000 0,930 
Education level (recoded) 1,000 0,921 
 
 
Our analysis wielded three factors with an Eigen value of higher or equal to one.  
 
Table 3.1.b Feminism and religion re-analyzed. Cumulative variance 
explained 
 
 
 Eigen values % of variance cumulated 
percentage 
1,000 2,401 24,009 24,009 
2,000 1,768 17,677 41,686 
3,000 1,216 12,162 53,848 
 
One can say with certainty that there is no real sharp contradiction between 
religion and feminism on a global scale. Distance to religious practice has only 
4% of the variance in common with the education level (correlation between the 
two factors is 0.192). Gender determines feminist convictions to some 40%. 
Furthermore, it is also evident that feminist convictions are not only held by 
women, but also increasingly by enlightened men. Interestingly enough, our data 
also show that people supporting typical feminist contentions, like female access 
to tertiary education and jobs even at a time of crisis (Factor 3), are not 
necessarily too strongly in support of secularism or the acceptancy of women as 
a single parent (factor loading 0.352, i. e. 12.39% of variance explained). Single 
parenthood is a form of household organization very common in Western 
countries. The argument is that marriage is an outdated institution et cetera. 
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Support for single parenthood by women is rather an expression of the distance 
towards religion (factor loading of 0. 431, i. e. 18.58% of variance explained).  
 
 
Table 3.1.c Feminism and religion re-analyzed. The factor loadings 
 
 
 distance to 
traditionalist 
forms of religion 
Generation gap 
in educational 
level 
feminism 
Important child qualities: religious 
faith 
-0,736 -0,093 -0,087 
Age 0,115 -0,391 -0,034 
How important is God in your life -0,814 -0,132 -0,032 
How often do you attend religious 
services (never) 
0,751 0,081 0,035 
Education level (recoded) 0,200 0,959 0,108 
Highest educational level attained 0,204 0,964 0,113 
Woman as a single parent 0,431 0,100 0,352 
Jobs scarce: Men should have more 
right to a job than women (reject) 
0,213 0,154 0,600 
Sex (Gender) -0,155 -0,119 0,606 
University is more important for a 
boy than for a girl (reject) 
0,111 0,173 0,669 
 
 
The correlations between the factors suggest that the often described 
contradiction between feminism and religion hardly exists today. The squared 
correlation coefficients indicate that the common variance between the religious 
and the feminist dimension is below 5%. The correlation between secularism 
and feminism (see Table 3.1.d) is only 0.106, i. e. only 1.12% of the variance of 
feminism is explained by secularism. This is a long distance from the often 
militant contentions of the critics of religion around the globe about the 
incompatibility between religion and feminism.  
 
 
Table 3.1.d Feminism and religion re-analyzed. Correlation matrix of 
components 
 
 
 correlation matrix of the components 
 distance to 
traditionalist 
forms of religion 
Generation gap 
in educational 
level 
feminism 
distance to traditionalist forms of 
religion 
1,000 0,192 0,106 
Generation gap in educational 
level 
0,192 1,000 0,109 
feminism 0,106 0,109 1,000 
 
N = 173231 respondents with complete data (global sample = 257597 representative 
respondents) 
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In Table 3.1.e we present the country results of our analysis. The countries 
belonging to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) are marked in green 
color. There is a startling variety of feminisms and secularisms in the world 
today. The feminism among the population in predominantly Muslim Bosnia is 
ranked equally with that in Mexico and Guatemala, and the people of 
predominantly Muslim Albania are as feminist as the populations in neighboring 
Romania and the Czech Republic. Albania, the Czech Republic and Romania all 
had a very harsh communist rule after 1945. Feminism in Turkey is at the same 
level of development as the one in China and Belarus, et cetera.  
 
Turkey’s religiosity or distance to religion depends to a large extent on the 
region of Turkey which you analyze, with the country averages comparable to 
those of the United States, Colombia, Poland, Mexico, or India. The deeply 
Roman Catholic population of El Salvador is at the same level of religiosity as 
the population of Saudi Arabia, and they all are in the same league of religiosity 
as Catholic Guatemala, predominantly protestant Zambia, and Muslim Algeria 
and Iran.  
 
 
Table 3.1e Feminism and religion re-analyzed (country results) 
 
 
OIC members are marked in green color 
 
 
Country/region distance to 
traditionalist 
forms of religion 
Generation gap 
in educational 
level 
feminism 
Albania 0,264 -0,342 0,138 
Algeria -0,682 0,270 -0,403 
Andorra 1,059 0,295 0,371 
Argentina 0,095 -0,366 0,189 
Armenia 0,409 0,367 -0,436 
Australia 0,693 0,352 0,121 
Azerbaijan 0,139 0,506 -0,435 
Bangladesh -0,817 -0,215 -0,853 
Belarus 0,721 0,083 -0,204 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0,295 0,055 0,202 
Brazil -0,479 -0,315 0,390 
Bulgaria 0,854 0,015 0,274 
Burkina Faso -0,866 -0,741 -0,416 
Canada 0,282 0,128 0,388 
Chile 0,000 -0,105 0,186 
China 0,727 -0,352 -0,134 
Colombia -0,189 0,392 0,492 
Cyprus 0,100 0,271 0,236 
Czech Republic 1,259 -0,210 0,131 
Dominican Republic -0,347 1,061 0,468 
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Egypt -0,885 -0,352 -0,596 
El Salvador -0,638 -0,204 0,480 
Estonia 1,104 0,120 -0,001 
Ethiopia -0,562 -0,196 0,366 
Finland 0,760 -0,098 0,327 
France 1,062 -0,283 0,413 
Georgia 0,045 0,348 -0,050 
Germany 1,040 -0,113 0,276 
Ghana -1,048 -0,597 -0,234 
Great Britain 0,828 0,271 0,242 
Guatemala -0,662 -0,019 0,199 
Hong Kong 1,175 0,016 0,110 
Hungary 0,882 -0,160 0,292 
India -0,246 -0,064 -0,489 
Indonesia -0,992 0,392 -0,301 
Iran -0,699 0,112 -0,677 
Italy 0,058 0,137 0,255 
Japan 0,955 0,418 0,299 
Jordan -1,008 -0,092 -0,620 
Kyrgyzstan 0,164 0,464 -0,210 
Latvia 0,773 0,329 0,065 
Lithuania 0,467 0,157 0,102 
Macedonia 0,336 -0,021 0,198 
Mali -0,788 -0,768 -0,598 
Mexico -0,202 -0,016 0,218 
Moldova 0,148 0,124 -0,050 
Morocco -0,799 -0,721 -0,673 
Netherlands 1,033 -0,129 0,385 
New Zealand 0,943 0,325 0,447 
Nigeria -0,979 0,172 -0,447 
Norway 1,089 0,312 0,488 
Pakistan -1,180 -0,372 -0,361 
Peru -0,365 0,198 0,113 
Philippines -0,721 0,214 -0,347 
Poland -0,195 -0,269 0,268 
Puerto Rico -0,574 0,529 0,299 
Romania -0,175 0,025 0,176 
Russian Federation 0,900 0,223 -0,093 
Rwanda -0,776 -0,792 -0,110 
Saudi Arabia -0,646 0,472 -0,812 
Serbia 0,337 0,144 0,356 
Serbia and Montenegro 0,641 -0,116 0,001 
Singapore -0,336 -0,129 -0,065 
Slovakia 0,489 -0,113 0,130 
Slovenia 0,703 -0,058 0,223 
South Africa -0,495 0,012 0,111 
South Korea 0,531 0,704 0,024 
Spain 0,655 -0,436 0,277 
Sweden 1,270 0,330 0,484 
Switzerland 0,699 0,266 0,360 
Taiwan 0,724 0,259 -0,195 
Tanzania -0,899 -0,282 0,116 
Thailand -0,107 -0,512 0,083 
Trinidad and Tobago -0,616 -0,337 0,235 
Turkey -0,237 -0,334 -0,153 
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Uganda -0,749 0,102 0,079 
Ukraine 0,629 0,206 0,006 
United States -0,147 0,256 0,240 
Uruguay 0,570 -0,463 0,586 
Venezuela -0,256 0,064 0,193 
Viet Nam 0,851 -0,431 -0,212 
Zambia -0,669 -0,082 0,015 
Zimbabwe -0,915 -0,537 -0,111 
 
 
 
3. 2. The choropleth maps of global feminism 
 
 
Let us now return to the quantitative social statistical argument. Our Choropleth 
maps of feminism are based on more countries but fewer variables than the 
choropleth maps and the factor analytical results of Chapter 5. Distance to 
traditional (istic) forms of religion is highest in Scandinavia and in some of the 
highly industrialized countries of Western and Central Europe with a long-run 
history of political secularization, like France, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Estonia; and distance to traditionalist forms of religion is also high in Japan, 
Australia, New Zealand, in Russia and China, in the United Kingdom, Hungary 
and Bulgaria.  
 
Spain, Uruguay, the Ukraine, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic are in the “next 
league” of secularization, while the populations in Argentina, Canada, and Italy 
are more secular than the United States, Turkey, Mexico, Chile, Venezuela, 
Colombia, India, Poland and Romania, which are forming the next 
“secularization league”. The next group of countries is a group of already more 
religious nations of Western Christianity – Peru, Brazil and South Africa. Most 
of the populations in the predominantly Muslim countries in the sample, 
including Algeria, Morocco, Mali, Saudi Arabia Iran and Bangladesh, belong to 
the next group and are as religious or secular as the populations in the Catholic 
countries Guatemala, El Salvador, and the Philippines, and are also on the same 
level as populations in the African countries Uganda and Zambia. According to 
our analysis, the most traditionally religious countries on earth are Ghana, 
Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, as well as the predominantly Muslim 
countries Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan and Indonesia.  
 
In Chapter 5 we already highlighted the factor “educational generation gap”. 
Our analysis would have to repeat many of the statements, already made there, 
so we concentrate on the comparative aspects of our analysis for the countries, 
which were due to insufficient data not included in the analysis of Chapter 5. 
Saudi Arabia certainly belongs to the group of countries, experiencing the 
strongest “clash of educational levels” between generations, together with the 
Dominican Republic, South Korea, Colombia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Japan 
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and Indonesia. Finally, our choropleth map of feminism (Map 3.3) also shows 
several interesting results. One is the high degree of feminism achieved not only 
in Scandinavia, New Zealand and France, but also in El Salvador, the 
Dominican Republic, Colombia and Uruguay. A striking result is also the fact 
that Ethiopia and Brazil which are two nations which are generally regarded as 
“developing countries” are already in the same feminism league as most of the 
Western democracies in the North Atlantic arena. Ethiopia and Brazil are ahead 
of Australia and South Africa. In this map, also other surprising and notable 
results emerge, like the position of Indonesia. Indonesia is in the same league of 
feminism as Turkey, Belarus and China. Concerning feminism, Saudi Arabia, 
Iran and Bangladesh are the real laggards. Our article would not like to indulge 
into too many predictions, but these data have to be combined with the 
knowledge about the generation gap in education, which would imply that in the 
next years there will be considerable societal clashes and confrontations over 
gender policy in Saudi-Arabia and Iran.  
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Map 3.1: Distance to traditionalist forms of religion 
 
 
 
 
Important child qualities: 
religious faith -0,736 
How important is God in your 
life -0,814 
How often do you attend 
religious services (never)
 0,751 
Woman as a single parent
 0,431 
 161 
 
Map 3.2: Generation gap in educational level 
 
 
 
 
Age -0,391 
Education level (recoded)
 0,959 
Highest educational level 
attained 0,964 
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Map 3.3: Feminism 
 
 
 
Woman as a single parent 0,352 
Jobs scarce: Men should have more 
right to a job than women (reject)
 0,600 
Sex (Gender) 0,606 
University is more important for a 
boy than for a girl (reject) 0,669 
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3. 4. The regional geography of Muslim feminism 
 
 
In the following Table (Table 3.2), we present the factor scores of our analysis at 
a regional level. For reasons of space, we mention here only regions in Muslim 
countries which never had undergone a communist development history with its 
notorious policies of “scientific atheism”. Interested readers and researchers are 
referred to our website 
21
 where we made available all the factor scores from all 
the regions of the world with available data. Our Table is ordered by the amount 
of feminism in the entire core center of the Muslim world. We also document 
for each region the development history and denominational characteristics of 
each region.  
 
Using the facilities of the Microsoft EXCEL program, our readers can easily 
estimate that the most secular regions in the center of the Muslim world outside 
the orbit of (former) Communism are the Muslim Kemalist Turkish regions of 
the Aegean (with a factor score of 0.171); the Muslim Shia Iranian region of 
Kurdistan (factor score of 0.110) and the Muslim Kemalist Turkish region of 
South Eastern Anatolia, largely populated by Turkey’s Kurdish minority (factor 
score: -0.154).  
 
The secularism factor scores of some of the more pronouncedly secular Muslim 
regions range between +0.171 to -0.389:  
 
 
Turkey TR: Aegean 
Iran IR: Kordestan 
Turkey TR: South Eastern Anatolia 
Turkey TR: Mediterranean 
Saudi Arabia SA: Hail 
Saudi Arabia SA: Qassim 
Bangladesh BD: Feni 
Bangladesh BD: Tangail 
 
This corresponds exactly to the following results in predominantly non-Muslim 
highly or medium developed countries, which are members of the OECD or the 
European Union. The list of these regions includes not only poorer regions of 
the European Union and some new member countries of the OECD, but also 
regions in Canada and the United States:  
                                                 
21
 https: //www. academia. 
edu/5255298/The_global_analysis_of_feminism_and_its_regional_implications_for_the_Mus
lim_world  
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Secularism factor scores in OECD or European Union regions ranging between 
+0.171 to -0.389: 
 
Romania RO: Mutenia 
Canada CA: Nova Scotia 
Romania RO: Galati 
USA US: New England 
Canada CA: Saskatchewan 
USA US: Northwest 
Canada CA: Newfoundland 
Chile CL: Zona Metropolitana 
Italy IT: Lombardia 
Cyprus CY: Nicosia 
Romania RO: Moldova 
Chile CL: Norte 
Romania RO: Oltenia 
Romania RO: Bucuresti 
USA US: Middle Atlantic States 
USA US: California 
Cyprus CY: Famagusta 
Italy IT: Veneto 
Italy IT: Lazio 
Canada CA: New Brunswick 
Romania RO: Timis 
Italy IT: Sicilia 
Romania RO: Banat 
Cyprus CY: Paphos 
Chile CL: Centro 
Romania RO: Dobrogia 
Romania RO: Sibiu 
Canada CA: Prince Edward Island 
Romania RO: Prahova 
USA US: Rocky Mountain state 
Italy IT: Campania 
Romania RO: Arad 
USA US: South Atlantic 
Romania RO: Buzau 
Chile CL: Sur 
Mexico MX: Centro 
Italy IT: Puglia 
Romania RO: Dolj 
Romania RO: Transylvania 
USA US: East North Central 
Mexico MX: Norte 
Mexico MX: Sur 
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Romania RO: Iasi 
Cyprus CY: Larnaca 
Romania RO: Valcea 
Romania RO: Crisana-Maramures (region) 
Romania RO: Arges 
USA US: West North Central 
USA US: West South Central 
Romania RO: Brasov 
Cyprus CY: Limassol 
 
 
The very high educational gaps of more than 0.500 between the generations 
in the predominantly Muslim regions in: 
 
 
Indonesia ID: Dareah Istimewa Yogyakarta 
Indonesia ID: South Kalimantan 
Indonesia ID: DKI 
Indonesia ID: West Nusa Tenggara 
Algeria DZ: Comune 9 
Pakistan PK: Urban Sindh 
Iran IR: Lorestan 
Saudi Arabia SA: Abha \ Khamis 
Saudi Arabia SA: Tabuk 
Indonesia ID: Jakarta province 
Algeria DZ: Comune 4 
Indonesia ID: Banten 
Indonesia ID: East Java 
Iran IR: Mazandaran 
Indonesia ID: Lampung 
Iran IR: Ilam 
Saudi Arabia SA: Dammam \ Khobar 
Saudi Arabia SA: Riyadh 
Saudi Arabia SA: Qassim 
Iran IR: Boyer ahmad 
 
 
well correspond to the range of results to be observed in the following regions 
in core-Western countries:  
 
 
Korea-South KR: Tawjeon / Daejeon 
Korea-South KR: Kwangju / Gwangju 
Korea-South KR: Seoul 
Norway NO: Oslo and Akershus 
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Korea-South KR: Taegu / Daegu 
Sweden SE: Stor Stockholm 
New Zealand NZ: Coastal-North Otago 
Sweden SE: Uppsala 
Portugal PR: Sur 
Korea-South KR: Kyeongbuk / North Gyeongsang 
Portugal PR: Montana 
Korea-South KR: Kyeonggi / Gyeonggi Do 
Korea-South KR: Kyowygi Do 
Korea-South KR: Jeonnam / South Jeolla 
Korea-South KR: Pusan / Busan 
New Zealand NZ: Wellington 
Korea-South KR: Kangwon / Gangwon Do 
Sweden SE: Vasterbotten 
Germany DE: Ost-Berlin 
Korea-South KR: Kyeongnam / South Gyeongsang 
GB (UK) GB: Eastern 
Sweden SE: Skåne 
Korea-South KR: Chungnam / South Chungcheong 
Australia AU: New South Wales 
Portugal PR: Oeste 
Sweden SE: Halland 
Latvia LV: Kurzeme 
Romania RO: Bucuresti 
Germany DE: West-Berlin 
Japan JP: Kanto 
Cyprus CY: Paphos 
Portugal PR: Centro 
Korea-South KR: Chungbuk / North Chungcheong 
Sweden SE: Västra Götaland 
Norway NO: South Eastern Norway 
Portugal PR: Metropolitana 
Latvia LV: Daugavpils 
 
 
The feminism factor loadings of the predominantly Muslim regions in 
 
 
Bangladesh BD: Kishoreganj 
Turkey TR: Aegean 
Turkey TR: Eastern Marmara 
Turkey TR: Eastern Black Sea 
Indonesia ID: Bengkulu province 
Indonesia ID: West Nusa Tenggara 
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are in the same range of the development of feminism in core-western 
regions of:  
 
 
Finland FI: Etelä-Savo 
Korea-South KR: Taegu / Daegu 
Finland FI: Kymen 
Germany DE: Brandenburg 
Bulgaria BG: Varna 
Czech R CZ: Støedoèeský kraj - Central Bohemia - 
Spain ES: C Valenciana 
Korea-South KR: Seoul 
Germany DE: Thueringen 
Korea-South KR: Chungbuk / North Chungcheong 
Mexico MX: Norte 
Romania RO: Brasov 
Estonia EE: Parnumaa 
Romania RO: Arges 
Latvia LV: Kurzeme 
Spain ES: Aragon 
Hungary HU: East Hungary 
Korea-South KR: Kyeongbuk / North Gyeongsang 
Italy IT: Veneto 
Mexico MX: Sur 
Cyprus CY: Limassol 
Czech R CZ: Jihoèeský kraj - South Bohemia - 
Hungary HU: North Hungary 
Korea-South KR: Kyowygi Do 
USA US: East North Central 
Chile CL: Sur 
Korea-South KR: Kangwon / Gangwon Do 
Australia AU: Victoria (Vic) 
GB (UK) GB: London 
Slovenia SI: Obalno-Kraska 
Romania RO: Sibiu 
Czech R CZ: Jihomoravský kraj - South Moravia - 
Estonia EE: Tartumaa 
Italy IT: Puglia 
Slovakia SK: Central Slovakia 
Spain ES: Navarra 
Korea-South KR: Pusan / Busan 
Australia AU: Western Australia (WA) 
Australia AU: Tasmania (Tas) 
Korea-South KR: Kyeonggi / Gyeonggi Do 
Australia AU: South Australia (SA) 
168 
 
Slovakia SK: Northern Slovakia 
Australia AU: New South Wales and ACT 
(NSW&ACT) 
New Zealand NZ: Southland 
Bulgaria BG: Razgrad 
Korea-South KR: Chungnam / South Chungcheong 
Latvia LV: Latgale 
Chile CL: Centro 
Estonia EE: Laane-Viruma 
Romania RO: Prahova 
Spain ES: Murcia 
Mexico MX: Centro occidente 
Australia AU: Queensland (Qld) 
Romania RO: Moldova 
Czech R CZ: Severoèeský kraj - North Bohemia - 
Korea-South KR: Incheon 
Cyprus CY: Iskele (Karpas) 
Romania RO: Banat 
Romania RO: Caras-Severin 
Germany DE: Schleswig-Holstein 
Latvia LV: Liepaja 
Bulgaria BG: Haskovo 
Cyprus CY: Paphos 
Romania RO: Transylvania 
 
 
There is already a significant feminist movement and a significant rethinking of 
the religious traditions in the light of gender justice in the entire Muslim world, 
and not just in Muslim post-communist countries. The rise of women is to be 
achieved as part of society’s advancement towards freedom, and Arab countries 
can achieve this goal by eradicating all infringements on human dignity, and 
specifically by guaranteeing full citizenship and the enjoyment of all human 
rights for all women on an equal footing with men.  
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Table 3.2: Feminism and religion - regional value analysis for the Muslim world ranked by the feminism factor in 
descending order 
 
 
Description of the region Country Region N = distance to 
traditionalist 
forms of 
religion 
Generation 
gap in 
educational 
level 
feminism 
Muslim Bangladesh BD: Kishoreganj 60 -1,211 -0,498 0,182 
Muslim Kemalist Turkey TR: Aegean 131 0,171 0,098 0,135 
Muslim Kemalist Turkey TR: Eastern Marmara 102 -0,434 0,064 0,120 
Muslim Kemalist Turkey TR: Eastern Black Sea 49 -0,408 -0,068 0,099 
Muslim Indonesia ID: Bengkulu province 191 -1,038 0,085 0,053 
Muslim Indonesia ID: West Nusa Tenggara 57 -1,129 0,778 0,028 
Muslim Bangladesh BD: Faridpur 50 -1,214 -0,462 -0,002 
Muslim Kemalist Turkey TR: Western Black Sea 85 -0,529 -0,310 -0,046 
Muslim Indonesia ID: South Kalimantan 33 -1,192 0,830 -0,088 
Muslim Kemalist Turkey TR: Western Marmara 47 -0,651 -0,608 -0,091 
Arab Muslim, former French 
colony 
Algeria DZ: Comune 6 67 -0,741 0,437 -0,125 
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Muslim Kemalist Turkey TR: East Central Anatolia 71 -0,558 -0,483 -0,132 
Muslim Kemalist Turkey TR: Western Anatolia 125 -0,452 -0,145 -0,133 
Muslim Indonesia ID: East Java 481 -0,974 0,576 -0,135 
Muslim Pakistan PK: Urban NWFP 148 -1,163 0,353 -0,146 
Muslim Kemalist Turkey TR: Istanbul 245 -0,448 -0,205 -0,147 
Arab Muslim, former French 
colony 
Algeria DZ: Comune 1 306 -0,709 0,262 -0,164 
Muslim Pakistan PK: Urban Sindh 212 -0,979 0,704 -0,176 
Arab Muslim, former French 
colony 
Algeria DZ: Comune 4 87 -0,835 0,587 -0,206 
Muslim Kemalist Turkey TR: South Eastern Anatolia 123 -0,154 -0,673 -0,212 
Muslim Indonesia ID: Dareah Istimewa Yogyakarta 45 -0,726 1,098 -0,233 
Muslim Indonesia ID: Jakarta province 192 -0,869 0,620 -0,253 
Muslim Indonesia ID: Lampung 97 -1,123 0,566 -0,253 
Arab Muslim Egypt EG: Beni Swaif  75 -1,015 -0,254 -0,268 
Muslim Indonesia ID: DKI 116 -0,863 0,809 -0,271 
Arab Muslim Egypt EG: Menofia  121 -1,120 -0,438 -0,279 
Arab Muslim Morocco MA: Region 13 96 -0,605 -0,584 -0,282 
Muslim Kemalist Turkey TR: North Eastern Anatolia 49 -0,508 -0,275 -0,290 
Arab Muslim Egypt EG: Canal zone 174 -0,922 -0,396 -0,290 
Muslim Kemalist Turkey TR: Mediterranean 152 -0,325 -0,307 -0,303 
171 
 
Muslim Pakistan PK: Urban Punjab 525 -1,038 0,171 -0,304 
Arab Muslim Jordan JO: MADABA 39 -0,904 -0,048 -0,307 
Muslim Pakistan PK: Urban Baluchistan 46 -1,274 0,084 -0,333 
Muslim Indonesia ID: Central Java province 593 -0,991 0,232 -0,334 
Arab Muslim, former French 
colony 
Algeria DZ: Comune 2 161 -0,606 0,263 -0,348 
Arab Muslim Egypt EG: Sinai 99 -0,949 0,118 -0,352 
Arab Muslim Morocco MA: Region 10 114 -0,690 -0,575 -0,360 
Arab Muslim Morocco MA: Doukkla - Abda 95 -0,597 -0,674 -0,364 
Arab Muslim Egypt EG: Qalubia  197 -0,973 -0,349 -0,371 
Arab Muslim, former French 
colony 
Algeria DZ: Comune 9 31 -0,821 0,760 -0,378 
Muslim Indonesia ID: Jambi province 189 -1,038 -0,029 -0,390 
Muslim Bangladesh BD: Coxex Bazar 44 -0,441 -0,602 -0,393 
Muslim Pakistan PK: Rural Punjab 527 -1,254 -1,070 -0,407 
Muslim Indonesia ID: Banten 111 -1,044 0,587 -0,413 
Arab Muslim Egypt EG: Gharbia  174 -0,873 -0,375 -0,417 
Arab Muslim Egypt EG: Giza  274 -0,862 -0,063 -0,419 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: North Khorasan 30 -0,905 -0,250 -0,443 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Lorestan 121 -0,599 0,678 -0,448 
Arab Muslim Egypt EG: Alex 401 -0,971 -0,260 -0,449 
Arab Muslim Morocco MA: Region 9 247 -0,676 -0,632 -0,458 
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Arab Muslim Egypt EG: Fayoum  98 -1,055 -0,771 -0,460 
Arab Muslim Morocco MA: Region 7 226 -0,729 -0,873 -0,467 
Arab Muslim Jordan JO: MA´AN 36 -0,793 -0,221 -0,469 
Muslim Bangladesh BD: Chittagong 113 -0,677 0,254 -0,486 
Arab Muslim Egypt EG: Cairo 773 -0,887 -0,022 -0,488 
Arab Muslim Saudi 
Arabia 
SA: Dammam \ Khobar 216 -0,509 0,536 -0,489 
Arab Muslim, former French 
colony 
Algeria DZ: Comune 7 175 -0,624 0,305 -0,494 
Arab Muslim Saudi 
Arabia 
SA: Al Madinah 93 -0,977 0,324 -0,497 
Muslim Indonesia ID: West java province 670 -1,001 0,323 -0,506 
Arab Muslim Jordan JO: KARAK 77 -0,640 -0,226 -0,508 
Arab Muslim Egypt EG: Damiatta  50 -0,860 -0,440 -0,512 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Fars 269 -0,581 0,421 -0,518 
Arab Muslim Egypt EG: Kafr El shiekh  97 -0,758 -0,537 -0,519 
Muslim Pakistan PK: Rural Sindh 203 -1,368 -1,165 -0,532 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Ilam 34 -0,760 0,557 -0,545 
Muslim Bangladesh BD: Feni 40 -0,375 0,411 -0,547 
Arab Muslim Morocco MA: Region 5 117 -0,808 -0,913 -0,563 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Kerman 165 -0,703 -0,065 -0,566 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Golestan 94 -0,681 0,321 -0,583 
Arab Muslim Egypt EG: Behaira  197 -0,809 -0,554 -0,588 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Khozestan 173 -0,541 0,176 -0,591 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Kordestan 45 0,110 0,329 -0,594 
Arab Muslim Jordan JO: JARASH 42 -0,803 -0,132 -0,594 
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Arab Muslim Egypt EG: Lower Egypt 1126 -0,882 -0,314 -0,595 
Arab Muslim Morocco MA: Region 6 63 -0,576 -0,831 -0,596 
Arab Muslim Jordan JO: TAFELA 50 -0,847 -0,100 -0,609 
Arab Muslim Egypt EG: Sharkia  224 -0,877 -0,444 -0,617 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Hormozgan 86 -0,827 -0,299 -0,620 
Arab Muslim Jordan JO: MAFRAQ 61 -0,873 -0,111 -0,623 
Muslim Kemalist Turkey TR: Central Anatolia 75 -0,555 -0,304 -0,624 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Tehran 765 -0,591 0,196 -0,630 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Ghom 68 -0,733 0,421 -0,632 
Arab Muslim Jordan JO: AMMAN 368 -0,799 -0,061 -0,638 
Arab Muslim Jordan JO: IRBID 176 -0,815 -0,173 -0,639 
Arab Muslim Jordan JO: BALQA 76 -0,838 -0,450 -0,641 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Ardabil 71 -0,776 0,024 -0,651 
Arab Muslim Egypt EG: Assuiot  123 -0,807 -0,374 -0,651 
Arab Muslim, former French 
colony 
Algeria DZ: Comune 5 119 -0,590 0,103 -0,654 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Isfahan 269 -0,753 0,290 -0,654 
Arab Muslim Saudi 
Arabia 
SA: Hail 70 -0,331 0,282 -0,662 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: East azarbayjan 287 -0,796 -0,024 -0,672 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Gilan 167 -0,699 -0,060 -0,676 
Muslim Pakistan PK: Rural NWFP 112 -1,438 -1,201 -0,679 
Muslim Bangladesh BD: Comilla 81 -1,191 0,243 -0,680 
Muslim Pakistan PK: Rural Baluchistan 43 -1,467 -1,165 -0,683 
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Arab Muslim Jordan JO: AQABA 53 -0,674 0,042 -0,685 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Mazandaran 259 -0,767 0,574 -0,687 
Arab Muslim, former French 
colony 
Algeria DZ: Comune 3 114 -0,710 0,001 -0,696 
Arab Muslim Egypt EG: Aswan  49 -1,038 -0,129 -0,699 
Arab Muslim Morocco MA: Grand Casablanca 328 -0,903 -0,600 -0,702 
Arab Muslim Egypt EG: Sohag  123 -0,841 -0,677 -0,705 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Khorasan 331 -0,777 -0,174 -0,718 
Arab Muslim Jordan JO: AJLOON 49 -0,843 -0,546 -0,726 
Arab Muslim Jordan JO: ZARQA 162 -0,849 -0,445 -0,726 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: West azarbayjan 177 -0,675 -0,131 -0,732 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Ghazvin 79 -0,848 -0,202 -0,744 
Muslim Bangladesh BD: Nator 35 -0,448 -0,467 -0,749 
Arab Muslim Egypt EG: Dakahlia  249 -0,885 -0,470 -0,763 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Kermanshah 139 -0,692 0,077 -0,764 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Sistan and balouchestan 58 -0,962 -0,203 -0,766 
Arab Muslim Egypt EG: Qena  100 -0,964 -0,552 -0,778 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Hamadan 136 -0,809 -0,258 -0,780 
Arab Muslim Morocco MA: Rabat-Salé-Zemmour 164 -0,850 -0,554 -0,781 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Bushehr 49 -0,597 -0,092 -0,784 
Arab Muslim Saudi 
Arabia 
SA: Jeddah 296 -0,810 0,415 -0,788 
Muslim Bangladesh BD: Rangpur 63 -1,016 0,127 -0,795 
Arab Muslim Saudi SA: Tabuk 73 -1,057 0,631 -0,807 
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Arabia 
Muslim Bangladesh BD: Sylhet 75 -1,241 -0,288 -0,823 
Arab Muslim Egypt EG: Upper egypt 990 -0,794 -0,523 -0,847 
Arab Muslim Saudi 
Arabia 
SA: Makkah 93 -0,750 0,481 -0,862 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Yazd 85 -0,813 0,268 -0,862 
Arab Muslim Egypt EG: Luxor  50 -0,959 -0,555 -0,865 
Arab Muslim Morocco MA: Marrakech-Tensift 194 -0,969 -0,883 -0,873 
Arab Muslim, former French 
colony 
Algeria DZ: Comune 8 58 -0,590 0,260 -0,884 
Muslim Bangladesh BD: Gaibandha 48 -0,784 0,281 -0,889 
Muslim Bangladesh BD: Barisal 105 -0,507 0,234 -0,892 
Arab Muslim Saudi 
Arabia 
SA: Abha \ Khamis 96 -0,704 0,641 -0,909 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Boyer ahmad 37 -0,666 0,513 -0,913 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Semnan 70 -0,774 0,173 -0,937 
Arab Muslim Saudi 
Arabia 
SA: Riyadh 293 -0,496 0,534 -0,951 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Markazi 96 -0,815 -0,420 -0,955 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Zanjan 80 -0,979 -0,376 -0,957 
Muslim Shia Iran IR: Chaharmahal 49 -0,683 0,099 -0,960 
Muslim Bangladesh BD: Mymensingh 118 -1,295 -0,292 -0,981 
Arab Muslim Morocco MA: Gharb-Chrarda 102 -0,819 -0,877 -0,989 
Muslim Bangladesh BD: Dhaka 195 -0,585 0,273 -0,992 
Arab Muslim Morocco MA: Fès-Boulemane 102 -0,833 -0,758 -1,006 
176 
 
Arab Muslim Egypt EG: Menya  148 -0,922 -0,793 -1,032 
Arab Muslim Morocco MA: Meknès-Tafilalet 120 -0,944 -0,730 -1,046 
Muslim Bangladesh BD: Jhenaidah 35 -0,723 -0,578 -1,056 
Arab Muslim Morocco MA: Chaouia-Ouardigha 41 -0,869 -0,875 -1,079 
Muslim Bangladesh BD: Tangail 70 -0,389 -0,745 -1,096 
Arab Muslim Egypt EG: Ismailia  49 -0,989 -0,583 -1,110 
Muslim Bangladesh BD: Sirajgonj 60 -0,484 -1,031 -1,139 
Arab Muslim Saudi 
Arabia 
SA: Taif 38 -0,617 -0,087 -1,172 
Arab Muslim Morocco MA: Tanger-Tétouan 32 -1,040 -0,799 -1,207 
Muslim Bangladesh BD: Brahmanbaria 69 -1,137 -1,010 -1,213 
Muslim Bangladesh BD: Habiganj 47 -1,060 -0,629 -1,266 
Arab Muslim Saudi 
Arabia 
SA: Qassim 98 -0,358 0,521 -1,311 
Muslim Bangladesh BD: Sherpur 32 -0,747 -0,641 -1,357 
Muslim Bangladesh BD: Rajshahi 50 -0,605 -1,066 -1,634 
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4. The implosion of “self-expression” in the West and 
further doubts about the correctness of Inglehart’s 
theory in the light of the new direct measurements of 
self-expression values from the World Values Survey, 
2010-2014 
 
 
The idea that self-expression values in the West are imploding, while in other 
regions of the world they are rising is a major turn-around in existing global 
value research. An explanation for this could be that the crisis nowadays in the 
West brought about this change. This Chapter will document this tendency 
extensively. We take the Inglehartian theory at its face value, and just perform 
some simple operations, based on elementary algebra and simple bi-variate 
statistics to show that the implosion indeed happened. Any social science 
researcher and graduate student around the globe can perform these calculations. 
The question in Chapters 4.1 and 4.2 is not whether or not Inglehart’s theory is 
correctly explaining the world, but only which consequences can be drawn from 
it in a time perspective.  
 
But we also highlight the fact in Chapter 4.3 that the latest wave of World 
Values Survey data, wave 6, 2010-2014, released in May 2014, i.e. as this article 
goes to the press, contains an item which directly asked 74,044 respondents in 
52 countries whether they think that self-expression is an important value for 
child education. The correlation between these data and Inglehart’s self-
expression index is negative and the R^2 between the two variables is almost 
20%. 
 
 
A look at the time series element in the World Values Survey data shows that 
indeed, global value change seems to correspond to various ups and downs. To 
this end, we calculated from the original WVS website Inglehart’s own data 
(http: //www. worldvaluessurvey. 
org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_54) which countries – in 
descending order – had very high increases or decreases in non-traditional 
values over the preceding WVS Survey.  
 
Let us recall that self-expression values are defined by:  
 
 Respondent gives priority to self-expression and quality-of-life (measured 
by the four-item materialist/post-materialist values index, documented 
in the WVS data) .59 
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 Respondent describes self as very happy .58 
 Respondent has signed and would sign a petition .59 
 Homosexuality is always justifiable .54 
 You should be trusting people .44 
 
 
4.1. The implosion 
 
 
Inglehart and Welzel, 2010a seem to indicate awareness of the possibility of a 
real implosion of value development across time: 
 
“Modernization theory needs to be revised for several reasons. First, 
modernization is not linear, moving indefinitely in the same direction. 
Industrialization leads to one major process of change, bringing 
bureaucratization, hierarchy, centralization of authority, secularization, and a 
shift from traditional to secular-rational values. But the postindustrial phase of 
modernization brings increasing emphasis on individual autonomy and self-
expression values, which erode the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes and 
make democracy increasingly likely to emerge. The process is not deterministic; 
a given country's leaders and nation-specific events also matter. Moreover, 
modernization's changes are not irreversible. Economic collapse can reverse 
them, as happened during the Great Depression in Germany, Italy, Japan, and 
Spain—and during the 1990s in most Soviet successor states.” (Inglehart and 
Welzel, 2010a) 
 
Similarly, Inglehart and Welzel, 2009 highlight: 
 
Thus, other things being equal, high levels of economic development tend to 
make people more tolerant and trusting bringing more emphasis on self-
expression and participation in decision-making. This process is not 
deterministic, and any forecasts can only be probabilistic, since economic 
factors are not the only influence; a given country’s leaders and nation-specific 
events also shape what happens. Moreover, modernization’s changes are not 
irreversible. Severe economic collapse can reverse them, as happened during 
the Great Depression in Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain and during the 1990s 
in most of the Soviet successor states. Similarly, if the current economic crisis 
becomes a twenty-first-century Great Depression, we could face a struggle 
against renewed xenophobia and authoritarianism. (Inglehart and Welzel, 2009) 
 
First, our Table 4.1 will explain our methodology to measure the trend towards 
secular values. Our measurement will provide us with a clear-cut and simple 
trend measure of secular values over time. Table 4.2 will explain our 
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methodology to measure the trend towards self-expression values; we equally 
hope to provide our readers with a simple and at the same time convincing 
measure of dynamic change along this Inglehartian category. Graph 4.1 and 
Table 4.3 will explain our methodology to measure the resilience of the trend 
towards self-expression values; and Graph 4.2 and Table 4.4 will explain our 
methodology to explain the principal component “economic growth” for the 
years 2008 to 2011 by showing the clear-cut relationship between the 
resilience of global value change towards self-expression values and 
economic growth during the current crisis period. Our methodology thus is 
based on simple first differences (Tables 4.1, Tables 4.2), and then standard 
linear OLS bi-variate regression analysis (Table 4.3 and Table 4.4).  
 
So, to start with, Table 4.1 shows that there is an unabated tendency towards 
secularization and away from traditional religion in Canada, the United States, 
Puerto Rico, Australia, Venezuela, New Zealand, Israel, the UK, and Sweden. 
The “comeback” of religion above all had to be observed in former communist 
countries, like Estonia, Russia, Belarus, the Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Bulgaria, Armenia, and Serbia. 
 
Table 4.2 is again based on simple differences. Jordan, Zimbabwe, Pakistan, 
Turkey, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Tanzania, Algeria, Georgia, and the Ukraine are 
the “superstars” according to Inglehart’s self-expression values; while at the 
same time, self-expression has severely contracted in Sweden, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, and in other leading Western democracies. 
 
Graph 4.2 is the bi-variate scatterplot and linear regression analysis between the 
trend values from Table 4.1 on the x-axis and the trend values from Table 4.2 on 
the y-axis. The trend values between the two variables and their residuals can be 
seen in Graph 4.1 and also in Table 4.3: Table 4.3 clearly defines our concept of 
the resilience of the trend towards self-expression. Again so-called Third World 
countries or developing countries are in the lead, while the countries of the West 
are imploding. 
 
Graph 4.2 describes the bi-variate scatterplot and linear regression analysis 
between the resilience of the trend towards self-expression values on the x-axis 
and the principle components of world economic growth during the crisis years 
2008-2011 on the y-axis. Table 4.4 uses these concepts to highlight then the 
dynamics of global growth in the contemporary period. The Table again shows 
the devastating extent of the current economic crisis in the West and the upsurge 
of developing countries – several Muslim countries among them. 
 
Let us thus start with the presentation of the time trend for Inglehart’s “secular 
values”. The twenty most dramatic inroads against traditional religion had to be 
registered in: Canada; United States; Puerto Rico; Australia; Venezuela; New 
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Zealand; Israel; Great Britain; Sweden; Tanzania, United Republic Of; 
Dominican Republic; Argentina; Nigeria; Peru; South Africa; Brazil; Chile; 
Mexico; Norway; and Uruguay. 
 
The comebacks of religion and the receding of the “secular” tendencies 
presented themselves in the following countries (in descending order): 
 
Estonia; Russian Federation; Belarus; Ukraine; Latvia; Lithuania; Moldova; 
Bulgaria; Armenia; Taiwan Province of China; Serbia and Montenegro; Japan; 
Albania; South Korea; Romania; Azerbaijan; Georgia; Macedonia, Republic of; 
Slovenia; Hungary; Croatia; Kyrgyzstan; Czech Republic; Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; Slovakia; Germany; Indonesia: 
 
 
Table 4.1: Value change – secular values, deduced from the original data 
from the calculations by Inglehart and associates 
 
 
 TRADITIONAL/SE
CULAR RATIONAL 
VALUES WVS 1-
4/2006 
TRADITIONAL/SECUL
AR RATIONAL 
VALUES FIFTH WAVE 
Value change Secular 
values 
Canada -0,042 1,328 1,370 
United States -0,346 0,955 1,301 
Puerto Rico -0,894 0,267 1,161 
Australia 0,075 1,066 0,990 
Venezuela -0,822 0,119 0,941 
New Zealand 0,408 1,217 0,809 
Israel 0,147 0,948 0,801 
Great Britain 0,321 1,121 0,800 
Sweden 1,234 1,966 0,732 
Tanzania, United 
Republic Of 
-0,937 -0,290 0,647 
Dominican Republic -0,444 0,152 0,596 
Argentina -0,247 0,346 0,593 
Nigeria -0,816 -0,230 0,586 
Peru -0,489 0,090 0,579 
South Africa -0,506 0,062 0,568 
Brazil -0,452 0,107 0,559 
Chile -0,431 0,106 0,537 
Mexico -0,267 0,261 0,528 
Norway 0,704 1,199 0,495 
Uruguay 0,020 0,499 0,479 
Philippines -0,450 0,013 0,463 
Spain 0,239 0,701 0,462 
Egypt -0,713 -0,252 0,461 
Netherlands 0,780 1,217 0,437 
Algeria -0,734 -0,316 0,418 
Uganda -0,586 -0,214 0,371 
Jordan -0,882 -0,524 0,358 
Zimbabwe -0,772 -0,419 0,353 
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Poland -0,275 0,058 0,334 
Pakistan -0,763 -0,438 0,325 
Singapore -0,278 0,038 0,316 
France 0,730 1,039 0,309 
Bangladesh -0,671 -0,369 0,302 
Switzerland 0,706 0,962 0,256 
Turkey -0,360 -0,136 0,224 
Viet Nam -0,125 0,061 0,186 
India -0,080 0,090 0,171 
Finland 0,688 0,848 0,160 
Italy 0,235 0,284 0,049 
Indonesia -0,339 -0,343 -0,005 
Germany 0,812 0,796 -0,016 
Slovakia 0,516 0,448 -0,068 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
0,226 0,038 -0,188 
Czech Republic 1,093 0,893 -0,200 
Kyrgyzstan 0,032 -0,227 -0,259 
Croatia 0,543 0,282 -0,261 
Hungary 0,429 0,153 -0,276 
Slovenia 0,617 0,332 -0,286 
Macedonia, Republic 
of 
0,304 0,008 -0,296 
Georgia -0,042 -0,354 -0,312 
Azerbaijan 0,018 -0,304 -0,322 
Romania 0,172 -0,208 -0,379 
South Korea 0,591 0,187 -0,404 
Albania 0,329 -0,100 -0,428 
Japan 1,152 0,700 -0,452 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
0,503 0,028 -0,475 
Taiwan Province of 
China 
0,422 -0,138 -0,560 
Armenia 0,390 -0,190 -0,580 
Bulgaria 0,766 0,110 -0,656 
Moldova 0,444 -0,223 -0,666 
Lithuania 0,494 -0,228 -0,722 
Latvia 0,902 0,157 -0,745 
Ukraine 0,658 -0,199 -0,857 
Belarus 0,714 -0,162 -0,877 
Russian Federation 0,852 -0,166 -1,019 
Estonia 1,011 -0,099 -1,109 
 
 
We now apply the same simple first difference methodology to the dynamics of 
“self-expression”. The twenty superstars of self-expression development 
according to the Inglehart theory are: Jordan; Zimbabwe; Pakistan; Turkey; 
Bangladesh; Nigeria; Tanzania, United Republic Of; Algeria; Georgia; Ukraine; 
Moldova; Romania; Egypt; Uganda; Poland; Azerbaijan; Venezuela; Russian 
Federation; Macedonia, Republic of; and Kyrgyzstan. 
 
The following countries witnessed an implosion of their self-expression 
processes: Sweden; Netherlands; New Zealand; Switzerland; Australia; Finland; 
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Norway; Japan; Great Britain; Canada; Germany; United States; Czech 
Republic; France; South Korea; Spain; and Israel: 
 
 
Table 4.2: Value change - selfexpression, deduced from the original data 
from the calculations by Inglehart and associates 
 
 
 SURVIVAL/SELF-
EXPRESSION 
VALUES WVS 1-
4/2006 
SURVIVAL/SELF-
EXPRESSION VALUES 
FIFTH WAVE 
Value change self-
expression 
Jordan -0,621 0,620 1,241 
Zimbabwe -0,765 0,398 1,163 
Pakistan -0,669 0,335 1,004 
Turkey -0,443 0,530 0,973 
Bangladesh -0,426 0,545 0,971 
Nigeria -0,276 0,624 0,900 
Tanzania, United 
Republic Of 
-0,125 0,774 0,899 
Algeria -0,441 0,426 0,867 
Georgia -0,664 0,174 0,838 
Ukraine -0,947 -0,132 0,816 
Moldova -0,993 -0,249 0,744 
Romania -0,780 -0,045 0,735 
Egypt -0,175 0,553 0,728 
Uganda -0,300 0,416 0,716 
Poland -0,353 0,329 0,683 
Azerbaijan -0,644 0,015 0,659 
Venezuela 0,243 0,877 0,633 
Russian Federation -0,912 -0,292 0,621 
Macedonia, Republic 
of 
-0,600 0,009 0,610 
Kyrgyzstan -0,555 0,035 0,590 
Brazil -0,124 0,452 0,576 
Philippines -0,071 0,491 0,562 
South Africa -0,054 0,483 0,537 
Armenia -0,678 -0,141 0,537 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
-0,662 -0,142 0,520 
Peru -0,061 0,453 0,514 
Puerto Rico 0,431 0,938 0,507 
Chile -0,065 0,427 0,492 
Belarus -0,819 -0,328 0,491 
Lithuania -0,645 -0,158 0,487 
Dominican Republic 0,113 0,535 0,422 
Bulgaria -0,701 -0,279 0,421 
Hungary -0,518 -0,103 0,415 
Singapore -0,158 0,226 0,384 
Taiwan Province of 
China 
-0,663 -0,298 0,364 
Estonia -0,737 -0,384 0,353 
Indonesia -0,332 -0,016 0,316 
Argentina 0,052 0,355 0,303 
Albania -0,525 -0,225 0,301 
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Mexico 0,235 0,493 0,257 
India -0,101 0,151 0,252 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
-0,288 -0,062 0,226 
Latvia -0,600 -0,390 0,209 
Slovenia -0,220 -0,045 0,175 
Uruguay 0,185 0,287 0,102 
Viet Nam 0,124 0,224 0,100 
Slovakia -0,184 -0,088 0,096 
Italy 0,165 0,236 0,071 
Croatia -0,173 -0,104 0,069 
Israel 0,111 0,111 -0,001 
Spain 0,057 0,010 -0,046 
South Korea -0,041 -0,331 -0,290 
France 0,259 -0,120 -0,378 
Czech Republic 0,086 -0,300 -0,386 
United States 0,951 0,530 -0,421 
Germany 0,298 -0,137 -0,434 
Canada 0,841 0,389 -0,452 
Great Britain 0,661 0,193 -0,468 
Japan 0,206 -0,328 -0,534 
Norway 0,536 -0,110 -0,645 
Finland 0,610 -0,075 -0,686 
Australia 1,025 0,329 -0,695 
Switzerland 0,732 -0,033 -0,766 
New Zealand 1,130 0,242 -0,888 
Netherlands 0,794 -0,098 -0,893 
Sweden 0,902 -0,326 -1,228 
 
 
From these materials, it is now very easy to deduce an analysis of the resilience 
of the trend towards self-expression, based on the residuals from Graph 4.1: 
resilient are those political cultures, which are above the regression line, and not 
resilient are those political cultures, which are below the regression line. The x-
axis is constituted by the value change in the direction of secular values, while 
the y-axis in constituted the trend towards self-expression values. 
 
Table 4.3 analyses the results from the exercise undertaken, and explained in 
Graph 4.1.  
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Graph 4.1: calculating the resilience of the trend towards self-expression: 
value changes towards secularism (x-axis) and towards self-expression (y-
axis), deduced from the original data from the calculations by Inglehart and 
associates 
 
 
 
 
 
Among the twenty countries of our globe with a strong resilience of the self-
expression tendencies, there are a very large percentage of Muslim countries 
(i.e. members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) among them. Let us 
think for an instance Inglehart’s theory to its end: the twenty superstars of a 
resilient trend towards self-expression are, according to the Inglehartian theory: 
Jordan; Zimbabwe; Pakistan; Tanzania, United Republic Of; Bangladesh; 
Nigeria; Turkey; Algeria; Venezuela; Egypt; Uganda; Puerto Rico; Georgia; 
Poland; Brazil; Philippines; South Africa; Peru; Romania; and the Ukraine. 
 
The most notable implosions or slow developments of self-expression – 
independent from the secularization process – had to be noted by contrast in the 
following twenty countries, which are all western democracies, i.e. members of 
the European Union or the OECD: Sweden; Netherlands; Switzerland; New 
Zealand; Finland; Japan; Norway; Australia; Germany; Czech Republic; South 
Korea; France; Great Britain; Canada; United States; Croatia; Latvia; Spain; 
Slovakia; Italy: 
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Table 4.3: Resilience of the trend towards self-expression values, deduced 
from the original data from the calculations by Inglehart and associates 
 
 
 Value 
change 
secular 
values 
Value 
change 
self-
expression 
trend value Residual = 
resilience of trend 
towards self-
expression 
Jordan 0,358 1,241 0,208 1,032 
Zimbabwe 0,353 1,163 0,210 0,953 
Pakistan 0,325 1,004 0,216 0,788 
Tanzania, United 
Republic Of 
0,647 0,899 0,141 0,758 
Bangladesh 0,302 0,971 0,221 0,750 
Nigeria 0,586 0,900 0,156 0,744 
Turkey 0,224 0,973 0,240 0,734 
Algeria 0,418 0,867 0,195 0,672 
Venezuela 0,941 0,633 0,073 0,560 
Egypt 0,461 0,728 0,185 0,543 
Uganda 0,371 0,716 0,205 0,511 
Puerto Rico 1,161 0,507 0,022 0,485 
Georgia -0,312 0,838 0,364 0,474 
Poland 0,334 0,683 0,214 0,468 
Brazil 0,559 0,576 0,162 0,414 
Philippines 0,463 0,562 0,184 0,378 
South Africa 0,568 0,537 0,160 0,377 
Peru 0,579 0,514 0,157 0,356 
Romania -0,379 0,735 0,379 0,356 
Ukraine -0,857 0,816 0,490 0,326 
Chile 0,537 0,492 0,167 0,325 
Moldova -0,666 0,744 0,446 0,298 
Azerbaijan -0,322 0,659 0,366 0,293 
Dominican 
Republic 
0,596 0,422 0,153 0,269 
Macedonia, 
Republic of 
-0,296 0,610 0,360 0,250 
Kyrgyzstan -0,259 0,590 0,351 0,238 
Singapore 0,316 0,384 0,218 0,166 
Argentina 0,593 0,303 0,154 0,149 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
-0,475 0,520 0,401 0,119 
Armenia -0,580 0,537 0,426 0,111 
Russian 
Federation 
-1,019 0,621 0,527 0,093 
Mexico 0,528 0,257 0,169 0,088 
Hungary -0,276 0,415 0,355 0,059 
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Lithuania -0,722 0,487 0,459 0,029 
Indonesia -0,005 0,316 0,293 0,023 
India 0,171 0,252 0,252 0,000 
Belarus -0,877 0,491 0,495 -0,003 
Bulgaria -0,656 0,421 0,443 -0,022 
Taiwan Province 
of China 
-0,560 0,364 0,421 -0,057 
Uruguay 0,479 0,102 0,180 -0,078 
Albania -0,428 0,301 0,391 -0,090 
Israel 0,801 -0,001 0,106 -0,106 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
-0,188 0,226 0,335 -0,109 
Viet Nam 0,186 0,100 0,248 -0,149 
Slovenia -0,286 0,175 0,358 -0,183 
Estonia -1,109 0,353 0,548 -0,195 
Italy 0,049 0,071 0,280 -0,209 
Slovakia -0,068 0,096 0,307 -0,211 
Spain 0,462 -0,046 0,184 -0,231 
Latvia -0,745 0,209 0,464 -0,255 
Croatia -0,261 0,069 0,352 -0,283 
United States 1,301 -0,421 -0,010 -0,411 
Canada 1,370 -0,452 -0,026 -0,426 
Great Britain 0,800 -0,468 0,106 -0,574 
France 0,309 -0,378 0,220 -0,598 
South Korea -0,404 -0,290 0,385 -0,675 
Czech Republic -0,200 -0,386 0,338 -0,724 
Germany -0,016 -0,434 0,295 -0,729 
Australia 0,990 -0,695 0,062 -0,757 
Norway 0,495 -0,645 0,177 -0,822 
Japan -0,452 -0,534 0,396 -0,930 
Finland 0,160 -0,686 0,254 -0,940 
New Zealand 0,809 -0,888 0,104 -0,992 
Switzerland 0,256 -0,766 0,232 -0,998 
Netherlands 0,437 -0,893 0,190 -1,083 
Sweden 0,732 -1,228 0,122 -1,350 
 
 
In Graph 4.2 we will now highlight the close, observable relationship between 
the resilience of the trend towards self-expression and the principle component 
of economic growth rates calculated from IMF data during the crisis years from 
2008 to 2011 (see http://economics.uni-corvinus.hu/index.php?id=47854). The 
resilience of self-expression is explaining more than 1/5 of economic growth in 
the world system.  
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Muslim countries are among the trend leaders in both directions, i.e. the 
resilience of self-expression, and economic growth during the crisis years. 
 
 
Graph 4.2: the resilience of the self-expression value trend and current 
economic growth, deduced from the original data from the calculations by 
Inglehart and associates and from IMF data 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4 now highlights these trends and residuals; it is to be seen that member 
countries of the OIC – commonly called the “Muslim world”, are both among 
the positive and negative residuals from Graph 4.2. 
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Table 4.4: the resilience of the trend towards self-expression and economic 
growth, deduced from the original data from the calculations by Inglehart 
and associates and from IMF data 
 
 
 resilience 
of self-
expression 
principal 
component 
economic 
growth 
2008-2011 
trend value 
principle 
component 
economic 
growth 
residual (growth 
driven by other 
factors beyond 
value change) 
India 0,000 1,590 -0,225 1,815 
Uruguay -0,078 1,138 -0,285 1,423 
Argentina 0,149 1,195 -0,109 1,305 
Viet Nam -0,149 0,930 -0,339 1,269 
Peru 0,356 1,187 0,050 1,137 
Belarus -0,003 0,902 -0,227 1,129 
Indonesia 0,023 0,867 -0,207 1,073 
Singapore 0,166 0,931 -0,096 1,028 
Nigeria 0,744 1,335 0,350 0,986 
Uganda 0,511 1,139 0,169 0,970 
South Korea -0,675 0,044 -0,745 0,789 
Sweden -1,350 -0,514 -1,266 0,751 
Tanzania, United 
Republic Of 
0,758 1,096 0,360 0,736 
Dominican 
Republic 
0,269 0,691 -0,017 0,708 
Azerbaijan 0,293 0,688 0,001 0,686 
Bangladesh 0,750 0,962 0,354 0,609 
Moldova 0,298 0,509 0,005 0,504 
Albania -0,090 0,188 -0,294 0,482 
Israel -0,106 0,174 -0,307 0,480 
Philippines 0,378 0,473 0,067 0,406 
Australia -0,757 -0,472 -0,809 0,337 
Switzerland -0,998 -0,663 -0,994 0,331 
Brazil 0,414 0,323 0,095 0,228 
Kyrgyzstan 0,238 0,184 -0,041 0,225 
Chile 0,325 0,230 0,026 0,204 
Netherlands -1,083 -0,959 -1,060 0,101 
Slovakia -0,211 -0,295 -0,387 0,092 
Egypt 0,543 0,263 0,194 0,068 
Finland -0,940 -0,887 -0,950 0,062 
New Zealand -0,992 -0,959 -0,990 0,031 
Germany -0,729 -0,802 -0,787 -0,015 
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Czech Republic -0,724 -0,831 -0,783 -0,048 
Poland 0,468 0,082 0,137 -0,054 
Georgia 0,474 0,013 0,141 -0,128 
Turkey 0,734 0,202 0,342 -0,140 
Norway -0,822 -1,055 -0,859 -0,196 
Canada -0,426 -0,781 -0,553 -0,228 
Russian 
Federation 
0,093 -0,406 -0,153 -0,253 
Macedonia, 
Republic of 
0,250 -0,373 -0,032 -0,341 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
-0,109 -0,655 -0,308 -0,347 
Mexico 0,088 -0,525 -0,156 -0,369 
France -0,598 -1,078 -0,686 -0,393 
Jordan 1,032 0,169 0,572 -0,403 
Japan -0,930 -1,352 -0,942 -0,410 
United States -0,411 -0,985 -0,542 -0,443 
South Africa 0,377 -0,381 0,067 -0,448 
Algeria 0,672 -0,243 0,294 -0,538 
Pakistan 0,788 -0,168 0,383 -0,551 
Bulgaria -0,022 -0,795 -0,242 -0,553 
United Kingdom -0,574 -1,266 -0,668 -0,599 
Armenia 0,111 -0,822 -0,139 -0,683 
Slovenia -0,183 -1,105 -0,366 -0,739 
Lithuania 0,029 -1,085 -0,202 -0,883 
Spain -0,231 -1,322 -0,402 -0,919 
Estonia -0,195 -1,391 -0,375 -1,015 
Ukraine 0,326 -0,995 0,027 -1,022 
Croatia -0,283 -1,470 -0,443 -1,028 
Italy -0,209 -1,446 -0,386 -1,060 
Venezuela 0,560 -0,856 0,208 -1,063 
Hungary 0,059 -1,248 -0,179 -1,070 
Zimbabwe 0,953 -0,590 0,511 -1,101 
Romania 0,356 -1,066 0,050 -1,117 
Latvia -0,255 -2,229 -0,421 -1,808 
 
 
4.2. The choropleth maps of the implosion process 
 
 
Our Choropleth maps underline our contentions. A pure Inglehartian world 
values analysis would have to come to the conclusion that the value basis of 
Western society is eroding. 
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So while the methodology of the two approaches – Inglehart’s and our own – is 
different, the same conclusions can be drawn from it. Map 4.5 is the final verdict 
then in the debate about these issues: being based on Table 4.3, it just shows 
how powerful the Tsunami of the crisis of 2008 hit the world of the North 
Atlantic arena, and how the geography of global development is changing to the 
detriment of the hitherto dominant West. 
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Map 4.1: Inglehart Secular Values – most recent data, deduced from the original data from the calculations by 
Inglehart and associates 
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Map 4.2: Inglehart Self-Expression Values - most recent data, deduced from the original data from the calculations by 
Inglehart and associates 
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Map 4.3: DYN Secular values, deduced from the original data from the calculations by Inglehart and associates 
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Map 4.4: DYN self-expression values, deduced from the original data from the calculations by Inglehart and associates 
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Map 4.5: Resilience of self-expression values, deduced from the original data from the calculations by Inglehart and 
associates 
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4.3. The direct measurement of self-expression values in the World 
Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014 with the item “important 
child qualities: self-expression” and the consequences for 
Inglehart’s theory 
 
 
We now invite our readers to have a renewed look at Map 4.15 in Chapter 4 and 
at the left, first column of Table 4.1. This would be the world view, which 
Inglehart’s theory would suggest, very much in the spirit of classical 
modernization theory. The Western countries, especially the Protestant 
countries, are seen as islands of modernity and their self-expression culture as a 
robust precondition of “effective democracy”. The data, emerging from the first 
four waves of the World Values Survey, provided some large-scale evidence to 
maintain such a theory. However, with all the extensions of the World Values 
Survey project over the last decades, both in terms of geography as well as the 
completeness of the data, also on such phenomena as the shadow economy, the 
world of Map 4.15 somehow receded into the memory about a world order, 
which no longer exists and which was severely shattered in its foundations by 
the tsunami of the global economic crisis of 2008. As we tried to show in this 
article, it was also shattered by the long shadows of the internal corrosion, which 
social decay and the loss of values brought about long before the 2008 crisis hit 
the North Atlantic arena. The very last wave of the World Values Survey project, 
released in May 2014, contains for the first time an item for the direct 
measurement of “self-expression”: not how advanced quantitative sociology 
tries to impute its values from the knowledge about different other variables, but 
what ordinary citizens of our globe understood it to be. In presenting these data 
in the following Table 4.5, and Maps 4.7 and 4.8, we close this Chapter on the 
dynamics of self-expression values with a note of caution. Some of the countries 
on top of the list might still sound familiar from the research, presented by 
Inglehart over decades, culminating in his article in 2000 (Inglehart/Baker) for 
the “American Sociological Review”, while other countries hitherto were 
considered to be laggards in self-expression development. According to the 
“online data analysis” version of the newly presented World Values Survey 
website, nowadays Estonia; Azerbaijan; South Korea; Slovenia; Poland; Cyprus; 
Germany; Uruguay; Turkey; Sweden; Taiwan; Chile; Australia; Japan; Ukraine; 
New Zealand; Russia; Colombia; Belarus; and Morocco are now the global 
leaders in “self-expression” values, while the United States, for example, is only 
rank 39 of the 52 nations, and Russia is rank 17. Not only the top 20 are ahead 
of the United States, but also Kuwait; Romania; Kazakhstan; the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories; Jordan; Ghana; Lebanon; Netherlands; Peru; Nigeria; 
Libya; Egypt; Zimbabwe; Armenia; Qatar; Mexico; Tunisia; and Algeria. 
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Table 4.5 World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014: Important child 
qualities: Self-expression 
 
 
 Important child qualities: 
Self-expression 
Estonia 62,90 
Azerbaijan 53,60 
South Korea 49,90 
Slovenia 48,80 
Poland 41,00 
Cyprus 39,30 
Germany 39,20 
Uruguay 38,60 
Turkey 37,90 
Sweden 37,60 
Taiwan 37,50 
Chile 36,40 
Australia 36,30 
Japan 33,60 
Ukraine 32,30 
New Zealand 32,10 
Russia 32,10 
Colombia 31,50 
Belarus 29,80 
Morocco 29,70 
Kuwait 29,40 
Romania 29,00 
Kazakhstan 28,60 
The Occupied 
Palestinian 
Territories 
25,30 
Jordan 24,60 
Ghana 23,20 
Lebanon 23,10 
Netherlands 23,00 
Peru 22,90 
Nigeria 22,80 
Libya 22,50 
Egypt 20,60 
Zimbabwe 20,60 
Armenia 19,70 
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Qatar 19,60 
Mexico 18,60 
Tunisia 18,30 
Algeria 17,80 
United States 17,60 
Pakistan 16,70 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
15,30 
Singapore 13,70 
Kyrgyzstan 13,50 
Ecuador 12,60 
Iraq 12,60 
Philippines 11,50 
Malaysia 10,70 
China 10,50 
Rwanda 8,70 
Spain 8,30 
Uzbekistan 8,30 
Yemen 6,50 
 
 
Graph 4.3 portrays the relationship between the response rates from Table 4.5 
and the middle column of Table 4.2. Data are available from the following 
countries: Armenia; Australia; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Chile; Egypt; Estonia; 
Germany; Japan; Jordan; Kyrgyzstan; Mexico; Netherlands; New Zealand; 
Nigeria; Pakistan; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Romania; Russia; Singapore; 
Slovenia; South Korea; Spain; Sweden; Turkey; Ukraine; United States; 
Uruguay; and Zimbabwe. 
 
The correlation between the two variables, as is to be easily seen from Graph 
4.3, is negative, and the R
^2
 is 19.1%: 
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Graph 4.3: World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014: Important child 
qualities: Self-expression and the Inglehart self-expression scores (latest 
data, see Table 4.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maps 4.7 and 4.8 portray the Choropleth maps, to be derived from Table 4.5. In 
the concluding Chapter 12 we show that both of Inglehart’s main aggregates – 
traditional/secular and survival/self-expression values - can well be measured by 
the factors derived in this work. Maps 4.7 and 4.8 contain an important message 
in the context of the debates of Chapter 4.1 and Chapter 4.2: self-expression 
values have shifted geographically around the globe, and various Western 
countries are in a real crisis. 
 
 
 
 200 
Map 4.7: The direct measurement of self-expression values in the World Values Survey, Wave 2010-2014 – the values 
from Table 4.5 
 
 
6,50
13,55
20,60
27,65
34,70
41,75
48,80
55,85
62,90
69,95
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
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Map 4.7: The direct measurement of self-expression values in the World Values Survey, Wave 2010-2014 – the natural 
logarithm of the values from Table 4.5 
 
 
1,87
2,16
2,44
2,72
3,01
3,29
3,57
3,86
4,14
4,43
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
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5. Hofstede, Ralston et al., Inglehart and the future of 
world development 
 
 
In many European countries, bitter debates on human values take place, be it on 
matters of sexuality, family policy, religion, or – increasingly – on the possible 
accession of Turkey to the European Union. Similar debates are to be witnessed 
in many other Western countries outside the European Union. For us as 
empirical social scientists, the main questions arising out of such debates are for 
example: what are the empirical relationships between acceptancy of 
prostitution and acceptancy of homosexuality on a global scale? Is there a 
positive, a non-existent, or a negative correlation between the two?  
 
 
The following Chapter is intended to provide new and additional insights into 
our rethinking of the World Values Survey data and analysis. For one, we would 
like to present a still more conclusive proof of the interrelationship between the 
different types of permissiveness and the weight these factors have in 
relationship to the other variables, contained in the World Values Survey data. 
Based on our analysis of the complete available data based on 28 items from the 
World Values Survey from 70 countries of the world, including the OIC member 
countries Albania; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Burkina 
Faso; Indonesia; Jordan; Kyrgyzstan; Mali; Nigeria; Turkey; and Uganda we 
attempt to show the interrelationships between permissiveness, the shadow 
economy, educational values, and other socio-political variables, like 
fundamental positions on the market economy and democracy. Much of what we 
will be presenting will be a counterpoint to the hitherto dominant interpretations 
offered by Professor Ronald Inglehart, who seems to suggest that for a society to 
have a an effective democracy, it needs to have very pronounced self-expression 
values, including the acceptancy of homosexuality. 
 
In the second part of this Chapter, we will then look at the summary 
relationships between our own new factors and those presented by Hofstede and 
Inglehart. We will come to the conclusion that our factors sufficiently correlate 
with the factors presented by Hofstede and Inglehart, without implying what we 
perceive to be their shortcomings. 
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5. 1. One, two, three types of permissiveness and their effects on 
value systems 
 
 
We have maintained throughout this work that Inglehart overlooks the negative 
side-effects of secular and self-expression values. We have shown in the 
previous chapters that this especially relevant for the issue of the shadow 
economy.  
 
To re-iterate our point, we should not underestimate the role which self-
expression values, associated by Inglehart and associates with participation in 
decision making, political activism, environmental protection, gender equality, 
and growing tolerance of ethnic minorities, foreigners, gays and lesbians play 
for their theory of democracy, which rests, according to them on a culture of 
trust and tolerance in which people place high value on individual freedom and 
self-expression and have activist political orientations: 
 
“The shift from survival to self-expression values is linked with the rise of 
postindustrial society. It reflects a cultural shift that occurs when younger 
generations emerge who have grown up taking survival for granted. Survival 
values give top priority to economic and physical security and conformist social 
norms. Self-expression values give high priority to freedom of expression, 
participation in decision making, political activism, environmental protection, 
gender equality, and growing tolerance of ethnic minorities, foreigners, gays 
and lesbians. Growing emphasis on these values produces a culture of trust 
and tolerance in which people place high value on individual freedom and 
self-expression and have activist political orientations. These attributes are 
crucial to democracy – and thus explain how economic growth, which takes 
societies from agrarian to industrial and then from industrial to post-
industrial, leads to democratization. The unprecedented economic growth of the 
past 50 years has meant that an increasing share of the world’s population has 
grown up taking survival for granted. Time series data from the values surveys 
indicates that mass priorities have shifted from an overwhelming emphasis on 
economic and physical security toward an emphasis on subjective well-being, 
selfexpression, participation in decision-making and a relatively trusting and 
tolerant outlook. Both dimensions are closely linked with economic 
development: the value systems of high-income countries differ dramatically 
from those of low-income countries. Every nation that the World Bank defines 
as high income ranks relatively high on both dimensions -- with a strong 
emphasis on both self-expression and secular-rational values. All of the low-
income and lowermiddle income societies rank relatively low on both 
dimensions. The upper-middle income countries fall somewhere in between. To 
a remarkable degree, the values and beliefs of a given society reflect its level of 
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economic development—just as modernization theory implies.” (Inglehart and 
Welzel, 2009) 
 
In the following, we will now extend the argument by using Schumpeter’s 
hypothesis (Schumpeter, 1950) about the generalized loss of family values as the 
possible trigger of the overall decline of the capitalist order.  
 
To arrive at an empirical and theoretical synthesis of our analysis, we will 
attempt to show the relationship between the decay of traditional family values, 
the loss of religious values and the rise of the shadow economic mentality. To 
this end, we will perform a promax factor analysis for a very large number of 
countries with complete data on  
 
 Acceptance or rejection of income inequality 
 Democratic values 
 Economic and social values, rejection of the shadow economy, 
government benefits fraud, bribery and corruption 
 Family values and sexual norms 
 Opinions on markets and state intervention 
 Religious values 
 Values guiding the education of children – independence; hard work; 
feeling of responsibility; imagination; tolerance and respect for other 
people; thrift, saving money and things; determination and perseverance; 
religious faith; unselfishness; obedience 
 
Are the convictions of religious human beings incompatible with modernization 
and “effective democracy”, and are religiously motivated persons, sharing 
traditional religious values, the antithesis to the values of “selfexpression”, 
which implies a low importance given to religion in society, a low importance of 
obedience in child education, a weak sense of national pride, a disconnection of 
one’s life from the pride of one’s parents, the full acceptancy of divorce and 
abortion, no desire for limits on selling foreign goods, and little respect for 
authority in society? As Inglehart and associates seem to suggest? Or are Barro 
and Schumpeter right in their conviction that the belief in eternal judgment 
brings about an improvement of the societal ethics of contractual obligations 
(Barro) or that traditional family values are important for the existence of the 
capitalist enterprise and economic growth (Schumpeter) which threatens to be 
substituted by a socialist bureaucracy? 
 
The countries with complete data for these questions are a fair sample of the 
available data from the World Values Survey project  
 
 
1. Albania 2. Andorra 3. Argentina 
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4. Armenia 
5. Australia 
6. Azerbaijan 
7. Bangladesh 
8. Belarus 
9. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
10. Brazil 
11. Bulgaria 
12. Burkina Faso 
13. Canada 
14. Chile 
15. Croatia 
16. Cyprus 
17. Czech Republic 
18. Dominican 
Republic 
19. Estonia 
20. Ethiopia 
21. Finland 
22. Georgia 
23. Germany 
24. Ghana 
25. Guatemala 
26. Hong Kong 
27. Hungary 
28. India 
29. Indonesia 
30. Italy 
31. Japan 
32. Jordan 
33. Kyrgyzstan 
34. Latvia 
35. Lithuania 
36. Macedonia 
37. Mali 
38. Mexico 
39. Moldova 
40. New Zealand 
41. Nigeria 
42. Norway 
43. Peru 
44. Philippines 
45. Poland 
46. Puerto Rico 
47. Romania 
48. Russian 
Federation 
49. Serbia 
50. Serbia and 
Montenegro 
51. Slovakia 
52. Slovenia 
53. South Africa 
54. South Korea 
55. Spain 
56. Sweden 
57. Switzerland 
58. Taiwan 
59. Tanzania 
60. Thailand 
61. Trinidad and 
Tobago 
62. Turkey 
63. Uganda 
64. Ukraine 
65. United States 
66. Uruguay 
67. Venezuela 
68. Viet Nam 
69. Zambia 
70. Zimbabwe 
 
The questions chosen from the WVS are the following:  
 
1. How important is God in your life 
2. How often do you attend religious services 
3. Justifiable: claiming government benefits even if one is not entitled to them 
4. Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport 
5. Justifiable: cheating on taxes 
6. Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 
7. Justifiable: homosexuality 
8. Justifiable: prostitution 
9. Justifiable: abortion 
10. Justifiable: divorce 
11. Justifiable: euthanasia 
12. Justifiable: suicide 
13. Important child qualities: independence 
14. Important child qualities: hard work 
15. Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility 
16. Important child qualities: imagination 
17. Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people 
18. Important child qualities: thrift, and saving money and things 
19. Important child qualities: determination and perseverance 
20. Important child qualities: religious faith 
21. Important child qualities: unselfishness 
22. Important child qualities: obedience 
23. Self-positioning in political scale (left to right) 
24. Income equality (rejection or acceptance) 
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25. Private vs. state ownership of business 
26. Competition good or harmful 
27. Political system: Having the army rule (reject) 
28. Political system: Having a democratic political system (reject) 
 
Table 5.1 shows the percentages of the total variance explained by our 
investigation for each variable of our model.  
 
Table 5.1: promax factor analysis, based on the latest edition of the 
combined World Values Surveys on religion, on what is justifiable, and on 
democracy (quantitative analysis of “Permissiveness”) 
 
 
 initial extraction 
How important is God in your life 1,000 0,642 
How often do you attend religious services 1,000 0,617 
Justifiable: claiming government benefits 
even if one is not entitled to them 
1,000 0,532 
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public 
transport 
1,000 0,615 
Justifiable: cheating on taxes 1,000 0,642 
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 1,000 0,550 
Justifiable: homosexuality 1,000 0,641 
Justifiable: prostitution 1,000 0,610 
Justifiable: abortion 1,000 0,655 
Justifiable: divorce 1,000 0,601 
Justifiable: euthanasia 1,000 0,527 
Justifiable: suicide 1,000 0,491 
Important child qualities: independence 1,000 0,501 
Important child qualities: hard work 1,000 0,639 
Important child qualities: feeling of 
responsibility 
1,000 0,560 
Important child qualities: imagination 1,000 0,468 
Important child qualities: tolerance and 
respect for other people 
1,000 0,491 
Important child qualities: thrift, and saving 
money and things 
1,000 0,516 
Important child qualities: determination and 
perseverance 
1,000 0,430 
Important child qualities: religious faith 1,000 0,561 
Important child qualities: unselfishness 1,000 0,573 
Important child qualities: obedience 1,000 0,433 
Self-positioning in political scale 1,000 0,578 
Income equality 1,000 0,601 
Private vs. state ownership of business 1,000 0,632 
Competition good or harmful 1,000 0,546 
Political system: Having the army rule 1,000 0,381 
Political system: Having a democratic 
political system 
1,000 0,293 
 
 
The nine factors to be extracted from the data for more than 90.000 
representative respondents in 70 countries are the following:  
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 moral (sexual) permissiveness (‘Permissiveness 1’) 
 acceptancy of the shadow economy(‘Permissiveness 2’) 
 distance from religion (‘Permissiveness 3’) 
 educational values: independence and imagination 
 distance to market economy values 
 education values: responsibility and tolerance 
 educational values: determination and perseverance and being against 
saving 
 right wing acceptance of inequality 
 educational values: favoring unselfishness, rejecting hard work 
 
Contrary to Inglehart’s expectations about a positive role of the low importance 
given to religion in society, and divorce and abortion being fully accepted, it 
emerges that the two factors of permissiveness (permissive family values and 
the loss of hard-core Max Weberian economic values) are closely interrelated 
with one another and with the loss of religious values, and that the three Barro-
type and Schumpeterian “permissiveness factors” together already explain some 
30,4% of the total variance of individual opinions under investigation on a 
global scale.  
 
 
Table 5.2: The Eigen values for our analysis of latest edition of the 
combined World Values Surveys on religion, on what is justifiable, and on 
democracy (quantitative analysis of “Permissiveness”) 
 
 
  initial Eigen values 
 Total % of 
variance 
cumulated 
percentage 
1,000 4,506 16,094 16,094 
2,000 2,525 9,017 25,110 
3,000 1,476 5,273 30,383 
4,000 1,301 4,646 35,030 
5,000 1,224 4,372 39,402 
6,000 1,120 3,999 43,401 
7,000 1,107 3,953 47,354 
8,000 1,065 3,802 51,156 
9,000 1,002 3,578 54,734 
 
Table 5.3 shows the factor loadings for each of the variables analyzed here. The 
variables with a high importance for “effective democracy”, i. e. tolerance and 
respect for other people, rejection or acceptance of corruption, and the 
assessment of democracy as such and vis-à-vis military rule, are highlighted in 
our Table 5.3. Nowhere there is a notable negative or positive factor 
analytical loading of beyond 0. 333 (>10% of variance explained) 
 208 
confirming that religious people are antidemocratic, right-wing, and pro or 
anti-market.  
 
In addition, the structure of the factor loadings even suggests the following: 
 
a) distance from religion is even a motive to reject a democratic political system 
b) moral/sexual permissiveness goes hand in hand with economic and social 
decay 
 
 moral (sexual) 
permissiveness 
(‘Permissivenes
s 1’) 
distance from 
religion 
(‘Permissivenes
s 3’) 
Political system: Having a democratic 
political system (reject) 
-0,099 0,125 
Competition good or harmful (harmful) 0,038 0,004 
Private vs. state ownership of business (state) -0,064 -0,027 
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport 0,213 0,056 
Justifiable: cheating on taxes 0,239 0,088 
Justifiable: claiming government benefits 
even if one is not entitled to them 
0,104 0,001 
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 0,218 -0,043 
 
 
Table 5.4 shows the all-important correlations between the promax factors, 
extracted from the correlation matrix between the variables of our model. Table 
5.5 and Maps 5.1 to 5.9 show the country values for our analysis (“factor 
scores”) as well as the cascades of moral and social decay in the Western 
countries and also the evidence for the Muslim countries with available data. 
Graph 5.5 finally summarizes the pessimistic research findings, which rather 
support the views of Barro and Schumpeter against the logic, proposed by 
Inglehart.  
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Table 5.3: multivariate model, based on 91649 global representative respondents with complete data from 70 countries 
and territories, based on the World Values Survey from the combined latest edition [2012] of global opinion 
investigation, integrating the fifth wave of investigations, 2005-2008. Is (‘Permissiveness’) really a precondition of 
democracy? – Some continued doubts about implications of the Inglehart School 
 
 
If highest numerical values differ from the 
variable name, the highest values of the 
indicator for the multivariate analysis are 
mentioned in brackets 
moral 
(sexual) 
permissiven
ess 
(‘Permissive
ness 1’) 
acceptancy 
of the 
shadow 
economy(‘P
ermissivenes
s 2’) 
distance 
from 
religion 
(‘Permissive
ness 3’) 
educational 
values: 
independen
ce and 
imagination 
distance to 
market 
economy 
values 
education 
values: 
responsibili
ty and 
tolerance 
educational 
values: 
determinati
on and 
perseveranc
e and being 
against 
saving 
right wing 
acceptance 
of 
inequality 
educational 
values: 
favoring 
unselfishnes
s, rejecting 
hard work 
Competition good or harmful (harmful) 0,038 0,134 0,004 0,080 0,719 0,006 -0,138 -0,100 0,138 
How important is God in your life -0,380 -0,019 -0,789 -0,149 0,071 -0,122 -0,071 0,130 0,036 
How often do you attend religious services 
(never) 
0,352 -0,003 0,770 0,075 -0,037 0,159 0,063 -0,115 -0,011 
Important child qualities: determination and 
perseverance 
0,028 0,039 0,304 0,160 -0,065 0,041 0,523 0,074 -0,058 
Important child qualities: feeling of 
responsibility 
0,095 -0,032 0,157 0,138 -0,038 0,730 -0,006 -0,007 -0,013 
Important child qualities: hard work -0,145 0,021 0,010 -0,259 -0,013 -0,346 -0,011 0,117 -0,675 
Important child qualities: imagination 0,165 -0,025 0,062 0,610 0,015 -0,076 0,071 -0,152 0,085 
Important child qualities: independence 0,105 0,010 0,164 0,695 -0,067 0,176 0,061 0,058 -0,044 
Important child qualities: obedience -0,150 0,014 -0,286 -0,437 0,122 -0,459 -0,177 0,007 0,251 
Important child qualities: religious faith -0,255 -0,031 -0,743 -0,196 0,032 -0,171 -0,105 0,064 0,052 
Important child qualities: thrift, and saving 
money and things 
-0,116 0,019 0,083 -0,004 -0,009 -0,080 -0,650 0,066 -0,146 
Important child qualities: tolerance and 
respect for other people 
0,134 -0,118 -0,045 -0,298 -0,004 0,532 0,274 -0,125 0,058 
Important child qualities: unselfishness 0,019 -0,013 0,031 -0,180 -0,011 -0,218 0,094 0,003 0,658 
Income equality (large differences needed) -0,025 -0,002 -0,032 -0,086 -0,002 -0,026 0,186 0,711 -0,185 
Justifiable: abortion 0,788 0,146 0,436 0,110 -0,107 0,139 0,157 -0,120 -0,054 
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public 0,213 0,774 0,056 0,005 0,123 -0,033 -0,028 -0,007 0,016 
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transport 
Justifiable: cheating on taxes 0,239 0,783 0,088 0,013 0,042 -0,047 -0,015 0,015 -0,033 
Justifiable: claiming government benefits 
even if one is not entitled to them 
0,104 0,725 0,001 0,027 0,181 -0,056 -0,118 0,018 0,073 
Justifiable: divorce 0,769 0,094 0,331 0,082 -0,102 0,174 0,184 -0,132 0,002 
Justifiable: euthanasia 0,692 0,149 0,414 0,067 -0,095 0,140 0,089 -0,046 -0,008 
Justifiable: homosexuality 0,779 0,127 0,219 0,198 0,000 0,226 0,189 -0,182 0,102 
Justifiable: prostitution 0,759 0,283 0,167 0,134 0,007 0,084 0,098 -0,102 0,040 
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 0,218 0,728 -0,043 0,021 0,115 -0,108 -0,118 0,071 0,022 
Justifiable: suicide 0,668 0,295 0,207 0,132 0,043 0,047 0,010 -0,070 0,018 
Political system: Having a democratic 
political system (reject) 
-0,099 0,232 0,125 -0,038 0,300 -0,044 -0,395 0,035 0,197 
Political system: Having the army rule 
(very bad) 
0,253 -0,231 0,173 -0,030 -0,342 0,214 0,436 -0,288 -0,195 
Private vs. state ownership of business 
(state) 
-0,064 0,073 -0,027 -0,099 0,762 -0,059 -0,027 0,049 -0,064 
Self-positioning in political scale (right 
wing) 
-0,145 0,008 -0,114 0,051 -0,058 -0,033 -0,220 0,717 0,116 
 moral 
(sexual) 
permissiven
ess 
(‘Permissive
ness 1’) 
acceptancy 
of the 
shadow 
economy(‘P
ermissivenes
s 2’) 
distance 
from 
religion 
(‘Permissive
ness 3’) 
educational 
values: 
independen
ce and 
imagination 
distance to 
market 
economy 
values 
education 
values: 
responsibili
ty and 
tolerance 
educational 
values: 
determinati
on and 
perseveranc
e and being 
against 
saving 
right wing 
acceptance 
of 
inequality 
educational 
values: 
favoring 
unselfishnes
s, rejecting 
hard work 
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Table 5.4: promax factor analysis, based on the latest edition of the combined World Values Surveys on religion, on 
what is justifiable, and democracy (quantitative analysis of “Permissiveness”) - The inter-correlations between the 
promax factors 
 
    correlation matrix of the components    
 moral 
(sexual) 
permissive
ness 
(‘Permissi
veness 1’) 
acceptancy 
of the 
shadow 
economy(‘P
ermissivenes
s 2’) 
distance 
from 
religion 
(‘Permissive
ness 3’) 
education
al values: 
independe
nce and 
imaginatio
n 
distance to 
market 
economy 
values 
education 
values: 
responsibilit
y and 
tolerance 
educational 
values: 
determinatio
n and 
perseverance 
and being 
against 
saving 
right wing 
acceptance of 
inequality 
educational 
values: 
favoring 
unselfishness, 
rejecting hard 
work 
moral (sexual) 
permissiveness 
(‘Permissiveness 1’) 
1,000 0,199 0,348 0,130 -0,082 0,194 0,203 -0,183 0,013 
acceptancy of the shadow 
economy(‘Permissiveness 
2’) 
0,199 1,000 0,040 0,050 0,195 -0,102 -0,156 0,073 0,051 
distance from religion 
(‘Permissiveness 3’) 
0,348 0,040 1,000 0,178 -0,074 0,154 0,101 -0,070 -0,098 
educational values: 
independence and 
imagination 
0,130 0,050 0,178 1,000 -0,031 0,168 -0,029 -0,011 0,009 
distance to market 
economy values 
-0,082 0,195 -0,074 -0,031 1,000 -0,084 -0,194 0,014 0,138 
education values: 
responsibility and 
tolerance 
0,194 -0,102 0,154 0,168 -0,084 1,000 0,170 -0,100 -0,031 
educational values: 
determination and 
perseverance and being 
against saving 
0,203 -0,156 0,101 -0,029 -0,194 0,170 1,000 -0,103 -0,146 
right wing acceptance of 
inequality 
-0,183 0,073 -0,070 -0,011 0,014 -0,100 -0,103 1,000 -0,055 
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educational values: 
favoring unselfishness, 
rejecting hard work 
0,013 0,051 -0,098 0,009 0,138 -0,031 -0,146 -0,055 1,000 
 
N = 91649,000 global representative citizens with available data 
 
 
Table 5.5: promax factor analysis, based on the latest edition of the combined World Values Surveys on religion, on 
what is justifiable, and democracy (quantitative analysis of “Permissiveness”) - The data [country means from Promax 
factor analysis] for new maps of global values from 70 countries and territories, based on the World Values Survey from 
the combined latest edition [2012] of global opinion investigation, integrating the fifth wave of investigations, 2005-2008 
[Member countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation are highlighted in green color] 
 
 
 
Country/region moral 
(sexual) 
permissivenes
s 
(‘Permissiven
ess 1’) 
acceptancy 
of the 
shadow 
economy(‘P
ermissivenes
s 2’) 
distance from 
religion 
(‘Permissivenes
s 3’) 
educational 
values: 
independen
ce and 
imagination 
distance to 
market 
economy 
values 
education 
values: 
responsibility 
and tolerance 
educational 
values: 
determinati
on and 
perseveranc
e and being 
against 
saving 
right wing 
acceptance 
of 
inequality 
educational 
values: 
favoring 
unselfishness, 
rejecting 
hard work 
Albania -0,313 0,058 0,077 -0,143 -0,381 -0,276 -0,217 -0,035 -0,185 
Andorra 1,525 -0,134 0,705 0,004 0,119 0,490 0,409 -0,477 -0,185 
Argentina 0,221 -0,141 -0,200 0,001 0,266 0,261 0,174 -0,206 -0,078 
Armenia -0,160 0,528 0,567 -0,227 0,320 -0,279 0,097 0,282 -0,516 
Australia 0,732 -0,361 0,497 0,056 -0,306 0,187 0,350 -0,293 0,310 
Azerbaijan -0,518 0,266 0,204 0,105 -0,098 -0,002 -0,110 -0,070 -0,695 
Bangladesh -1,017 -0,677 -0,819 0,598 -0,228 -0,058 -0,116 0,864 -0,363 
Belarus 0,098 0,541 0,873 -0,529 0,074 -0,153 -0,098 0,184 -0,672 
Bosnia and Herzegovina -0,287 -0,312 0,107 -0,086 -0,306 -0,107 0,091 -0,186 -0,029 
Brazil -0,204 0,555 -0,652 -0,381 0,297 -0,210 -0,264 -0,010 0,358 
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Bulgaria 0,282 -0,075 0,881 -0,120 -0,052 -0,287 0,095 0,072 -0,346 
Burkina Faso -0,435 0,061 -0,930 -0,667 -0,002 -0,888 -0,004 0,044 -0,260 
Canada 0,515 -0,293 0,120 0,117 -0,251 0,241 0,381 -0,276 0,211 
Chile -0,087 0,200 -0,297 0,093 0,603 0,270 -0,163 -0,436 0,646 
Croatia 0,589 0,624 0,382 0,193 -0,734 0,073 0,383 -0,315 -0,342 
Cyprus 0,046 -0,165 -0,147 -0,140 0,011 0,007 0,083 -0,317 0,175 
Czech Republic 0,940 0,227 1,054 -0,476 -0,179 -0,006 0,048 0,080 -0,464 
Dominican Republic -0,132 -0,307 -0,680 -0,323 0,125 0,289 0,386 0,507 -0,287 
Estonia 0,154 0,025 1,102 -0,271 -0,159 0,062 0,266 -0,070 -0,794 
Ethiopia -0,771 -0,294 -0,654 0,764 -0,137 -0,622 -0,316 0,440 0,006 
Finland 0,610 -0,155 0,585 0,390 -0,080 0,707 0,122 -0,409 0,525 
Georgia -0,536 -0,042 -0,079 -0,181 -0,115 0,030 0,167 0,444 -0,690 
Germany 0,709 -0,205 0,784 0,766 -0,085 0,691 0,145 -0,732 -0,128 
Ghana -0,556 -0,222 -1,048 -0,565 0,211 -0,722 0,540 0,586 -0,349 
Guatemala -0,210 0,519 -0,861 -0,319 0,510 -0,104 -0,335 0,328 0,564 
Hong Kong 0,019 -0,042 0,842 0,128 0,165 -0,490 -0,440 -0,092 0,184 
Hungary 0,380 0,450 0,803 -0,065 -0,274 0,361 0,114 -0,554 0,136 
India -0,359 -0,085 -0,269 -0,062 -0,104 -0,498 -0,261 -0,175 -0,105 
Indonesia -0,946 -0,250 -1,047 0,359 0,521 -0,083 -0,570 0,980 0,276 
Italy -0,002 -0,370 -0,059 0,083 -0,032 0,483 0,411 -0,217 0,120 
Japan 0,305 -0,397 0,846 0,594 -0,154 0,534 0,222 -0,033 0,327 
Jordan -1,029 -0,102 -1,192 -0,053 0,231 -0,505 -0,137 0,280 0,694 
Kyrgyzstan -0,628 0,192 0,238 0,165 0,232 -0,113 -0,266 0,140 -0,290 
Latvia 0,370 0,471 0,842 -0,400 -0,129 0,165 0,117 0,072 -0,731 
Lithuania -0,184 0,234 0,475 0,017 -0,122 -0,022 -0,063 0,018 -0,475 
Macedonia -0,417 -0,082 0,240 0,154 -0,441 0,373 0,018 -0,232 0,479 
Mali -0,005 0,500 -0,822 -0,286 0,300 -0,716 -0,253 0,358 -0,148 
Mexico -0,169 0,469 -0,363 0,076 0,294 -0,083 -0,361 0,065 0,689 
Moldova -0,252 0,530 0,139 -0,151 0,360 -0,058 -0,132 0,122 -0,539 
New Zealand 0,752 -0,411 0,603 0,152 -0,395 0,194 0,444 -0,270 0,131 
Nigeria -0,707 -0,193 -1,083 -0,805 0,025 -0,951 0,439 0,154 -0,460 
Norway 0,799 -0,328 0,672 0,850 -0,201 0,769 0,372 -0,401 0,275 
Peru -0,172 0,012 -0,570 -0,397 0,145 0,072 0,090 0,098 -0,147 
Philippines -0,315 0,713 -0,807 0,070 0,580 -0,392 -0,500 0,466 0,201 
Poland -0,114 -0,004 -0,498 -0,063 0,765 0,426 -0,463 0,199 0,403 
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Puerto Rico -0,365 -0,325 -0,896 -0,438 -0,012 0,320 0,076 0,128 0,492 
Romania -0,174 -0,149 -0,247 0,089 -0,467 0,097 -0,049 0,035 -0,455 
Russian Federation -0,093 0,386 1,186 -0,650 0,467 -0,092 -0,279 0,177 -0,580 
Serbia 0,393 1,353 0,119 0,132 0,312 -0,205 -0,129 0,216 -0,018 
Serbia and Montenegro -0,060 -0,171 0,611 -0,168 -0,400 -0,137 0,335 -0,147 -0,396 
Slovakia 0,544 0,379 0,166 -0,469 0,128 0,027 -0,018 -0,199 -0,519 
Slovenia 0,621 0,191 0,662 0,255 -0,277 0,376 0,173 -0,395 0,228 
South Africa -0,274 0,009 -0,654 -0,206 -0,043 -0,222 -0,061 -0,042 -0,049 
South Korea -0,088 -0,051 0,555 0,613 0,167 0,241 -0,529 0,161 -0,567 
Spain 0,833 -0,177 0,409 -0,242 0,240 0,092 0,229 -0,477 -0,213 
Sweden 1,309 -0,185 0,895 0,624 -0,320 0,852 0,248 -0,270 0,344 
Switzerland 1,003 -0,255 0,364 0,418 -0,349 0,641 0,370 -0,632 0,170 
Taiwan -0,112 -0,165 0,745 0,279 0,073 0,487 -0,489 0,382 -0,010 
Tanzania -0,786 -0,517 -0,977 -0,035 -0,249 -0,783 0,121 -0,044 0,076 
Thailand -0,384 0,613 -0,369 0,254 0,763 -0,285 -0,540 0,520 0,574 
Trinidad and Tobago -0,372 0,056 -0,804 -0,551 0,050 -0,196 0,019 0,284 -0,129 
Turkey -0,629 -0,438 -0,290 -0,143 0,408 -0,192 -0,229 0,066 -0,111 
Uganda -0,695 0,272 -0,839 -0,574 -0,538 -0,701 0,339 0,206 -0,225 
Ukraine -0,061 0,604 0,566 -0,311 0,248 -0,219 -0,053 0,221 -0,469 
United States 0,237 -0,287 -0,307 -0,012 -0,464 0,114 0,220 -0,121 0,088 
Uruguay 0,429 -0,288 0,285 0,138 0,286 0,288 0,179 -0,342 0,749 
Venezuela -0,403 -0,057 -0,455 -0,227 0,133 0,075 -0,291 0,145 0,550 
Viet Nam -0,791 -0,233 0,853 0,196 0,186 -0,340 -0,657 1,352 0,066 
Zambia 0,006 0,641 -0,768 -0,204 0,320 -0,647 0,125 0,423 -0,156 
Zimbabwe -0,910 -0,501 -0,958 -0,854 -0,363 -0,610 0,454 -0,436 -0,301 
Country/region moral 
(sexual) 
permissivenes
s 
(‘Permissiven
ess 1’) 
acceptancy 
of the 
shadow 
economy(‘P
ermissivenes
s 2’) 
distance from 
religion 
(‘Permissivenes
s 3’) 
educational 
values: 
independen
ce and 
imagination 
distance to 
market 
economy 
values 
education 
values: 
responsibility 
and tolerance 
educational 
values: 
determinati
on and 
perseveranc
e and being 
against 
saving 
right wing 
acceptance 
of 
inequality 
educational 
values: 
favoring 
unselfishness, 
rejecting 
hard work 
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For the analysis of the choropleth maps of global values, it’s again necessary, as 
in previous Chapters, to analyze in more detail the factor definitions (loadings 
which are higher than or are equal to 0.5) as well as the countries with the 
highest and lowest factor scores each. 
 
 
Factor definitions: 
 
 
 moral (sexual) permissiveness (‘Permissiveness 1’) 
 
 
Definition: 
 
Justifiable: abortion 
Justifiable: homosexuality 
Justifiable: divorce 
Justifiable: prostitution 
Justifiable: euthanasia 
Justifiable: suicide 
 
 
Highest values: 
Andorra 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Czech Republic 
Spain 
 
Lowest values: 
Jordan 
Bangladesh 
Indonesia 
Zimbabwe 
Viet Nam 
 
 
 acceptancy of the shadow economy(‘Permissiveness 2’) 
 
 
Definition:  
 
Justifiable: cheating on taxes 
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Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport 
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 
Justifiable: claiming government benefits even if one is not entitled to them 
 
 
Highest values: 
Serbia 
Philippines 
Zambia 
Croatia 
Thailand 
 
 
Lowest values: 
Bangladesh 
Tanzania 
Zimbabwe 
Turkey 
New Zealand 
 
 
 distance from religion (‘Permissiveness 3’) 
 
 
Definition: 
 
How often do you attend religious services (never?) 
negative loading: How important is God in your life 
negative loading: important child qualities: religious faith 
 
 
Highest values: 
Russian Federation 
Estonia 
Czech Republic 
Sweden 
Bulgaria 
 
Lowest values: 
Jordan 
Nigeria 
Ghana 
Indonesia 
Tanzania 
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 educational values: independence and imagination 
 
 
Definition: 
 
Important child qualities: independence 
Important child qualities: imagination 
 
 
Highest values: 
Norway 
Germany 
Ethiopia 
Sweden 
South Korea 
 
Lowest values: 
Zimbabwe 
Nigeria 
Burkina Faso 
Russian Federation 
Uganda 
 
 
 distance to market economy values 
 
 
Definition: 
 
Favoring private or state ownership of business (state ownership) 
Competition good or harmful (harmful) 
 
Highest values: 
Poland 
Thailand 
Chile 
Philippines 
Indonesia 
 
Lowest values: 
Croatia 
Uganda 
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Romania 
United States 
Macedonia 
 
 
 education values: responsibility and tolerance 
 
 
Definition: 
 
Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility 
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people 
Negative loading: obedience (-0,459) 
 
 
Highest values: 
Sweden 
Norway 
Finland 
Germany 
Switzerland 
 
 
Lowest values: 
Nigeria 
Burkina Faso 
Tanzania 
Ghana 
Mali 
 
 
 educational values: determination and perseverance and being 
against saving 
 
 
Definition: 
 
Important child qualities: determination and perseverance 
Negative loading: Important child qualities: thrift, and saving money and things 
 
 
Highest values: 
Ghana 
Zimbabwe 
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New Zealand 
Nigeria 
Italy 
 
 
Lowest values: 
Viet Nam 
Indonesia 
Thailand 
South Korea 
Philippines 
 
 
 right wing acceptance of inequality 
 
 
Definition: 
 
Self-positioning in political scale (right wing) 
Income equality (large differences needed) 
 
 
Highest values: 
Viet Nam 
Indonesia 
Bangladesh 
Ghana 
Thailand 
 
Lowest values: 
Germany 
Switzerland 
Hungary 
Spain 
Andorra 
 
 
 educational values: favoring unselfishness, rejecting hard work 
 
 
Definition: 
 
Important child qualities: unselfishness 
Negative loading: important child qualities: hard work 
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Highest values: 
Uruguay 
Jordan 
Mexico 
Chile 
Thailand 
 
Lowest values: 
Estonia 
Latvia 
Azerbaijan 
Georgia 
Belarus 
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Map 5.1: moral (sexual) permissiveness (‘Permissiveness 1’) 
 
 
 
Justifiable: abortion 
Justifiable: homosexuality 
Justifiable: divorce 
Justifiable: prostitution 
Justifiable: euthanasia 
Justifiable: suicide 
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Map 5.2: acceptancy of the shadow economy (‘Permissiveness 2’) 
 
 
 
 
Justifiable: cheating on taxes 
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on 
public transport 
Justifiable: someone accepting a 
bribe 
Justifiable: claiming government 
benefits even if one is not entitled 
to them 
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Map 5.3: distance from religion (‘Permissiveness 3’) 
 
 
 
How often do you attend religious services 
(never) 
negative loading: How important is God in 
your life 
negative loading: important child qualities: 
religious faith 
 224 
 
Map 5.4: educational values: independence and imagination 
 
 
 
 
Important child qualities: 
independence 
Important child qualities: 
imagination 
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Map 5.5: distance to market economy values 
 
 
 
Favoring private or state 
ownership of business (state 
ownership) 
Competition good or harmful 
(harmful) 
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Map 5.6: educational values: responsibility and tolerance 
 
 
 
Important child qualities: 
feeling of responsibility 
Important child qualities: 
tolerance and respect for 
other people 
Negative loading: 
obedience (-0,459) 
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Map 5.7: educational values: determination and perseverance and being against saving 
 
 
 
Important child qualities: 
determination and perseverance 
Negative loading: Important child 
qualities: thrift, and saving money 
and things 
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Map 5.8: right wing acceptance of inequality (global rank, right wing acceptance of inequality). 
22
 High right-wing 
acceptance of inequality: marked in blue; low right-wing acceptance of inequality: marked in red 
 
1,00
8,88
16,75
24,63
32,50
40,38
48,25
56,13
64,00
71,88
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
                                                 
22
 The indicator did not produce meaningful maps with the original values, so we transformed it to a ranking. 
Self-positioning in political scale 
(right wing) 
Income equality (large differences 
needed) 
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Map 5.9: educational values: favoring unselfishness, rejecting hard work 
 
 
 
 
Important child qualities: 
unselfishness 
Negative loading: 
important child qualities: 
hard work 
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5. 2. Hofstede, Ralston et al. , Inglehart and our typologies  
 
 
We have now almost reached the end of our journey. With lots of data, shown in 
Tables, Graphs and Maps, we have tried to present our picture of the analyses, 
as they emerge from the data of the World Values Survey, and the Arab Opinion 
Index. In Table 5.6 we provide our readers with clear-cut Pearson-Bravais 
correlation coefficients between the data presented by Hofstede and Inglehart 
and the factor scores from our own analytical dimensions, presented in this work 
on the bases of promax factor analysis with individual data from up to more than 
80 countries. Table 5.7 shows the Pearson-Bravais correlations between the 
Ralston et al. dimensions and our results. In many ways, we can show that 
Hofstede’s Power Distance, Individualism versus Collectivism, Long-Term 
Orientation, and Indulgence versus Restraint very well correspond to our own 
factor analyses. The same happens with Inglehart’s main dimensions, traditional 
versus secular, and survival versus self-expression. In all cases, however, we 
could avoid some of the problematic assumptions, still inherent in the research 
by Hofstede and Inglehart. Our factors show correlations of +-.500 and more 
with those mentioned dimensions of Hofstede’s and Inglehart’s research. 
Hofstede’s other factors – Masculinity versus Femininity, and Uncertainty 
Avoidance, found no confirmation of a correlation of +-.500 or more with our 
own factors. But this does not necessarily imply that Hofstede’s research is 
falsified on this point. It might also very well be that  
 
1) relationships between phenomena changed over time or  
2) Hofstede’s samples (employees of the transnational corporation IBM) exhibit 
other tendencies and correlations as the populations at large. 
 
In the following, we list the comparisons of the research results by Hofstede and 
Inglehart and our own with more detail. The data for this exercise are freely 
available from 
https://www.academia.edu/7504018/Choropleth_maps_of_global_values_and_b
ackground_variables). 
23
 
                                                 
23
 Readers are reminded here that the mentioned EXCEL files, downloadable from 
https://www.academia.edu/7504018/Choropleth_maps_of_global_values_and_background_v
ariables serve a dual purpose: easy data documentation for standard variables, used in this 
work, and the drawing of choropleth maps. For that very reason, data for Hongkong and 
Macau, which are territories belonging to the People’s Republic of China, could not be used 
further. Likewise, we should draw our reader’s attention that available data for Taiwan, 
Province of China, were used in the choropleth maps. 
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Our own factors which confirmed the theoretical work by 
Hofstede and Inglehart: 
 
 
 traditional religion 
 the ‘ego’ company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness) 
 feminism analysis: distance to traditionalist forms of religion 
 feminism analysis: feminism 
 re-analysis: moral (sexual) permissiveness (‘Permissiveness 1’) 
 re-analysis: distance from religion (‘Permissiveness 3’) 
 re-analysis: education values: responsibility and tolerance 
 re-analysis: educational values: favoring unselfishness, rejecting hard 
work 
 
 
Our own factors which confirmed the theoretical work by 
Hofstede only: 
 
 
 authoritarian character 
 tolerance and respect + postmaterialism 
 re-analysis: educational values: determination and perseverance and being 
against saving 
 re-analysis: right wing acceptance of inequality 
 
 
Our own factors which confirmed the theoretical work by 
Inglehart only: 
 
 
 economic permissiveness 
 
 
Our own factors which confirmed earlier theories by a correlation 
of less than +-0.50: 
 
 
 Hofstede: Masculinity versus Femininity 
 Hofstede: Uncertainty Avoidance Index 
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Our own factors which were absent from earlier theoretical 
attempts: 
 
 
 racism 
 higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the 
generations) 
 distrust of the army and the press 
 [predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy 
 re-analysis: acceptancy of the shadow economy (‘Permissiveness 2’) 
 re-analysis: educational values: independence and imagination 
 re-analysis: distance to market economy values 
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Table 5.6: Hofstede, Inglehart and the factors from our work – Pearson Bravais correlations of the country results 
 
 
 Hofstede: 
Power 
Distance 
Hofstede: 
Individual
ism vs. 
Collectivis
m 
Hofstede: 
Masculinit
y versus 
Femininity 
Hofstede: 
Uncertaint
y 
Avoidance 
Index 
Hofstede: 
Long-
Term 
Orientatio
n 
Hofstede: 
Indulgenc
e versus 
Restraint 
Inglehart: 
Traditiona
l/Secular 
Values 
Inglehart: 
Survival 
vs. Self-
Expressio
n Values 
economic permissiveness 0,304 -0,138 0,064 0,162 0,091 -0,051 0,272 -0,715 
traditional religion 0,447 -0,439 0,288 0,082 -0,546 0,179 -0,911 0,110 
racism 0,426 -0,491 0,087 -0,247 0,189 -0,401 -0,362 -0,020 
higher education of the younger 
generation (education gap 
between the generations) 
-0,086 -0,038 -0,210 -0,019 0,047 0,119 -0,310 -0,087 
distrust of the army and the 
press 
-0,435 0,332 -0,043 0,371 -0,058 0,246 0,424 -0,405 
authoritarian character 0,567 -0,365 0,200 0,355 0,086 -0,374 -0,238 -0,297 
tolerance and respect + 
postmaterialism 
-0,686 0,597 -0,071 -0,079 -0,196 0,530 0,293 -0,247 
the ‘ego’ company (rejection of 
obedience + unselfishness) 
-0,067 0,122 -0,196 -0,032 0,796 -0,600 0,640 0,700 
[predominantly] female 
rejection of the market 
economy and democracy 
0,094 -0,238 -0,065 0,461 -0,039 0,191 0,146 -0,140 
feminism analysis: distance to 
traditionalist forms of religion 
-0,424 0,526 -0,159 -0,086 0,523 -0,057 0,916 0,300 
feminism analysis: feminism 0,349 -0,064 0,247 -0,013 0,513 0,446 0,531 -0,399 
re-analysis: moral (sexual) 
permissiveness 
(‘Permissiveness 1’) 
-0,560 0,650 -0,076 -0,028 0,130 0,180 0,705 0,561 
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re-analysis: acceptancy of the 
shadow economy 
(‘Permissiveness 2’) 
0,386 -0,210 -0,038 0,150 0,045 -0,133 0,236 -0,439 
re-analysis: distance from 
religion (‘Permissiveness 3’) 
-0,383 0,404 -0,222 -0,029 0,578 -0,304 0,913 0,065 
re-analysis: educational values: 
independence and imagination 
-0,326 0,081 -0,152 -0,218 0,130 0,104 0,277 0,456 
re-analysis: distance to market 
economy values 
0,431 -0,480 0,025 0,212 -0,182 0,006 -0,229 -0,230 
re-analysis: education values: 
responsibility and tolerance 
-0,594 0,522 -0,104 0,154 0,095 0,260 0,555 0,476 
re-analysis: educational values: 
determination and perseverance 
and being against saving 
-0,631 0,654 -0,033 0,054 -0,020 0,171 0,185 0,330 
re-analysis: right wing 
acceptance of inequality 
0,470 -0,564 -0,042 -0,204 -0,025 -0,213 -0,321 -0,324 
re-analysis: educational values: 
favoring unselfishness, 
rejecting hard work 
-0,110 -0,035 0,097 -0,039 -0,595 0,665 -0,280 0,549 
 Hofstede: 
Power 
Distance 
Hofstede: 
Individual
ism vs. 
Collectivis
m 
Hofstede: 
Masculinit
y versus 
Femininity 
Hofstede: 
Uncertaint
y 
Avoidance 
Index 
Hofstede: 
Long-
Term 
Orientatio
n 
Hofstede: 
Indulgenc
e versus 
Restraint 
Inglehart: 
Traditiona
l/Secular 
Values 
Inglehart: 
Survival 
vs. Self-
Expressio
n Values 
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In the following two Tables, we evaluate the relationship of the Ralston et al. 
factors with the other aggregates, presented in this article. Again, the data for 
this exercise are freely available from 
https://www.academia.edu/7504018/Choropleth_maps_of_global_values_and_b
ackground_variables). 
24
 The Ralston et al. values (raw country scores) were 
listed in Ralston, Egri, Reynaud et al., 2011. Ralston et al.’s factors Affective 
Autonomy and Harmony do not achieve any correlations which have more than 
25% of variance in common with our own factors, and in addition, the following 
dimensions from our own research are untapped, it seems, by the Ralston et al. 
factors (to judge from the less than 25% of variance they have in common with 
the Ralston et al. factors): 
 
 racism 
 higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the 
generations) 
 distrust of the army and the press 
 female rejection of the market economy and democracy 
 re-analysis: shadow economy mentality (‘Permissiveness 2’) 
 re-analysis: educational values: independence and imagination 
 re-analysis: education values: unselfishness and being against hard work 
 feminism analysis: Generation gap in educational level 
 
In addition, the following factors from Hofstede and Inglehart are untapped; it 
seems, by Ralston et al.’s theories (again to judge from the less than 25% of 
variance they have in common with the Ralston et al. factors) 
 
Hofstede: Masculinity versus Femininity 
Hofstede: Uncertainty Avoidance Index 
Inglehart: Self-Expression Values (WVS 1-4, 2006) 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 See note before. 
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Table 5.7: The correlations of the country results of Ralston et al. with the country results by Hofstede, Inglehart and 
the factors from our work 
 
 
 Embedde
dness 
Hierarchy Mastery Affective 
Autonom
y 
Intellectu
al 
Autonom
y 
Egalitaria
nism 
Harmony 
Chapter 5: traditional religion 0,567 0,370 0,403 0,167 0,453 0,598 0,263 
Chapter 5: racism 0,373 0,370 0,111 -0,391 -0,364 -0,193 -0,108 
Chapter 5: higher education of the younger 
generation (education gap between the 
generations) 
0,185 0,156 0,379 0,344 0,444 0,208 0,214 
Chapter 5: distrust of the army and the press -0,333 -0,469 -0,249 0,214 0,382 0,033 -0,073 
Chapter 5: authoritarian character 0,518 0,325 0,299 -0,058 -0,016 0,015 0,350 
Chapter 5: tolerance and respect + postmaterialism -0,525 -0,556 -0,284 0,145 0,228 0,100 -0,137 
Chapter 5: the ‘ego’ company (rejection of 
obedience + unselfishness) 
-0,341 -0,180 -0,331 -0,210 -0,400 -0,640 -0,395 
Chapter 5: female rejection of the market economy 
and democracy 
0,162 -0,070 -0,133 -0,148 0,094 0,113 -0,044 
Chapter 12 re-analysis: moral (sexual) 
permissiveness (‘Permissiveness 1’) 
-0,727 -0,642 -0,462 0,171 -0,018 -0,230 -0,148 
Chapter 12 re-analysis: shadow economy 
mentality (‘Permissiveness 2’) 
0,093 -0,261 -0,145 -0,281 -0,133 -0,156 0,044 
Chapter 12 re-analysis: distance from religion 
(‘Permissiveness 3’) 
-0,516 -0,337 -0,372 -0,191 -0,486 -0,641 -0,249 
Chapter 12 re-analysis: educational values: 
independence and imagination 
-0,299 -0,187 -0,202 -0,089 -0,096 -0,092 -0,340 
Chapter 12 re-analysis: distance to market 0,497 0,557 0,122 -0,219 -0,039 0,172 0,023 
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economy values 
Chapter 12 re-analysis: education values: 
responsibility and tolerance 
-0,518 -0,533 -0,370 0,028 0,210 -0,052 -0,154 
Chapter 12 re-analysis: educational values: 
determination and perseverance and being against 
saving 
-0,557 -0,598 -0,230 0,220 0,267 -0,007 -0,016 
Chapter 12 re-analysis: right wing acceptance of 
inequality 
0,452 0,545 0,188 -0,206 -0,394 -0,110 -0,068 
Chapter 12 re-analysis: education values: 
unselfishness and being against hard work 
0,160 0,054 0,165 0,100 0,274 0,490 0,161 
Chapter 6: feminism analysis: distance to 
traditionalist forms of religion 
-0,702 -0,616 -0,542 -0,082 -0,283 -0,557 -0,390 
Chapter 6: feminism analysis: Generation gap in 
educational level 
-0,181 -0,115 -0,042 0,191 0,116 -0,191 -0,252 
Chapter 6: feminism analysis: feminism -0,677 -0,749 -0,516 0,145 0,207 -0,101 -0,392 
Hofstede: Power Distance 0,570 0,569 0,365 -0,216 -0,119 -0,002 0,258 
Hofstede: Individualism vs. Collectivism -0,567 -0,532 -0,328 0,251 0,136 -0,078 -0,147 
Hofstede: Masculinity versus Femininity -0,187 -0,065 -0,103 0,028 0,065 0,052 -0,046 
Hofstede: Uncertainty Avoidance Index 0,050 -0,238 -0,080 -0,091 0,325 0,213 0,362 
Hofstede: Long-Term Orientation -0,378 -0,218 -0,400 -0,322 -0,488 -0,685 -0,379 
Hofstede: Indulgence versus Restraint 0,062 -0,006 0,203 0,492 0,501 0,586 0,210 
Inglehart: Secular Values (WVS 1-4, 2006) -0,705 -0,619 -0,635 -0,187 -0,351 -0,709 -0,447 
Inglehart: Self-Expression Values (WVS 1-4, 
2006) 
-0,412 -0,243 -0,154 0,437 0,207 0,154 -0,223 
 Embedde
dness 
Hierarchy Mastery Affective 
Autonom
y 
Intellectu
al 
Autonom
y 
Egalitaria
nism 
Harmony 
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The Ralston et al. factor “Embeddedness” has the highest correlation with the 
absence of sexual permissiveness (permissiveness 1 – Chapter 12 of this work). 
Hierarchy is most closely correlated with the absence of feminism (see Chapter 
6 of this work). Mastery is closely related to the absence of secular values from 
Inglehart’s theory; and Egalitarianism also has almost 50% of variance with that 
Inglehartian factor (absence of secular values) in common. Affective Autonomy 
and Harmony are only weakly connected to the other global value aggregates, 
presented in this article. Intellectual Autonomy is somehow related to 
Hofstede’s Indulgence Factor, but the other correlations are relatively small. 
Ralston et al. ’ Egalitarianism is strongest in religious societies; it negatively 
correlates with Hofstede’s long-term orientation and our “ego factor”.  
 
Table 5.8 now shows the correlations of the country scores from Ralston et al.’s 
work with standard socio-economic indicators. Interestingly enough, Muslim 
population shares and OIC membership present high correlations with the 
Ralston et al. factors “Embeddedness”, “Hierarchy” and “Mastery”. For the 
other correlations of the Ralston et al. factors, we refer our readers to Table 5.8 
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Table 5.8: The correlations of the country results of Ralston et al. with country aggregate and value research data 
 
 
 Embedde
dness 
Hierarchy Mastery Affective 
Autonom
y 
Intellectu
al 
Autonom
y 
Egalitaria
nism 
Harmony 
Membership in the Islamic Conference 0,677 0,613 0,537 0,098 0,089 0,321 0,480 
Muslim population share per total population 0,678 0,613 0,526 0,074 0,059 0,298 0,459 
% women in government, all levels -0,301 -0,346 -0,116 0,291 0,148 0,041 -0,123 
2000 Economic Freedom Score -0,261 -0,124 -0,145 0,239 0,065 -0,061 -0,412 
ecological footprint (g ha /cap) -0,327 -0,237 -0,206 0,288 0,026 -0,182 -0,251 
ESI-Index Environment Sustainability Index (Yale 
Columbia) 
-0,369 -0,482 -0,313 0,134 0,219 -0,016 -0,103 
Happy life years -0,382 -0,260 -0,276 0,288 0,130 0,050 -0,149 
Happy Planet Index, HPI 0,198 0,206 0,119 -0,028 0,087 0,302 0,260 
homicide rate 0,130 0,123 0,142 0,082 0,215 0,170 -0,009 
Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) 0,003 0,169 0,105 0,287 0,081 -0,098 -0,162 
Life Satisfaction (0-10) -0,311 -0,193 -0,220 0,338 0,143 0,098 -0,097 
WVS: mean acceptance competition 0,032 -0,063 -0,133 -0,006 0,254 0,187 -0,002 
WVS: mean acceptance gov benefits fraud 0,235 0,116 0,083 0,015 0,263 0,205 0,149 
WVS: mean left-right position 0,433 0,440 0,297 -0,134 -0,204 0,148 0,238 
Shadow economy as % of the GDP 0,456 0,325 0,265 -0,153 0,083 0,149 0,254 
Global tolerance index -0,595 -0,609 -0,404 0,329 0,250 -0,076 -0,361 
Human development index (HDI) value 
2004 
-0,610 -0,563 -0,498 0,080 0,015 -0,218 -0,386 
ln GDP per capita -0,594 -0,552 -0,492 0,149 0,036 -0,224 -0,386 
Middle class share (share of quintiles 2-4), average -0,484 -0,379 -0,456 -0,097 -0,432 -0,553 -0,377 
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60-96 
principal component growth 2008-2011, final 
version 
0,399 0,596 0,403 -0,024 -0,067 0,136 0,115 
quintile share income difference between richest 
and poorest 20% 
0,224 0,227 0,269 0,169 0,389 0,437 0,130 
social security expenditure per GDP average 
1990s (ILO) 
-0,626 -0,728 -0,494 0,079 0,145 -0,115 -0,172 
Total crimes (per capita) -0,473 -0,576 -0,251 0,220 -0,006 -0,040 -0,238 
unemployment rate 0,283 0,009 0,182 -0,037 0,169 0,356 0,287 
Value Development -0,359 -0,128 -0,049 0,213 0,077 0,093 -0,085 
World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness -0,549 -0,337 -0,387 0,186 -0,153 -0,315 -0,521 
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5. 3. On sexual behavior values and effective democracy 
 
 
In these concluding remarks we will first of all visit current debates in France 
and in Europe. These days, we read stories in the leading world newspapers like 
the one below which tell us a lot about the conflicts about global values in 
countries like Europe today. Is prostitution justifiable? Is homosexuality 
justifiable? Are both justifiable? Is one justifiable, the other is not? Are both 
not justifiable? The French Socialists, it seems, for example, seem to think that 
one is not, and the other is. President Hollande and his administration put 
considerable political energy into legalizing homosexual marriages and 
prohibiting prostitution. But global citizens hold another view, and there is a 
high positive correlation of 0.632 between the two items in the World Values 
Survey, based on 218877 individuals from around the globe. For a correlation 
at the individual level from such a large global survey, the coefficient is very 
high indeed. 
 
I.e. people in favor of the complete acceptability of homosexuality will also be 
in favor of the complete acceptability of prostitution and vice versa. But 
empirical World Values Survey research has many surprises in store for all 
ideological camps, and empirical World Values Survey research more often than 
not contradicts ideologies, left and right, religiously motivated and secularist 
alike. 
 
The Turkish newspaper Hürriyet brought the recent debate to a point, when it 
said: 
 
“Hürriyet November/22/2013: French lawmakers will next week consider a bill 
that punishes the clients of prostitutes and has sparked fierce debate in a 
country with a long history of liberal attitudes to sex. The bill, which the 
government says is aimed at preventing violence against women, has come 
under fire from celebrities like Catherine Deneuve and Charles Aznavour, 
leading intellectuals and prostitutes themselves. Spearheaded by Women's 
Rights Minister Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, the law will fine clients of prostitutes 
1,500 euros ($2,025) for a first offense and double that for repeat offenders. 
Prostitution itself is legal in France but soliciting, pimping and minors selling 
sex are prohibited. The government estimates about 20,000 prostitutes operate 
in France. […] About 60 people, including Deneuve, Aznavour and former 
culture minister Jack Lang released an open letter this month opposing the bill 
and calling for "a real debate" on prostitution "without ideological prejudice." 
Surprising some, among the most vocal opponents of the bill has been the 
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philosopher and feminist Elisabeth Badinter, who has pleaded that "the state 
has no place legislating on individual sexual activity." Badinter said she saw no 
direct link between male sexuality and violence against women, accusing some 
of having "a stereotypical view that is very negative and moralistic and which I 
reject." Her remarks drew a sharp rebuke from Health Minister Marisol 
Touraine. […] It comes after a deeply divisive debate on another contentious 
sexuality issue -- the legalisation of gay marriage. President Francois 
Hollande's Socialist government legalised homosexual marriages and adoptions 
earlier this year, but only after tens of thousands took to the streets in a series of 
protests to denounce the move. Europe is also in the midst of a wider debate 
over prostitution, which is legal in several countries on the continent.” 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/fierce-debate-as-france-looks-to-punish-
prostitutes-clients.aspx?pageID=238&nID=58376&NewsCatID=351  
 
 
The emotionalized and very bitter debate in France took place without any real 
reference to the empirical realities of global values “on the ground”. France, like 
many other European countries, seems to be disconnected from empirical global 
World Values Survey science research. The freely available archive of all the 
leading French language scholarly journals, Persee, lists just 17 articles 
mentioning the word “World Values Survey” at all. 25 Not a single article of 
these 17 articles deals with the problem of homosexuality, which was the issue 
of a real ideological warfare in the country recently. So we can say that French 
language social science hardly works at all with the World Values Survey. 
 
Current debates in Europe on issues of human values have acquired an almost 
quasi-religious character, with each side claiming that it is in the sole possession 
of truth, while in reality the complex relationships between value patterns are 
often overlooked. Tables 5.9 and 5.10 pick out the two issues which were at the 
heart of the recent debates in France – the acceptancy of homosexuality, and 
the acceptancy of prostitution. Looking at the partial correlations between the 
acceptancy of homosexuality and 20 other World Values Survey key-indicators 
of trust and behavior, we find that apart from the high correlations with 
acceptancy rates for such phenomena as divorce, abortion, and large-scale non-
confidence in Churches, which mainstream secular and left of the middle socio-
political currents in Europe will perceive as largely unproblematic, there are 
also significant and higher correlations between the unconditional 
acceptancy of homosexuality with accepting a bribe, avoiding a fare on 
public transport, cheating on taxes, and the generalized loss of trust in basic 
institutions of democratic society. We used World Values Survey data WVS, 
                                                 
25
 
http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revues/alph?_Prescripts_Search_tabs1=adva
nced&_Prescripts_Search_oai=false&_Prescripts_Search_revueDisplay=advanced  
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version “wvs1981_2008_v20090914. sav”, IBM-SPSS 21 software, and partial 
correlation (keeping constant income and education level). Our correlations are 
based on the WVS data for all the representative citizens of our globe with 
complete available data: 
 
Table 5.9: Was Schumpeter right after all? The loss of capitalist family 
values as measured by social acceptancy rates of homosexuality and their 
correlates from the World Values Survey 
 
 
 Control variables: 
Income level & 
Education level 
(recoded) 
  
 Justifiable: 
homosexuality 
  
 partial correlation error p df 
Justifiable: prostitution 0,628 0,000 43318 
Justifiable: divorce 0,475 0,000 43318 
Justifiable: abortion 0,474 0,000 43318 
Justifiable: suicide 0,419 0,000 43318 
Justifiable: euthanasia 0,397 0,000 42476 
No confidence: Churches 0,217 0,000 43318 
Justifiable: drinking alcohol 0,197 0,000 14292 
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 0,188 0,000 43318 
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public 
transport 
0,167 0,000 43318 
Justifiable: cheating on taxes 0,164 0,000 43318 
No confidence: Armed Forces 0,123 0,000 43318 
Justifiable: claiming government 
benefits 
0,105 0,000 42795 
No confidence: The Government 0,086 0,000 43318 
No confidence: The Civil Services 0,081 0,000 43318 
No confidence: Parliament 0,078 0,000 43318 
No confidence: The Press 0,076 0,000 43318 
No confidence: Television 0,072 0,000 43318 
No confidence: Major Companies 0,060 0,000 42066 
No confidence: The Political Parties 0,058 0,000 42473 
No confidence: Labor Unions 0,017 0,001 39781 
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Table 5.10: Social acceptancy rates of prostitution and their correlates from 
the World Values Survey 
 
 
 Control variables: 
Income level & 
Education level 
(recoded) 
  
 Justifiable: 
prostitution 
  
 partial correlation error p df 
Justifiable: homosexuality 0,628 0,000 43318 
Justifiable: abortion 0,491 0,000 43566 
Justifiable: suicide 0,454 0,000 43566 
Justifiable: divorce 0,434 0,000 43566 
Justifiable: euthanasia 0,385 0,000 42476 
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 0,299 0,000 43566 
Justifiable: cheating on taxes 0,272 0,000 43553 
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public 
transport 
0,231 0,000 43566 
Justifiable: drinking alcohol 0,214 0,000 14325 
No confidence: Churches 0,188 0,000 43566 
Justifiable: claiming government 
benefits 
0,162 0,000 42795 
No confidence: Armed Forces 0,113 0,000 43566 
No confidence: The Government 0,093 0,000 43566 
No confidence: The Civil Services 0,092 0,000 43566 
No confidence: Parliament 0,085 0,000 43323 
No confidence: The Press 0,069 0,000 43566 
No confidence: Television 0,066 0,000 43566 
No confidence: The Political Parties 0,062 0,000 42473 
No confidence: Major Companies 0,056 0,000 42066 
No confidence: Labor Unions 0,043 0,000 39781 
No confidence: The Police 0,040 0,000 43566 
No confidence: The United Nations 0,018 0,000 41746 
No confidence: The Women´s 
Movement 
0,018 0,000 40824 
 
 
Whatever way, the French Socialists overlooked the fact that the global citizens, 
saying homosexuality is always justified, will also have a high tendency to say 
as well that prostitution is always justified. The correlation between the two 
phenomena, independent from income and education, is 0.628, i.e. 39.4% of the 
variance is in common. Considering that these are results from individual 
interviews across the globe and across cultures, this correlation is really 
extraordinary. So if there is a majority of citizens voting “yes” in a hypothetical 
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global referendum on legalizing prostitution and gay marriages, the same 
constituencies would be in favor or against the motion. 
 
Beyond this specifically European point, a larger issue emerges, which really 
goes to the heart of the whole argument, i.e. whether changing sexual norms 
away from the standards of the father/mother/child family, prescribed by 
the major world religions, should be important for democracy. Inglehart and 
Welzel (2009) are very explicit about this, making it very clear that for them it is 
a vital issue for the future of democracy: 
 
“[…] Modernization does not automatically lead to democracy. Rather, it, in the 
long run, brings social and cultural changes that make democratization 
increasingly probable. Simply attaining a high level of per capita GDP does not 
produce democracy: if it did, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates would have 
become model democracies. (These countries have not gone through the 
modernization process described above.) But the emergence of postindustrial 
society brings certain social and cultural changes that are specifically 
conducive to democratization. Knowledge societies cannot function effectively 
without highly educated publics that have become increasingly accustomed to 
thinking for themselves. Furthermore, rising levels of economic security bring a 
growing emphasis on a syndrome of self-expression values -- one that gives high 
priority to free choice and motivates political action. Beyond a certain point, 
accordingly, it becomes difficult to avoid democratization, because repressing 
mass demands for more open societies becomes increasingly costly and 
detrimental to economic effectiveness. Thus, in its advanced stages, 
modernization brings social and cultural changes that make the emergence and 
flourishing of democratic institutions increasingly likely. 
 
The core idea of modernization theory is that economic and technological 
development bring a coherent set of social, cultural, and political changes. A 
large body of empirical evidence supports this idea. Economic development is, 
indeed, strongly linked to pervasive shifts in people's beliefs and motivations, 
and these shifts in turn change the role of religion, job motivations, human 
fertility rates, gender roles, and sexual norms. And they also bring growing 
mass demands for democratic institutions and for more responsive behavior 
on the part of elites. These changes together make democracy increasingly 
likely to emerge, while also making war less acceptable to publics.” (Inglehart 
and Welzel, 2009).  
 
At one point in their essay, they maintain: 
 
“The shift from traditional to secular-rational values is linked to the shift from 
agrarian to industrial societies. Traditional societies emphasize religion, respect 
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for and obedience to authority, and national pride. These characteristics change 
as societies become more secular and rational. 
 
The shift from survival to self-expression values is linked to the rise of 
postindustrial societies. It reflects a cultural shift that occurs when younger 
generations emerge that have grown up taking survival for granted. Survival 
values give top priority to economic and physical security and conformist social 
norms. Self-expression values give high priority to freedom of expression, 
participation in decision-making, political activism, environmental protection, 
gender equality, and tolerance of ethnic minorities, foreigners, and gays and 
lesbians. A growing emphasis on these latter values engenders a culture of 
trust and tolerance in which people cherish individual freedom and self-
expression and have activist political orientations. These attributes are crucial 
to democracy -- and thus explain how economic growth, which takes societies 
from agrarian to industrial and then from industrial to postindustrial, leads to 
democratization. The unprecedented economic growth of the past 50 years has 
meant that an increasing share of the world's population has grown up taking 
survival for granted. Time-series data from the values surveys indicate that mass 
priorities have shifted from an overwhelming emphasis on economic and 
physical security to an emphasis on subjective well-being, self-expression, 
participation in decision-making, and a relatively trusting and tolerant 
outlook.” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2009) 
 
This shift away from traditional family values now happens in advanced 
Western democracies at an unprecedented scale. The replacement of 
“traditional gender roles” by concepts like “parent 1” and “parent 2” in 
official documents has already begun in several industrialized western 
democracies, including the United States of America: 
 
“The words “mother” and “father” will be removed from U.S. passport 
applications and replaced with gender neutral terminology, the State 
Department says. “The words in the old form were ‘mother’ and ‘father,’” said 
Brenda Sprague, deputy assistant Secretary of State for Passport Services. 
"They are now ‘parent one’ and ‘parent two.’" A statement on the State 
Department website noted: “These improvements are being made to provide a 
gender neutral description of a child’s parents and in recognition of different 
types of families.” The statement didn't note if it was for child applications only. 
The State Department said the new passport applications, not yet available to 
the public, will be available online soon. Sprague said the decision to remove 
the traditional parenting names was not an act of political correctness. “We find 
that with changes in medical science and reproductive technology that we are 
confronting situations now that we would not have anticipated 10 or 15 years 
ago,” she said. Gay rights groups are applauding the decision. “Changing the 
term mother and father to the more global term of parent allows many different 
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types of families to be able to go and apply for a passport for their child without 
feeling like the government doesn’t recognize their family,” said Jennifer 
Chrisler, executive director of Family Equality Council. Her organization 
lobbied the government for several years to remove the words from passport 
applications. “Our government needs to recognize that the family structure is 
changing,” Chrisler said. “The best thing that we can do is support people who 
are raising kids in loving, stable families.” 
(http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/01/07/passport-applications-soon-
gender-neutral/)  
 
Major mainstream religious denominations like the Roman Catholic Church 
now began to join the debate on “parent 1” and “parent 2” by voicing their 
absolute discontent: 
 
“ROME, September 13, 2013 (LifeSiteNews.com) – Replacing terms like 
mother and father with “Parent 1 and Parent 2” is not an innocuous defense 
of “equality” but the beginning of a complete re-write of Italian society, a 
prominent Italian cardinal said this week. Changing the categories of family 
life and genealogy could send “a real earthquake” through the social 
structure. The expression, that has already been proposed for all official 
documents related to public housing and kindergarten placements in the city of 
Venice, will make “the category of fatherhood and motherhood disappear, to be 
replaced by the generic category of ‘parenting,’” the Cardinal Archbishop of 
Bologna, Carlo Caffarra, said. Speaking in a keynote address at a conference at 
the Teatro Manzoni in Bologna this week, Cardinal Caffarra identified the 
largest question facing Italian society: “Is marriage a reality at the disposal of 
the men, or does it have a ‘hard core’ that is not open to human preference?” 
(http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/cardinal-replacing-mom-and-dad-with-
parent-1-and-2-will-send-an-earthquake)  
 
From the perspective of developing countries, striving for stable institutions of 
democracy, one really has to question whether at the end of the day the political 
decision makers should start re-writing the identity cards and passports of their 
citizens and start hosting “love parades” in the name of “tolerance for gays and 
lesbians”, said to be so important for achieving effective democracy? Should 
they follow the lead of the Parliamentary Assembly of the “Council of Europe” 
(http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefDocDetails_E.asp?FileID=12456) and 
adopt new legislation of their own also to eliminate the words „father” and 
“mother” from official documents and can they hope then that their political 
system would become “an effective democracy” by adopting such measures? 
 
Let us return for a moment to the Choropleth maps 3.11 and 3.12 of this work 
and the data on “effective democracy”. As Alexander, Inglehart and Welzel, 
2011, explain, the freedom ratings of the index of effective democracy are 
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provided in two indices: The civil liberties ratings and the political rights 
ratings, which are averaged to obtain an overall index of democratic rights. This 
component index is transformed into a 0-to-100 range. The dimension of 
effectiveness in the index is provided by the use of the World Bank‘s Rule of 
Law index.  
 
If we keep development levels – as in Map 3.12 of this work – constant, it 
emerges that hard core, economic and social “bread and butter” feminism 
indicators and economic freedom indicators are far more influential than value 
change indicators in bringing about effective democracy even at low levels of 
development. Inglehart’s “self-expression” scale achieves about the same 
results as Hofstede’s “power distance” and our own “authoritarian personality” 
scale. The absence of militarism and of an oil exporting economy has also a 
beneficial effect on “effective democracy”. So, while feminism and a free 
economy generally affect effective democracy in a positive fashion, we have to 
emphasize as well that Maastricht-type of savings programs and also very high 
inward migration rates are not a driver, but a bottleneck of effective democracy. 
 
 
Table 5.11: the drivers of “effective democracy” irrespective of development 
level 
 
 
 Pearson 
correlation with 
effective 
democracy 
R^2 
% women in government, all levels 0,484 23,383 
WEF closing of global gender gap overall score 
2009 
0,461 21,278 
Investment Freedom 0,449 20,144 
closing political gender gap 0,449 20,119 
WEF Global Gender Gap Report Political 
Empowerment 2009 
0,449 20,119 
Dummy for oil exporting -0,447 19,949 
WEF Gender Gap Report Economic Participation 
and Opportunity 2009 
0,439 19,298 
% women in government, sub ministerial level 0,436 19,041 
UNDP gender empowerment index 0,433 18,773 
military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) -0,419 17,579 
Hofstede: Power Distance -0,419 17,573 
Inglehart: Self-Expression 0,419 17,557 
Hofstede: Individualism vs. Collectivism 0,409 16,702 
Heshmati/Karoui/Tausch: authoritarian character -0,402 16,131 
Protestant population share, 2000 0,398 15,855 
Heshmati/Karoui/Tausch: feminism analysis: 
feminism 
0,398 15,811 
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average surplus-deficit 2000-2007 -0,387 15,002 
military expenditures per GDP -0,373 13,915 
% women in government, ministerial level 0,373 13,898 
Heshmati/Karoui/Tausch: tolerance and respect + 
postmaterialism 
0,372 13,826 
Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) -0,371 13,800 
Ratio of estimated female to male earned income 0,371 13,734 
Tausch: Global tolerance index 0,368 13,578 
Property Rights 0,348 12,088 
Financial Freedom 0,346 11,996 
Kearney technological globalization 0,346 11,993 
Heshmati/Karoui/Tausch: re-analysis: right wing 
acceptance of inequality 
-0,328 10,747 
Heshmati/Karoui/Tausch: Value Development 
Index 
0,326 10,650 
 
Source: our own calculations from https://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-
for-books-and-articles - Analysis of the shadow economy 
 
 
Graph 5.1 highlights the politically, socially and ethically robust and globally 
applicable message of our article on the drivers of “effective democracy”: a 
sound gender political agenda, ending the political discrimination of women, 
and economic freedom will be conducive to “effective democracy”. 
Nevertheless the path towards “effective democracy” will be one of ups and 
downs, and especially in developing countries, there will be also certain limits 
for a too rapid economic liberalization. 
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Graph 5.1: the drivers of “effective democracy” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4. A glance at the World Values Survey wave, 6, 2010-2014 
 
 
As the manuscript to this article was about to be finished, the new data of the 
World Values Survey, 2010-2014 were released, containing yet another 
enormous wealth of new data, including on the Muslim world. We have chosen 
to concentrate on two phenomena, which received a large attention on the pages 
of this article – tolerance and democracy. World Values Survey data for the 6th 
wave are now available for Algeria; Armenia; Australia; Azerbaijan; Belarus; 
Chile; China; Colombia; Cyprus; Ecuador; Estonia; Germany; Ghana; Iraq; 
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Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Kyrgyzstan; Lebanon; Libya; Malaysia; 
Mexico; Morocco; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nigeria; Pakistan; Peru; 
Philippines; Poland; Qatar; Romania; Russia; Rwanda; Singapore; Slovenia; 
South Korea; Spain; Sweden; Taiwan; The Occupied Palestinian Territories; 
Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Ukraine; United States; Uruguay; 
Uzbekistan; Yemen; and Zimbabwe.  
 
In Table 5.12 we calculate a simple UNDP Human Development Index type of 
Index of Tolerance, minimizing the rejection of neighbors with the following 
characteristics among the publics of the above mentioned countries of wave 6 of 
the World Values Survey: 
 
 People who speak a different language 
 People of a different religion 
 Immigrants/foreign workers 
 People of a different race 
 
 
According to the World Values Survey data, the most tolerant nation on earth 
according to the minimization of rejection rates of the four mentioned categories 
of neighbors is Uruguay, followed by Sweden; New Zealand; Spain; Trinidad 
and Tobago; Poland; Rwanda; Colombia; Chile and Australia. 
 
Uzbekistan, Morocco and Kazakhstan are nowadays ahead of Germany; and 
Pakistan, Qatar and Tunisia are more tolerant than the EU-member country 
Romania. Muslim countries such as Turkey (which is still ahead of the OECD-
member country South Korea), have still a poor performance. 
 
 
Table 5.12: Xenophobia rates in the world system, 2010-2014: rejecting 
different types of neighbors 
 
 
 Rejection 
rate in % 
Rejection 
rate in % 
Rejection 
rate in % 
Rejection 
rate in % 
Index of 
toleranc
e (0-1) 
 People who 
speak a 
different 
language 
People of 
a 
different 
religion 
Immigran
ts/foreign 
workers 
People of 
a 
different 
race 
Overall 
toleranc
e index 
Uruguay 2,50 2,90 1,70 1,60 0,993 
Sweden 3,20 3,70 3,50 2,80 0,971 
New Zealand 5,50 1,40 5,90 2,90 0,955 
Spain 3,10 3,10 7,50 4,80 0,949 
Trinidad and Tobago 6,70 2,90 6,80 1,50 0,943 
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Poland 3,20 4,60 7,20 5,50 0,939 
Rwanda 7,70 4,80 5,40 3,50 0,924 
Colombia 7,50 6,50 4,70 3,20 0,922 
Chile 5,40 5,80 7,60 5,60 0,917 
Australia 9,90 4,00 10,50 5,00 0,885 
Zimbabwe 6,90 7,10 13,70 8,10 0,863 
Slovenia 5,00 8,50 13,60 10,90 0,858 
China 6,60 9,20 12,20 10,50 0,852 
United States 12,90 3,40 13,60 5,60 0,851 
Taiwan 7,00 4,50 20,20 8,40 0,845 
Peru 10,90 12,30 10,70 9,30 0,820 
Netherlands 14,50 2,70 19,60 8,20 0,806 
Uzbekistan 7,10 15,10 12,30 14,00 0,806 
Mexico 14,10 15,60 11,60 10,20 0,776 
Morocco 11,30 18,90 10,80 13,80 0,767 
Kazakhstan 11,30 12,10 27,80 11,20 0,736 
Ukraine 11,60 15,00 19,30 16,90 0,733 
Germany 13,40 14,10 21,40 14,80 0,725 
Singapore 10,20 10,80 35,80 12,60 0,709 
Pakistan 12,00 23,80 20,90 15,70 0,689 
Qatar 9,80 11,60 46,00 8,80 0,681 
Tunisia 12,90 29,70 18,80 16,90 0,659 
Romania 16,70 19,10 21,30 23,50 0,642 
Russia 18,90 14,30 32,20 17,20 0,629 
Ghana 21,90 22,50 20,20 19,90 0,612 
Philippines 30,70 16,30 14,10 21,60 0,599 
Belarus 17,60 18,00 33,40 23,10 0,590 
Cyprus 14,40 20,10 35,50 24,80 0,586 
Nigeria 23,70 26,50 20,10 20,90 0,577 
Estonia 16,50 20,70 37,50 25,40 0,558 
Algeria 18,10 42,70 28,00 19,80 0,513 
Japan 19,90 32,60 36,30 22,30 0,499 
Armenia 16,20 56,60 18,40 31,80 0,451 
Kyrgyzstan 25,90 34,10 30,70 28,10 0,450 
Jordan 27,40 28,70 37,20 27,20 0,441 
Iraq 27,80 28,20 39,00 27,70 0,430 
 253 
Kuwait 28,90 29,00
26
 37,20 28,10 0,425 
Turkey 30,00 36,80 30,50 35,80 0,377 
Ecuador 34,20 32,10 34,60 34,50 0,358 
Lebanon 32,40 33,80 40,40 36,30 0,330 
South Korea 33,30 31,10 44,20 34,10 0,329 
Yemen 31,30 53,30 24,20 34,00 0,329 
Malaysia 29,20 30,30 59,70 31,30 0,306 
Azerbaijan 26,30 34,80 40,60 58,10 0,269 
The Occupied 
Palestinian 
Territories 
39,20 50,30 39,90 44,00 0,177 
Libya 39,30 54,10 59,00 55,10 0,028 
 
 
Table 5.13 and Maps 5.9 to 5.12 list the World Values Survey results for the 
average importance given by the global publics to democracy and the standard 
deviation of this indicator. Where the standard deviation is low, opinions on 
democracy – either way – are undivided, while high standard deviations indicate 
that the publics are – often bitterly – divided on the issue of democracy.  
 
Countries with an above than average importance assigned to democracy, and 
very high internal divisions on this issue are Tunisia; Mexico; Romania; 
Armenia and Yemen. While there is a general consensus that democracy is 
important, there are important dissenting voices. Nostalgia for past more 
authoritarian patterns of government can go hand in hand with economic 
discontent with present conditions. Countries with an above than average 
importance assigned to democracy, and very low internal divisions on this issue 
are the Netherlands; Egypt; Sweden; Turkey; and Cyprus. For anyone, 
attempting to turn back the clocks of history in such countries could result 
to be a very costly error. The recent introduction of internet censorship in 
Turkey would be just one example showing the relevance of this hypothesis. 
 
Countries with still a below than average importance assigned to democracy, but 
already very high internal divisions on the issue are Libya; Philippines; Qatar; 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories; and Russia. In these countries and 
                                                 
26
 To be able to work with the full number of countries with otherwise available data, we had 
to impute the missing observation for Kuwait for the variable “rejecting neighbors: of a 
different religion” from the closely correlating variable: “rejecting people of a different 
race”. Since the two variables correlate with each other to the tune of +0.87 (explained R^2 = 
75.21%), we used the linear OLS regression function  
 
y (religio-phobia) = 0.9644 * racism + 1.9079  
 
from Table 12.12 to arrive at the imputed value of 29.0% religio-phobic people in Kuwait. 
This is the only instance in this book that we use such an imputation. 
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territories, debates on the issue of democracy will surge, one way or the 
other. While the average importance assigned to democracy is still lower 
than the world average, the divisions on the issue are already very high, and 
unforeseen events could trigger a popular movement for more participation 
and democracy. Finally, countries with a below than average importance 
assigned to democracy, and very low internal divisions on this issue are 
Singapore; Rwanda; South Korea; Estonia; and Lebanon. One might expect that 
the current stagnation in the democratic development of the country will 
continue: publics don’t assign a great importance to democracy, and they are 
hardly divided on this issue.  
 
 
Table 5.13 and our maps also have another, more immediate and direct 
implication: the dire state of the support of democracy in many Western 
countries, currently hit by the economic crisis and austerity packages, and the 
surge of democracy in the Muslim world and the Arab world in particular. That 
Egypt is ahead of Germany, Uzbekistan ahead of the EU-members Poland and 
Spain, and a number of other Arab and Muslim countries in general ahead of the 
United States; and Qatar ahead of the EU-member Estonia with justification 
should be celebrated by the Arab and Muslim readership of this article. Such 
comparison could be continued endlessly, and it is time for our readers now to 
lay down this article and start to click: 
 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp  
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Table 5.13: The importance of democracy 
 
 
 Importance of 
democracy (1-10) 
standard 
deviation: 
importance of 
democracy 
Sweden 9,29 1,53 
Cyprus 9,15 1,60 
Uruguay 9,00 1,61 
Egypt 8,95 1,51 
Germany 8,94 1,70 
Taiwan 8,91 1,61 
Netherlands 8,87 1,40 
Australia 8,83 1,90 
Uzbekistan 8,79 1,77 
Zimbabwe 8,77 1,90 
New Zealand 8,73 1,94 
Poland 8,70 1,91 
Spain 8,64 1,61 
Kazakhstan 8,62 1,81 
Armenia 8,62 2,13 
Malaysia 8,61 1,63 
Trinidad and Tobago 8,61 2,09 
Turkey 8,57 1,58 
Romania 8,57 2,25 
Mexico 8,54 2,28 
Chile 8,53 1,95 
Ecuador 8,51 1,82 
Morocco 8,49 2,09 
Yemen 8,49 2,13 
Tunisia 8,46 2,38 
China 8,43 1,59 
Ghana 8,43 1,84 
United States 8,41 2,05 
Peru 8,39 2,08 
Qatar 8,34 2,49 
South Korea 8,31 1,82 
Estonia 8,30 1,93 
Jordan 8,29 2,07 
Japan 8,27 2,00 
Kuwait 8,17 2,37 
Colombia 8,13 2,24 
Libya 8,13 2,68 
Algeria 8,12 2,32 
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Slovenia 8,11 2,17 
Azerbaijan 8,08 2,02 
Philippines 8,04 2,56 
Lebanon 8,01 1,96 
Iraq 7,95 2,13 
Kyrgyzstan 7,89 2,20 
Nigeria 7,86 1,99 
Pakistan 7,85 2,07 
Ukraine 7,83 2,35 
The Occupied Palestinian 
Territories 
7,78 2,44 
Rwanda 7,69 1,78 
Singapore 7,65 1,58 
Belarus 7,48 2,24 
Russia 7,42 2,42 
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Map 5.9: The importance of democracy (1-10) – World Values Survey, Wave 6, 2010-2014 
 
7,42
7,65
7,89
8,12
8,36
8,59
8,82
9,06
9,29
9,52
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
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Map 5.10: The importance of democracy (1-10) – World Values Survey, Wave 6, 2010-2014 – close-up for the Middle-
East region 
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Map 5.11: Where the value of democracy is weakly or strongly contested: standard deviations of the importance, 
assigned by publics to democracy (1-10) – World Values Survey, Wave 6, 2010-2014  
 
1,40
1,56
1,72
1,88
2,04
2,20
2,36
2,52
2,68
2,84
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
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Map 5.12: Where the value of democracy is weakly or strongly contested: standard deviations of the importance, 
assigned by publics to democracy (1-10) – World Values Survey, Wave 6, 2010-2014 - – close-up for the Middle-East 
region 
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